rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_3b77da13-3826-5a5d-b95e-377414f4509c">161.1
Notes
1 10.1 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 202019028.
2 45.1 Mayo Clinic v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1057 (D. Minn. 2019).
3 45.2 Id. at 1047.
4 45.3 Id.
5 45.4 See § 7.6(a).
6 45.5 This is one of the contextual canons used in construing statutes; it is a presumption of consistent usage. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (Thomson/West, St. Paul, MN: 2012).
7 45.6 This is the whole‐text canon (Reading Law, supra, note 45.5, at 1167). In this case, the court did not read “all parts of the statute together”; it read only two sections of it (IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii)). The entire statute is IRC § 170(b)(1)(A), where the law provides for nine categories of public charities, eight of which do not contain the primary‐function requirement. It is probable that the statute writers had a reason to insert the requirement only in IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(iii), a point the court did not explore.
8 45.7 The IRS calculated that the Mayo Clinic's educational activities were only 13 percent of its total activities and that its revenue from educational undertakings was only 6 percent of total revenue (Tech. Adv. Mem. 201407024). The court in this case may have violated another contextual canon: the absurdity doctrine. This canon states that a provision may be judicially corrected where the failure to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve (Reading Law, supra, note 45.5, at 234). Indeed, another contextual canon the court could have applied is the harmonious‐reading canon, pursuant to which the provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory (id., at 180).
9 161.1 E.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201852020.
CHAPTER NINE Scientific Organizations
§ 9.2 CONCEPT OF RESEARCH
p. 231, second paragraph. Insert as last sentence:
Also, the promotion of blockchain technology for the benefit of payors, providers, and financial institutions in the health care context was ruled by the IRS to not be scientific research.18.1
Note
1 18.1 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201918019.
CHAPTER TEN Religious Organizations
§ 10.1 Constitutional Law Framework (a) General Constitutional Law Principles (c) Internal Revenue Code Provisions
§ 10.2 Federal Tax Law Definition of Religion (c) Abuse of Tax Exemption
§ 10.3 Churches and Similar Institutions (c) Principle of Respect for Autonomy
§ 10.5 Integrated Auxiliaries of Churches
§ 10.1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK
(a) General Constitutional Law Principles
p. 239, last paragraph. Insert as last sentence:
In a similar holding, the Court held that states, once having implemented a program providing financial assistance (such as scholarships) for access to private schools, cannot exclude religious schools from participation in the program; a state supreme court's striking down such a program, on the ground it violates the state's constitution, was held to transgress the free exercise clause.27.1
p. 239, note 20. Insert following existing text:
The Supreme Court struck down a state executive order imposing restrictions on the size of gatherings in houses of worship, in an effort to control the spread of the coronavirus, because the limits were found excessively strict (Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020)). A similar case is under reconsideration, following remand by the Court (Harvest Rock Church v. Newsom (C.D. Cal.)).
p. 242, note 61. Delete 134 S. Ct. 1811 and insert 572 U.S. 565.
p. 242, note 61. Insert following existing text:
This decision has given rise to a historical significance test, where courts ascertain whether a statute is a continuation of a “historical practice” of Congress (id. at 576).
(c) Internal Revenue Code Provisions
p. 247, note 102. Insert following existing text:
On appeal, this decision was reversed, with the appellate court ruling that this rental allowance is not unconstitutional as a violation of the establishment clause because the provision has secular purposes and it passed a historical significance test (Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019)). The secular purposes were said to be elimination of discrimination against ministers, elimination of discrimination between ministers, and avoidance of excessive government entanglement with religion. As to the historical significance test, see supra note 61 and text accompanying it.
§ 10.2 FEDERAL TAX LAW DEFINITION OF RELIGION
(c) Abuse of Tax
