of a prolonged conflict of the Valencia tribunal with the alcalde of Consentaina. This finally produced obedience and the Suprema transmitted the royal order to Valencia with instructions for its observance.[1232]
MODERATION UNDER THE RESTORATION
While this doubtless diminished the exasperation of these conflicts, it did not check their frequency. They continued to be a constant source of trouble and it was from a desire to diminish this, as well as to extend its authority, that the Suprema, in 1806, forbade the tribunals from instituting them without submitting the case to it and receiving its approval.[1233] When, under the Restoration, the Inquisition was revived, in 1814, the officials naturally claimed the fuero, active and passive, civil and criminal, and Fernando VII, in the decision of a case carried up to him from Seville, announced, February 15, 1815, in no uncertain tones, that they should be protected in its enjoyment, but the cases appear to be rare and the aggressive spirit had disappeared.[1234] When, in Seville, the creditors of Francisco de Paula Esquivol complained of him to the tribunal, in place of defending him, it promptly dismissed him, June 27, 1815, an action which was confirmed by the Suprema.[1235] Even more significant was a case, in 1816, when in Seville Lorenzo Ayllon abused a priest while celebrating mass and endeavored to seize the sacrament, and the secular authorities arrested and proceeded to try him. In such a case there could be no question as to the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, but there was no disturbance, and when the tribunal claimed his transfer to the secret prison the Suprema interposed and ordered that he should be allowed to remain in the public gaol, a detainer being lodged to prevent his discharge during his trial—a concession to the royal jurisdiction which would have petrified Pacheco or Arce y Reynoso.[1236]
There was the same disposition to avoid coming to extremes with the spiritual courts. In 1816 the provisor of the see of Tuy prosecuted Joseph Metzcler for impious, execrable and sacrilegious blasphemies. The tribunal of Santiago applied, in a courteous note, to the provisor for the papers and received a reply without signature. This the Suprema directed it to return and explain that there was no desire to invade the episcopal jurisdiction, but as the blasphemous propositions and acts of Metzcler might be heretical, of which the Inquisition had exclusive cognizance, it must insist on seeing the evidence to extract what appertained to it, after which the papers would be returned. It seems to have obtained the evidence for, on October 15, 1817, it voted to imprison Metzcler, as soon as his trial by the provisor should be ended, but the Suprema instructed it not to wait for this, as the jurisdiction of the Inquisition was privileged.[1237]
There was one peculiarly irritating feature in the position of the Inquisition in these quarrels, which exacerbated them greatly and often neutralized all efforts to maintain harmony—the power which it arrogated to itself of refusing to form competencias on the ground that its rights were too clear to admit of debate. Thus it held that the salaried and titular officials, with their families and servants, were so wholly beyond all secular jurisdiction that it refused to entertain any proceedings in contest of their claims. It was in vain that Philip III, by a royal letter of 1615, declared that if inquisitors refused a conference, on the ground that the matter was too clear to justify it, the regent of the chancellery should form a competencia and forward the papers as usual.[1238] It was equally useless for Philip IV to decree, in 1630, that when a contention was started by either party, the other must entertain it, no matter how clear it might be, under pain, for a first offence, of five hundred ducats and, for a second, of suspension during the royal pleasure. To ensure the imposition of the fine, each Council was to give the other faculties for its collection from offenders, but, when the Suprema forwarded this decree to the tribunals, with orders for its strict observance, it added significantly that it did not apply to cases of salaried and titular officials, though no such exception was made in the decree. It knew that Philip would never summon courage to enforce his law and it was right. When, in 1633, the Council of Aragon endeavored to collect such a fine, the Suprema interposed, asserting that it could only be done by consent of both Councils, which was, in effect, to invalidate the law, and Philip himself violated it, in 1634, when Augustin Vidal, messenger of the tribunal of Valencia, was arrested by the royal court for the murder of Juan Alonso Martínez, a Knight of Santiago and Bayle of Alicante. The tribunal demanded him and refused a competencia, when Philip weakly ordered him to be surrendered “for this time and without prejudice to my royal jurisdiction.”[1239]
REFUSAL OF COMPETENCIAS
The Inquisition carried its point. Philip, by decisions of 1645 and 1658, admitted that there could be no competencias in the case of salaried officials and the Suprema enforced these decisions by a carta acordada of August 7, 1662, pointing out that they must not be entertained where such officials were concerned; at the same time tribunals were warned to exercise moderation and not to employ censures without consulting it, unless delay was inadmissible.[1240] Even Philip however had to intervene against the consequences of his own acts, in 1664, when the portero of the tribunal of Logroño killed in his house a priest, apparently through jealousy. The alcalde mayor prosecuted the murderer and arrested his wife; the tribunal excommunicated the alcalde and cast an interdict on the town. The Council of Aragon formed a competencia and claimed that during it the censures should be raised according to custom, but the Suprema refused on the ground that there could be no competencia. Philip was appealed to and ordered the censures raised for the unanswerable reason that as judges under excommunication could not hold their courts, if it were allowed thus to paralyze all judicial business it would have arbitrary control over all cases and frustrate all legal remedies.[1241] This decision was disregarded. It seems extraordinary that any community would endure for centuries the indefinite stoppage of the administration of justice, constantly occurring through the reckless abuse of the power of excommunication, as when, in 1672, we find the queen-regent applying to the inquisitor-general to know how she is to answer the complaints of the town of Logroño at the prolonged suspension of the powers of the corregidor who lay under excommunication, seeing that there is no conclusion of the competencia which has been so long pending.[1242]
The Inquisition evidently aggravated as far as it could the public distress as a means of establishing its claims. In an effort to limit the abuse of refusing competencias, there was a junta formed, in 1679, from the Suprema and Council of State with the assistance of some theologians. This admitted that there could be no competencia in the cases of salaried officials, except when they held public office and were prosecuted for malfeasance, but it laid down the rule that, when the Suprema refused a competencia, the Council of State could appeal to the king who could appoint a junta to decide this secondary question. A limited time was allowed to the Suprema to state its reasons for refusal and during a competencia the accused was to be liberated on bail and all censures were to be raised.[1243] This removed some of the hardships, but the Suprema seems to have sought to evade it by sullenly refusing to form the juntas with the Royal Councils, for another decree of Carlos II ordered it to attend when summoned so that these affairs might be settled.[1244] It was in vain that, in 1730, the Council of Castile urged that competencias be admitted in all cases, for Philip V decided that the agreement of 1679 should stand.[1245] Probably not much was gained in the latest attempt to settle these perennial quarrels by Carlos IV in 1804, who ordered that when a conflict arose between a royal court and a tribunal, in a matter not of faith concerning an official, the court should refer the case to the governor of the Royal Council and the tribunal to the Suprema. These should then select an examiner who was to report to the Secretaría de Gracia y Justicia for the royal decision.[1246]
PROTRACTED DELAYS
The evils of the system were admitted on all hands, but it was so vicious in principle that remedies were impossible. The customary juntas of two members each from the Suprema and the Council of Castile or of Aragon was at best a clumsy device, onerous on the Councils and usually leading only to procrastination. To systematize it, in 1625, a permanent Junta Grande de Competencias was formed of two members from each Council, whose duty it should be to despatch all cases, and rules for it were framed in April, 1626, but it was short-lived. In 1634 Philip IV ordered the formation of a junta of two members each of the Suprema and Council of Castile to formulate a plan of relief, but, on June 9th of that year, the Suprema reported that it had never been able to accomplish
