The Stoics did not perplex themselves with the in-soluble question of the origin and nature of matter.[C] Antoninus also assumes a beginning of things, as we now know them; but his language is sometimes very obscure. I have endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult passage (vii. 75, and the note).
[A] As to the word οὐσία, the reader may see the Index. I add here a few examples of the use of the word; Antoninus has (v. 24), ἡ συμπᾶσα οὐσία, "the universal substance." He says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), "there is one common substance" οὐσία, distributed among countless bodies. In Stobaeus (tom. 1, lib. 1, tit. 14) there is this definition, οὐσίαν δέ φασίν τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην. In viii. II, Antoninus speaks of τὸ οὐσίῶδες καὶ ὑλίκόν, "the substantial and the material;" and (vii. 10) he says that "everything material" (ἔνυλον) disappears in the substance of the whole (τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία). The οὐσία is the generic name of that existence which we assume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive no existence which can be coordinated with it and none above it. It is the philosopher's "substance:" it is the ultimate expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the basis, the being of a thing. "From the Divine, which is substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and everything that is created exists" (Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 198).
[B] I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, that all these general terms involve a contradiction. The "one and all," and the like, and "the whole," imply limitation. "One" is limited; "all" is limited; the "whole" is limited. We cannot help it. We cannot find words to express that which we cannot fully conceive. The addition of "absolute" or any other such word does not mend the matter. Even the word God is used by most people, often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation is implied, and yet at the same time words are added which are intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was asked what God was, is said to have answered that God has no name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. 6), "the names Father, God, Creator, Lord, and Master are not names, but appellations derived from benefactions and acts." (Compare Seneca, De Benef. iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of a thing, or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without an adequate notion of it, "adequate" meaning coextensive and coequal with the thing. We have a notion of limited space derived from the dimensions of what we call a material thing, though of space absolute, if I may use the term, we have no notion at all; and of infinite space the notion is the same—no notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, though I know not how, and we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot conceive it to be finite.
[C] The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. We derive the notion of space from matter and form. But we have no adequate conception either of matter or space. Matter in its ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what men call mind, spirit, or by whatever other name they may express the power which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid down the distinction between intelligence (νοϋς) and matter, and he said that intelligence impressed motion on matter, and so separated the elements of matter and gave them order; but he probably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a foundation of his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said, "The universe always existed." He had no idea of what is called creation. Ocellus Lucanus (i, § 2) maintained that the Universe (τοπαν) was imperishable and uncreated. Consequently it is eternal. He admitted the existence of God; but his theology would require some discussion. On the contrary, the Brachmans, according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that the universe was created and perishable; and the creator and administrator of it pervades the whole. The author of the book of Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 17): "Thy Almighty hand made the world of matter without form," which may mean that matter existed already.
The common Greek word which we translate "matter" is ϋλη. It is the stuff that things are made of.
Matter consists of elemental parts (στοίχεῖα) of which all material objects are made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature of the universe, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36), "loves nothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make new things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion." All things then are in a constant flux and change; some things are dissolved into the elements, others come in their places; and so the "whole universe continues ever young and perfect" (xii. 23).
Antoninus has some obscure expressions about what he calls "seminal principles" (σπερματίκοὶ λόγοί). He opposes them to the Epicurean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his "seminal principles" are not material atoms which wander about at hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In one passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, souls (ψυχαὶ) after the dissolution of their bodies being received into the "seminal principle of the universe." Schultz thinks that by "seminal principles Antoninus means the relations of the various elemental principles, which relations are determined by the Deity and by which alone the production of organized beings is possible." This may be the meaning; but if it is, nothing of any value can be derived from it.[A] Antoninus often uses the word "Nature" (φύσις), and we must attempt to fix its meaning, The simple etymological sense of φύσις is "production," the birth of what we call Things. The Romans used Natura, which also means "birth" originally. But neither the Greeks nor the Romans stuck to this simple meaning, nor do we. Antoninus says (x. 6): "Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or Nature [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature." Here it might seem as if nature were personified and viewed as an active, efficient power; as something which, it not independent of the Deity, acts by a power which is given to it by the Deity. Such, if I understand the expression right, is the way in which the word Nature is often used now, though it is plain that many writers use the word without fixing any exact meaning to it. It is the same with the expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may use in an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite sense at all. There is no meaning in this word Nature, except that which Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, "The only distinct meaning of that word Natural is Stated, Fixed, or Settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i.e., to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it at once." This is Plato's meaning (De Leg., iv. 715) when he says that God holds the beginning and end and middle of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his course, making his circuit according to nature (that is by a fixed order); and he is continually accompanied by justice, who punishes those who deviate from the divine law, that is, from the order or course which God observes.
[A] Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the words κατὰ σπερματικοῦ λόγου μέρος, where he is speaking of the Stoics; but he uses this expression in a peculiar sense (note II). The early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, and their writings show that the contest was begun between the Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. Even in the second Epistle of St. Peter (ii. I, v. 4) we find a Stoic expression, ἴνα διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας κοίνωνοὶ φύσεως.
When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death, we observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and invariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of phenomena,
