fermenting in mobs, prepares the mob mind for the direct suggestion impelling otherwise law-abiding citizens to atrocities. Another more insidious and potentially more dangerous result is the slow accumulation of feeling which builds between the white and Negro the strongest barrier of race prejudice.
Police.—There has been much criticism of the manner in which the riot was handled by the authorities, but it may be pointed out that the riot was not quelled until at least four groups of peace guardians had taken part in handling it. The two most important groups were the police and the militia; the others were composed of deputy sheriffs and Negro ex-soldiers.
Testimony before the coroner's jury and in hearings before this Commission throws considerable light on the actions of the Police Department as a whole during the riot, its methods in meeting the unusual situation, and on the conduct of individual policemen. First-hand information and opinion was obtained from Chief of Police Garrity and State's Attorney Hoyne.
The police had two severe handicaps at the outset of the rioting. The first, as declared by Chief Garrity, was lack of sufficient numbers adequately to cope with the situation. The coroner's jury found that "the police force should be enlarged. It is too small to cope with the needs of Chicago." The grand jury added: "The police force is also inadequate in numbers, and at least one thousand (1,000) officers should be added to the existing force." This number approximates the need urged by Chief Garrity, who, when asked before the Commission as to the sufficiency of his force, answered: "No. I haven't sufficient force. I haven't got a sufficient force now to properly police the city of Chicago by one-third." Militia officers and other police officials held the same general opinion.
The second handicap, distrust of white policemen by all Negroes, while implied and not admitted by Chief Garrity, was frankly explained by State's Attorney Hoyne. He said before the Commission: "There is no doubt that a great many police officers were grossly unfair in making arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses committed by white men while they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could get."
Leaders among the Negroes clearly indicate that discrimination in arrest was a principal cause of widespread and long-standing distrust. Whether justified or not, this feeling was actual and bitter. This distrust had grown seriously during the six months preceding the riot because no arrests were made in bombing cases. State's Attorney Hoyne said before the commission: "I don't know of a single case where the police have apprehended any man who has blown up a house."
Charles S. Duke, a well-educated and fair-minded Negro, gave his reaction to the bombings when he said that he did not "believe a Negro would have been allowed to go unpunished five minutes." Mrs. Clarke, Negro, said her house was bombed three times, once while a plain-clothes policeman was inside waiting for bombers, but no arrests were made. One suspect was put under surveillance but was not held.
The trial of the three Negro policemen before the Merit Committee of the Police Department because they refused to use the "Jim Crow" sleeping-quarters in a police station doubtless added to race feeling, particularly in view of the publicity it received in the "Black Belt."
Negro distrust of the police increased among the Negroes during the period of the riot. With each clash a new cause for suspicion seemed to spring up. The most striking instance occurred on the first afternoon when Policeman Callahan refused to arrest the white man whom the Negro crowd accused of causing the drowning of Williams, the Negro boy. This refusal has been called the beginning of the riot because it led to mob violence of grave consequences. However that may have been, the fact remains that this refusal was heralded broadcast by the Negroes as the kind of action they might expect from the police.
Typical of the minor tales which laid the foundation for the Negroes' bitterness toward this white policeman are the following:
1. Kin Lumpkin, Negro, was beaten by a mob on the "L" platform at Forty-seventh Street, as he was going home from work. The policeman arrested Lumpkin and had him booked for rioting. No other arrests were made. Lumpkin was held from July 28 to August 1.
2. Two policemen, one of them Officer McCarty of the Twenty-sixth Precinct, witnessed the beating of Wellington Dunmore, Negro, of 4120 South Campbell Avenue, but, according to the victim, refused to assist him.
3. John Slovall and brother, Negroes, were beaten and robbed by whites in sight of a white policeman. No arrests were made. The officer did not even call for aid.
4. While looking for his mother at Thirty-first and State streets on Tuesday, July 29, Wm. F. Thornton, Negro, 3207 South Park Avenue, asked a policeman to take him home. The officer took him to the police station and locked him up. Another Negro applied for protection, but the police searched him, clubbed him, and when he ran, the sergeant told another policeman to shoot him. The policeman obeyed and the man fell under the "L" station. He was picked up by the same patrol wagon that took Thornton to the Cottage Grove Police Station. The officer, Bundy, arrested Thornton.
NEGROES BEING ESCORTED BY POLICE TO SAFETY ZONE FROM THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF FORTY-EIGHTH STREET AND WENTWORTH AVENUE
SEARCHING NEGROES FOR ARMS IN POLICE STATION
A report on 229 Negroes and whites accused of various criminal activities disclosed the fact that 154 were Negroes and seventy-five were whites. The state's attorney reported eighty-one indictments against Negroes and forty-seven against whites after all riot cases were cleared up. These figures show that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were indicted as whites.
At first glance these figures indicate greater riot activity on the part of Negroes, and therefore one would expect to find twice as many whites injured as Negroes. But out of a total of 520 injured persons whose race was definitely reported, 342 were Negroes and 178 whites. The fact that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were injured as whites suggests the conclusion that whites were not apprehended as readily as Negroes.
Herman M. Adler, state criminologist of Illinois, testifying before the Commission, expressed the belief that the police showed much more readiness to arrest Negroes than whites because the officers thought they were "taking fewer chances if they 'soaked' a colored man."
Negro distrust of police and courts seems to have been confirmed by the action of the state's attorney's office in bringing only Negro riot cases before the grand jury. This body, however, took a stand for fair play and justice for both sides, and though its action may have been novel, it was effective. In its final report, the grand jury said:
This jury has no apology to offer for its attitude with reference to requesting the state's attorney to supply it with information of crimes perpetrated by whites against blacks before considering further evidence against blacks. This attitude gave rise to the reports in the press that this grand jury "had gone on a strike." As a matter of fact, its position was merely a suspension of hearing further cases of crimes committed by blacks against whites until the state's attorney submitted evidence concerning the various crimes committed by whites against blacks. The reason for this attitude arose from a sense of justice on the part of this jury. It is the opinion of this jury that the colored people suffered more at the hands of the white hoodlums than the white people suffered at the hands of the black hoodlums. Notwithstanding this fact, the cases presented to this jury against the blacks far outnumber those against the whites.
State's Attorney Hoyne justified this action by saying that the Police Department brought in Negroes only, and until they arrested whites, he was limited to proceedings against Negroes.
