the tenure of the premiership has been divided approximately equally between peers and commoners, but the apportionment of cabinet seats between the two houses has been extremely variable. The first cabinet of the reign of George III. contained fourteen members, thirteen of whom had seats in the House of Lords, and, in general, throughout the eighteenth century the peers were apt greatly to preponderate. With the growth in importance of the House of Commons, however, and especially after the Reform Act of 1832, the tendency was to draw an ever increasing proportion of the cabinet officers from the chamber in which lies the storm center of English politics. By legal stipulation one of the secretaries of state must sit in the upper house; and the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord Chancellor, and the Lord President of the Council are all but invariably peers. Beyond this, there is no positive requirement, in either law or custom. In the ministries of recent times the number of peers and of commoners has generally been not far from equal. To fill the various posts the premier must bring together the best men he can secure—not necessarily the ablest, but those who will work together most effectively—with but secondary regard to the question of whether they sit in the one or the other of the legislative houses. A department whose chief sits in the Commons is certain to be represented in the Lords by an under-secretary or other spokesman, and vice versa.[95]
72. Political Solidarity.—A second fundamental principle which dominates the structure of the cabinet is that which requires that the members be men of one political faith. William III. sought to govern with a cabinet in which there were both Whigs and Tories, but the result was confusion and the experiment was abandoned. Except during the ascendancy of Walpole, the cabinets of the eighteenth century very generally embraced men of more or less diverse political affiliations, but gradually the conviction took root that in the interest of unity and efficiency the political solidarity of the cabinet group is indispensable. The last occasion upon which it was proposed to make up a cabinet from utterly diverse political elements was in 1812. The scheme was rejected, and from that day to this cabinets have been composed regularly, not necessarily of men identified with a common political party, but at least of men who are in substantial agreement upon the larger questions of policy and who have expressed their willingness to co-operate in the carrying out of a given programme of action. The fundamental requisite is unity. A Liberal Unionist may occupy a post in a Conservative cabinet and a Laborite in a Liberal administration, but he may not oppose the Government upon any important question and expect to continue a member of it, save by the express permission of the premier. It is the obligation of every cabinet member to agree, or to appear to agree, with his colleagues. If he is unable to do this, no course is open to him save resignation.
73. Other Considerations Determining Appointment.—In the selection of his colleagues the premier works under still other practical restrictions. One of them is the well-established rule that surviving members of the last cabinet of the party, in so far as they are in active public life and desirous of appointment, shall be given prior consideration. Members of the party, furthermore, who have come into special prominence and influence in Parliament must usually be included. In truth, as Bagehot points out, the premier's independent choice is apt to find scope not so much in the determination of the cabinet's personnel as in the distribution of offices among the members selected; and even here he will often be obliged to subordinate his wishes to the inclinations, susceptibilities, and capacities of his prospective colleagues. In the expressive simile of Lowell, the premier's task is "like that of constructing a figure out of blocks which are too numerous for the purpose, and which are not of shapes to fit perfectly together."[96]
VII. The Cabinet in Action
74. Ministerial Responsibility.—In its actual operation the English cabinet system involves the unvarying application of three principles: (1) the responsibility of cabinet ministers to Parliament; (2) the non-publicity of cabinet proceedings; and (3) the close co-ordination of the cabinet group under the leadership of the premier. Every minister whether or not in the cabinet, is responsible individually to Parliament, which in effect means to the House of Commons, for all of his public acts. If he is accorded a vote of censure he must retire. In the earlier eighteenth century the resignation of a cabinet officer did not affect the tenure of his colleagues, the first of cabinets to retire as a unit being that of Lord North in 1782. Subsequently, however, the ministerial body so developed in compactness that in relation to the outside world, and even to Parliament, the individual officer came to be effectually subordinated to the group. Not since 1866 has a cabinet member retired singly in consequence of an adverse parliamentary vote. If an individual minister falls into serious disfavor one of two things almost certainly happens. Either the offending member is persuaded by his colleagues to modify his course or to resign before formal parliamentary censure shall have been passed, or the cabinet as a whole rallies to the support of the minister in question and stands or falls with him. This is but another way of saying that, in practice, the responsibility of the cabinet is collective rather than individual, a condition by which the seriousness and effectiveness of it are vastly increased. This responsibility covers the entire range of acts of the executive department of the government, whether regarded as acts of the crown or of the ministers themselves, and it constitutes the most distinctive feature of the English parliamentary system. Formerly the only means by which ministers could be held to account by Parliament was that of impeachment. With the development, however, of the principle of ministerial responsibility as a necessary adjunct to parliamentary government, the occasional and violent process of impeachment was superseded by continuous, inescapable, and pacific legislative supervision. The impeachment of cabinet ministers may be regarded, indeed, as obsolete.
75. How a Ministry may Be Overthrown.—A fundamental maxim of the constitution to-day is that a cabinet shall continue in office only so long as it enjoys the confidence and support of a majority in the House of Commons. There are at least four ways in which a parliamentary majority may manifest its dissatisfaction with a cabinet, and so compel its resignation. It may pass a simple vote of "want of confidence," assigning therefor no definite reason. It may pass a vote of censure, criticising the cabinet for some specific act. It may defeat a measure which the cabinet advocates and declares to be of vital importance. Or it may pass a bill in opposition to the advice of the ministers. The cabinet is not obliged to give heed to an adverse vote in the Lords; but when any of the four votes indicated is carried in the lower chamber the premier and his colleagues must do one of two things—resign or appeal to the country. If it is clear that the cabinet has lost the support, not only of Parliament, but also of the electorate, the only honorable course for the ministry is that of resignation. If, on the other hand, there is doubt as to whether the parliamentary majority really represents the country upon the matters at issue, the ministers are warranted in requesting the sovereign to dissolve Parliament and to order a general election. In such a situation the ministry continues tentatively in office. If at the elections there is returned a majority disposed to support the ministers, the cabinet is given a new lease of life. If, on the other hand, the new parliamentary majority is adverse, no course is open to the ministry save to retire. The new parliament will be convoked at the earliest practicable date; but in advance of its assembling the defeated cabinet will generally have resigned and a new government, presided over by the leader of the late Opposition, will have assumed the reins. During the interval required for the transfer of power none save routine business is likely to be undertaken.
76. Secrecy of Proceedings.—Perpetually responsible to the House of Commons and imperatively obligated to resign collectively when no longer able to command a working majority in that body, the cabinet must at all times employ every device by which it may be enabled to present a solid and imposing front. Two such devices are those of secrecy and the leadership of the premier. It is a sufficiently familiar principle that a group of men brought together to agree upon and execute a common policy in behalf of a widespread and diverse constituency will be more likely to succeed if the differences that must inevitably appear within their ranks are not published to the world. It is in deference to this principle that the German Bundesrath transacts its business to this day behind closed doors, and it was for an analogous reason that the public was excluded from the sittings of the convention by which the present constitution of the United
