three. The first is that of criticism, involving the habitual scrutiny and control of the measures of the executive and administrative organs. The second is the exercise, under limitations to be described, of the power of judicature. The third, and much the most important, is the function of public and private legislation and of fiscal control.
135. Criticism: Ministerial Responsibility.—Parliament does not govern and is not intended to govern. Never save when the Long Parliament undertook the administration of public affairs through committees of its members has Parliament asserted a disposition to gather immediately into its own hands those powers of state which are executive in character. At the same time, the growth of parliamentary government has meant the establishment of a connection between the executive and the parliamentary chambers (principally the Commons) as close as may be so long as separateness of organization is still maintained. The officials who comprise the working executive are invariably members of Parliament. They initiate public measures, introduce them, advocate and defend them, and, in general, guide and control the conduct of public business both inside and outside the chambers. But for every act they are responsible directly to the House of Commons. They may continue in power only so long as they are supported by a majority in that chamber. And their conduct is subject continually to review and criticism, through the instrumentality of questions, formal inquiries, and, if need be, judicial procedure.
It is within the competence of any member to address a question to any minister of the crown who is also a member, to obtain information. Except in special cases, notice of questions must be given at least one day in advance, and a period of approximately three-quarters of an hour is set apart at four sittings every week for the asking and answering of such questions. A minister may answer or decline to answer, but unless a declination can be shown to arise from legitimate considerations of public interest its effect politically may be embarrassing. In any event, there is no debate, and in this respect the English practice differs from the French "interpellation."[186] The asking of questions is liable to abuse but, as is pointed out by Ilbert, "there is no more valuable safeguard against maladministration, no more effective method of bringing the searchlight of criticism to bear on the action or inaction of the executive government and its subordinates. A minister has to be constantly asking himself, not merely whether his proceedings and the proceedings of those for whom he is responsible are legally or technically defensible, but what kind of answer he can give if questioned about them in the House, and how that answer will be received."[187] Any member is privileged to bring forward a motion censuring the Government or any member or department thereof, and a motion of this sort, when emanating from the leader of the Opposition, constitutes a vote of confidence upon whose result may depend the continued tenure of the ministry. By a call upon the Government or a given department for information, by the constitution of parliamentary committees, departmental committees, or royal commissions, and, in particular by taking advantage of the numberless opportunities afforded by the enactment of appropriation bills, the House of Commons may further impose upon the executive the most thoroughgoing responsibility and control. "A strong executive government, tempered and controlled by constant, vigilant, and representative criticism," is the ideal at which the parliamentary institutions of Great Britain are aimed.[188]
136. Judicial Powers: Impeachment and Attainder.—The functions of a judicial character which, in the capacity of the High Court of Parliament, the two chambers fulfill are of secondary importance and do not call for extended discussion. So far as the law of the subject goes, they comprise (1) the powers possessed by each of the houses to deal with the constitution and conduct of its own membership; (2) the power of the Lords to try their own members when charged with treason or felony; (3) the jurisdiction of the Lords in the capacity of a final court of appeal for the United Kingdom; (4) the power of the two houses, acting jointly, to carry through impeachments of public officers and to enact bills of attainder; and (5) the effecting of the removal of certain kinds of public officers through the agency of an address from both houses to the crown. In days when the king and the ministers were disposed to defy the law and to evade responsibility the power of impeachment by the Commons at the bar of the Lords, originated as early as the reign of Edward III., was of the utmost importance. When, however, the House of Commons progressed in competence to the point where it was able to review and control the conduct of ministers with such thoroughness and continuity as to make it impossible for them to conduct business without a parliamentary majority, impeachment lost its value and fell into disuse. The last occasion upon which impeachment proceedings were instituted was in 1805.[189] Procedure by bill of attainder, arising from the legislative omnipotence of Parliament and following the ordinary course of legislation, is also obsolete.
137. The House of Lords as a Court.—Most important among surviving parliamentary functions of a judicial character is the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the House of Lords. The judicial authority of the Lords is an anomaly, although as it is actually exercised it does not seriously contravene the principle which forbids the bringing together of judicial and legislative powers in the same hands. Historically, it arose from a confusion of the functions of two groups of men which were long largely identical in personnel, i.e., the Great Council, on the one hand, and the Lords of Parliament, on the other. In the reign of Henry IV. the Commons asked specifically to be relieved from judicial business, and the parliamentary jurisdiction which survived was recognized thereafter to be vested in the House of Lords alone. From an early date this jurisdiction was, as it is to-day, both original and appellate. As a court of first instance the chamber acquired the right to try peers charged with treason and felony and, on the accusation of the House of Commons, to bring to justice, through the process of impeachment, offenders who were not of the peerage. Nowadays these powers are of no practical consequence.
The position of the Lords as an appellate tribunal, however, is still a fundamental fact in the judicial system. Starting with control, by way of appeal, over the courts of common law in England, the chamber acquired in time a similar control over the English courts of chancery, and eventually over the courts of both Scotland and Ireland. Its jurisdiction has stopped short only of the ecclesiastical courts, and of the courts of the outlying portions of the Empire, appeals from which are heard in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. By the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, whereby the higher tribunals of the realm were remodelled, the appellate jurisdiction of the Lords was abolished outright; but in 1876, before the measure had been put in operation the plan was modified and there was passed the Appellate Jurisdiction Act whereby the appellate functions of the Lords were restored and provision was made for the creation at first of two, later of three, and eventually of four, salaried life peers, to be selected from men of eminence in the law, and to be known as Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. In so far as it is controlled by statute at all, the appellate jurisdiction of the chamber is regulated to-day by this measure. Nominally, judicial business is transacted by the House as a whole, and every member has a right not only to be present but to participate in the rendering of decisions. Actually, such business is transacted by a little group of law lords (the attendance of but three being necessary) under the presidency of the Lord Chancellor, and the unwritten rule which prohibits the presence at judicial sessions of any persons save the law lords is quite as strictly observed as is any one of a score of other important conventions of the constitution.[190] Under the act of 1876 it is within the competence of the law lords to sit and to pronounce judgments in the name of the House at any time, regardless of whether Parliament is in session.[191] A sitting of the Court is, technically, a sitting of the Lords, and all actions taken are entered in the Journal of the House as a part of its proceedings.[192]
138. Control of Legislation and Finance.—The principal and altogether most indispensable ends which Parliament to-day subserves are those of legislation and of financial control. Many of the measures, important and unimportant, under which the affairs of the realm are regulated are but temporary and require annual re-enactment, and the volume of fresh legislation which is unceasingly demanded is all but limitless. Similarly, to employ the words of Anson, the revenues which accrue to the crown and can be dealt with independently of Parliament would hardly carry on the business of government for a day,[193] and not only does Parliament (in effect, the House of Commons) by its appropriation acts make possible the legal
