socio-economic revolution.
Since 2003 the debate has continued but in a more subdued and nuanced fashion. While rejecting the ‘presidential’ thesis, most contributors have accepted that the Prime Minister’s role has been strengthened (e.g. Heffernan, 2005; Dowding, 2012). The resulting scholarship has enhanced understanding of British politics in general, but it still reflects the preoccupation of political scientists with definitions, models and institutional comparisons. It is a common refrain in the academic literature that the role of the Prime Minister is still ‘under-theorized’. It could be argued to the contrary that much of the work on the Prime Minister emanating from political scientists suffers from an excess of theory, being conducted within analytical frameworks which downplay other considerations (in particular, Britain’s relative decline as a global power, and the influence of the media; see Rose, 2001)), and draws too heavily on formal interviews tinged (even tainted) by hindsight, rather than contemporary media reports or the published diaries of key participants.
While the core executive approach is a valuable corrective to the notion that the Prime Minister can govern without co-operation of some kind, this is an unavoidable feature even of undemocratic states and thus cannot shed much light on the way in which the role has developed since 1979 (Brown, 2010). The core executive model focuses on the distribution of power – that is, in simplistic terms, the ability to get things done, for which co-operation (willing or not) is obviously needed. In Britain, the realization of most policy objectives (better health care, higher standards of education, etc.) cannot possibly be effected by a single person, but depends on co-operation at all levels down to nurses and classroom teachers. The argument presented here is that a more relevant question relating to the Prime Minister is that of prominence, particularly in terms of electoral politics. This is much more compatible with a zero-sum game; if the front page of every newspaper features a photograph of the Prime Minister, his or her colleagues are being denied equal publicity, even if they are making more noteworthy contributions to governance.
A book which is more concerned with prominence than power is suggested by other developments in the academic literature. For example, Rod Rhodes and others have investigated developments within the British state, which in their view has been ‘hollowed out’ in recent decades (e.g. Rhodes, 1994; Campbell and Wilson, 1995). This seems difficult to square with the core executive model, since it implies that ministers and government departments have been losing their ability to effect constructive change and hence have fewer ‘resources’ at their disposal. On the face of it, this does look like a significant shift in the Whitehall power-game; if ministers have lost status and authority, the same is not true (at least directly) of the Prime Minister, who has no departmental responsibilities. If governmental capacity has weakened, more onus would be placed on the Prime Minister to create the impression of success, for vote-winning purposes. On a related theme, Patrick Diamond has argued persuasively that, having been seriously affected by the hollowing out of the state, civil servants now increasingly find themselves being ‘politicized’ – that is, working to enhance the popularity of the party in office, rather than pursuing what they conceive to be the national interest (Diamond, 2018). Looking back over the period since 1979, it is difficult not to hanker after the days in which departmental ministers and their civil servants really did enjoy ‘independent resources’; in terms of the ability to achieve constructive results (and to palm off responsibility when things go wrong) Prime Ministers themselves would be better off if this were still true.
It could be argued that too much of the political science literature on the British Prime Minister has been vitiated by disciplinary perspectives. If we cannot hope for ‘joined-up government’, we can at least aspire to joined-up thinking, approaching recent developments in the Prime Minister’s position without theoretical preconceptions. The changes in the role since Thatcher will become apparent to anyone who reads Harold Wilson’s contribution to the debate. In The Governance of Britain (1976), Wilson still felt able to describe the role of the British Prime Minister as ‘one of the most exciting and certainly one of the best organised’ positions in the democratic world (Wilson, 1976, x). If at least one of these claims is no longer true – and ‘well organised’ is not the term which immediately springs to mind in relation to any aspect of the contemporary British political system – inquiries into the most probable causes must be as broadly based as possible, and as free as humanly possible from any ‘mind-forged manacles’.
Rationale and structure of the book
The approach of this book reflects my view that attempts to draw on all of these sources, updated and reassessed at suitable intervals, can themselves serve as useful contributions to the subject, and that these exercises have been too rare. Ideally, books of this kind can be written in a way which informs the general reader as well as offering suggestions for students. The main purpose of this attempt is to provide evidence and analysis which allow all readers to draw their own conclusions about changes in the Prime Minister’s role since 1979. In the interests of brevity, and to de-clutter the text, I have tried to confine the references to occasions when particular works really need to be cited. The bibliography would have been much longer if it had included even a representative sample of the publications which have affected my views on this subject.
The remaining chapters of the book deal with various aspects of the Prime Minister’s role. The format is thematic, but within each of the themes the treatment is broadly chronological (normally beginning with Thatcher and ending with Theresa May – the early part of the Johnson premiership is discussed in the concluding chapter). There is no attempt to provide an exhaustive list of the Prime Minister’s resources, and some aspects of the position (e.g. its reliance in so many ways on prerogative powers, and responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons) do not figure prominently in the discussion compared to the invaluable works of scholars like Lord (Peter) Hennessy (see, for example, Hennessy, 2000, 102–46). The primary focus of the present study is on the factors which have allowed Prime Ministers to retain so many of the duties and privileges once assigned to the monarchy, despite the subsequent introduction of democratic procedures.
With a structure which is chronological as well as thematic, the book can also serve as a history of UK politics since 1979 – albeit one which is skewed towards the prime ministerial perspective. This explains why devolution within the UK does not feature heavily – British Prime Ministers, including Blair, who oversaw the beginning of the process, have acted as if this constitutional development never happened. The reality, of course, is very different, and the divergencies between the various components of the UK have become increasingly important thanks to the 2016 referendum and the Covid-19 pandemic (which also revealed the centrifugal potential of directly elected Mayors, particularly in the north of England). My only excuse for adopting the prime ministerial perspective is that a separate full-length book would be required to do justice to the subject of devolution.
The composition of the book has coincided with momentous developments; indeed, it could be argued that the British public has been subjected to continuous upheaval since the financial crisis which began in 2007, giving it little chance to pause for reflection. Whatever challenges might come in the future, it is unlikely that the British political system will be capable of meeting them unless the prime ministerial role is reconsidered. H. H Asquith – who was well qualified to pass judgement – famously wrote that ‘The office of the prime minister is what its holder chooses and is able to make of it.’ The main conclusion of this book is that the one thing a contemporary Prime Minister cannot ‘choose’ to do is to make a success of the role, which has become increasingly dysfunctional along with the other institutions of Westminster and Whitehall. The only recourse for Prime Ministers who care for ‘the verdict of history’ is to fall back on a minimalist definition of ‘success’ – that is, in terms of victory in the next election, even if this is owed primarily to weaknesses or divisions among Opposition parties. For a healthy liberal democracy this would hardly suffice as a measurement of ‘success’: in particular, it implies that whenever the national interest conflicts with the electoral needs of the Prime Minister’s political party, the incumbent of No. 10 is now under overwhelming pressure to prefer
