The Negro in Chicago - A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot. Chicago Commission on Race Relations

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The Negro in Chicago - A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot - Chicago Commission on Race Relations

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portion of those who are already here." The notice read further: "This is not a protest against the Negro who has long been a resident of East St. Louis, and is a law abiding citizen."

      This meeting was held on May 28 in the auditorium of the city hall and was attended not only by the labor men but also by a large number of other persons. The Congressional Committee refers to one of the speakers at this meeting as "an attorney of some ability and no character." The report of the Committee says that he virtually advised the killing of Negroes and burning of their homes. The report says further:

      He was not authorized to speak for those who went there to protest against the lawlessness which disgraced the city and the presence of thousands of Negroes who it is claimed were taking the places of the white workmen, but his inflammatory speech caused many of his hearers to rush into the street and to resort to acts of violence. … He was in full sympathy with the action of the mob. They followed his advice and the scenes of murder and arson that ensued were the logical result of his utterances.

      That night, May 28, following the meeting, a crowd of white people assembled in front of the police station and clamored for Negro prisoners. A rumor circulated through the crowd that a white man had just been killed by Negroes, and parts of the crowd left, forming a mob which severely beat a number of Negroes whom it met. The situation was so serious that the mayor called for troops. The trouble subsided, however. It is important to note that from this time until the riot of July 1–2, no effort was made to strengthen the police force nor were any other steps taken to control the situation.

      In connection with the industrial phase of the situation, it should be remembered that the war had cut off the normal supply of foreign labor, and that not a few white workers had left East St. Louis for other industrial centers. Most of the Negro migrants were unskilled workers, and their competition was, therefore, with the unskilled white workers. One witness before the Congressional Committee expressed the view that the labor shortage in East St. Louis prior to the riot certainly did not justify the great influx of Negroes, but it is of record that most of the newcomers got profitable employment in unskilled occupations.

      The employers were fighting unions of any sort, whether of whites or Negroes. Unions were seeking membership of Negroes as well as whites in the hope that the use of Negroes as strike breakers might be prevented. Whether union men or not, the white workers resented the influx of Negro workers who might take their jobs. The inevitable consequence was friction between whites and Negroes.

      The Congressional Committee laid great stress upon corrupt politics as the leading cause of the riots of July 2. It disclosed an almost unbelievable combination of shameless corruption, tolerance of vice and crime, maladministration, and debauchery of the courts. The report says that East St. Louis for many years was a plague spot, harboring within its borders "every offense in the calendar of crime" and committing openly "every lapse in morals and public decency." Politicians looted its treasury, gave away valuable franchises, and elected plunderers to high office. Graft, collusion with crime and vice, and desecration of office were openly and deliberately practiced. Criminals were attracted and welcomed, and the good people of the community were powerless. Owners of large corporations and manufacturers pitted white against black labor, giving no thought to their thousands of workmen living in hovels, the victims of "poverty and disease, of long hours and incessant labor."

      The mayor, continues the report, was a tool of dishonest politicians, the electorate was "debauched," the police were a conscienceless bunch of grafters, and the revenue of the city was largely derived from saloons and dens of vice.

      Several officials and politicians of high standing were singled out by the Committee for especial condemnation as the "brains of the city's corruption."

      A great deal of the city's crime and vice was concentrated in what is known as "Black Valley." This was the section in which the Negroes lived, but much of the vice and crime was promoted and practiced by vicious whites. There was much mixing of whites and Negroes in the vilest practices.

      Similar conditions existed in the town of Brooklyn near by, with about 3,000 people, of whom only about fifty were white. Its dens of iniquity were notorious and were the resort of many white people. So openly operated were these resorts that the Congressional Committee reported that in the Brooklyn high school "24 out of 25 girls who were in the graduating class went to the bad in the saloons and dance halls and failed to receive their diplomas."

      Not only were conditions of this sort demoralizing and degrading for the decent Negroes, but the sanitary conditions were likewise extremely bad. Some of the houses in the Negro districts had not been painted for fifteen years and were in a state of great disrepair. Their setting consisted largely of pools of stagnant water and beds of weeds. At one period during the migration Negroes were coming in so fast that even these miserable housing conditions were inadequate, and some of them were forced to live in sheds. In one instance sixty-nine newcomers were found living in one small house. Whenever houses were vacated by white people and rented to Negroes, the rental price was largely increased, sometimes doubled.

      After reviewing the corruption in East St. Louis, the report of the Congressional Committee discussed the riot. It described the condition of affairs on the night of July 1, 1917, when the second and most serious outbreak occurred. An automobile (some witnesses said two) went through the Negro section of the city, its occupants firing promiscuously into homes. This aroused fierce resentment among the Negroes, who organized for defense and armed themselves with guns. The ringing of the church bell, a prearranged signal for assembling, drew a crowd of them, and they marched through the streets ready to avenge the attack. A second automobile filled with white men crossed their path. The Negroes cursed them, commanded them to drive on, and fired a volley into the machine. The occupants, however, were not the rioters but policemen and reporters. One policeman was killed and another was so seriously wounded that he died later.

      Thousands viewed the riddled car standing before police headquarters. The early editions of the newspapers gave full accounts of the tragedy, and on July 2 the rioting began. Negro mobs shot white men, and white men and boys, girls and women, began to attack every Negro in sight. News spread rapidly and, as excitement increased, unimaginable depredations and horrible tortures were committed and viewed with "placid unconcern" by hundreds. Negro men were stabbed, clubbed, and hanged from telephone poles. Their homes were burned. Women and children were not spared. An instance is given of a Negro child two years old which was shot and thrown into a doorway of a burning building.

      On the night of July 1, Mayor Mollman telephoned to the Adjutant General of Illinois saying that the police were no longer able to handle the situation and requesting that the militia be sent. Both the police and the militia are severely censured by the Congressional report for gross failure to do their duty. The police, says the report, could have quelled the riot instantly, but instead they either "fled into the safety of cowardly seclusion or listlessly watched the depredations of the mob, passively and in many instances actively sharing in the work."

      In all, five companies of the Illinois National Guard were sent to East St. Louis. Some of them arrived on the morning of July 2, the first at 8:40 a.m. These forces were in command of Colonel S. O. Tripp. Concerning the conduct of the militia, the Congressional Committee reported in strong terms, singling out Colonel Tripp for especial condemnation. It said that he was a hindrance instead of a help to the troops; that "he was ignorant of his duties, blind to his responsibilities and deaf to every intelligent appeal that was made to him."

      The troops, in the estimation of the Committee, were poorly officered and in only a few cases did their duty. The report states that "they seemed moved by the same spirit of indifference or cowardice that marked the conduct of the police force. As a rule they fraternized with the mob, joked with them and made no serious effort to restrain them."

      Many instances are given of active participation and encouragement of the mob in its murders, arson, and general

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