Stability and International Influence
International relations theory has for long tried to explain differences in state behavior within the international political system. The attempt has been to identify factors that would explain differences in the behavior of states.
Three approaches have dominated such analysis. The first is Innenpolitik which seeks to explain state behavior as being affected by domestic political ideology as well as domestic economic and social interest groups (Zakaria, 1992). This approach, for example, suggests that democracies will not go to war with each other because democratic states are primarily interested in peace and stability (Ray, 1998). However, the major criticism of this approach has been that it does not explain why countries with similar domestic systems behave differently abroad (Rose, 1998: 148).
The second analytical approach, neo-realism, postulates that international relations is an ‘autonomous realm’ where states leverage their capabilities to seek greater recognition and influence within the international system (Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994). This approach does not concern itself with domestic politics in these countries or its impact on their domestic stability. Neo-realists argue that in an international system that is anarchic, states make choices in terms of their international behavior based on their belief that they can survive only if they follow patterns of behavior set by existing major powers. The limitations of this approach was most evident in neo-realist analyses of the Soviet Union’s behavior before its collapse in 1991 which failed to take into account the impact of domestic economic decline and could not foresee its longer term implications for Soviet influence abroad and also global power politics (Wohlforth, 2001).
The third approach, neo-classical realism, while accepting that emerging states do try to imitate existing great powers to increase their influence in world affairs also takes into account domestic factors which might constrain emerging powers in their ability to achieve their goals (Ziegler, 2014: 592–593). Rather than see state behavior either as a function of domestic politics, or a single-minded pursuit of greater international influence, neo-classical realists see state behavior as being affected by relative changes in power. With increasing relative power comes a desire to gain more influence internationally. When relative power decreases, the desire for greater international influence is concomitantly reduced (Rose, 1998: 151–152). This implies that any decline in relative power, caused by domestic factors, could seriously undermine a states’ ability to seek greater power and influence abroad.
Most studies of the emergence BRICS have focused on a neo-realist approach to understanding their motivations in joining hands to gain for themselves a more influential role in international affairs. Seen from this perspective, the attempt by the BRICS countries to bring about changes in the international system is based on their belief that their economic strength vis-à-vis the G7 had increased since the 2008 financial crisis and therefore necessities their recognition as major powers in the international system through structural reform of existing international institutions — the UN, the IMF and the World Bank (Stuenkel, 2014; Hou, 2014).
However, it is also apparent that BRICS countries have not been very successful in molding the direction of international debate on reform of international political institutions in a manner that is favorable to them. Reform of the UN continues to remain stalled, the reform of the IMFs quota system still does not adequately reflect current realities in terms of economic strength, and the Doha Round of Trade negotiations at the WTO remain deadlocked with differences between developed and developing countries over the future direction of trade reform. Domestic problems such as inequality, corruption, lack of skills, and environmental issues mean that the BRICS countries seem destined to focus more on internal problems rather than on cohesive action abroad. In the words of one analyst, BRICS seems more of ‘marriage of convenience’ than a lasting relationship (Kralikova, 2014).
Seen from this perspective, the path to economic growth chosen by the five BRICS countries and the impact these choices have on internal stability and regime legitimacy will determine the ability of the BRICS bloc to exert enough influence internationally to bring about significant changes in the international system.
Initial Growth Paths
Identifying initial growth paths for the five countries that comprise BRICS can be difficult given their diverse histories. However, it is relatively easier to establish the dates of regime changes that led to significant changes in growth policies that impact the nature and quality of economic growth at present. India and China gained the ability to develop autarkic development policy in the 1940s — India when it gained independence from Britain in 1947 and China when the Communist Party captured power in 1949. Democratic governments were established in Brazil in 1985, in Russia in 1991, and in South Africa in 1994. Economic policy under new regimes in all five countries were designed with the objective of achieving rapid and equitable economic growth. However, the outcome of policy has been varied, and these could be traced back to the initial growth strategies adopted by these five countries.
India and China demonstrate most vividly how differences in initial growth paths can affect the nature and quality of long-term economic growth. Both were predominantly agrarian economies with an abundance of agricultural labor as well as a rapidly growing population. Both countries realized that the long-term challenge was to develop both agriculture as well as industries that would absorb the surplus labor which was unemployed or underemployed in agriculture. However, differences in political ideologies played a key role in the two countries choosing differing paths to achieve the same economic objectives. China under the Chinese Communist Party placed considerable emphasis on effective land reform and rural development through workers communes. The landlords and ‘middle peasants’ were almost completely eliminated, and their land distributed among landless laborers. The land was farmed by agricultural communes which, at least in the initial decade, addressed some of the critical problems that China faced. Collective land ownership by the communes, an effective taxation system, local mechanisms to share agricultural machinery, development of irrigation systems, and the setting up of rural banks were all critical in substantially increasing agricultural production in China in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Studwell, 2013: 14–16). However, it was not just in agricultural production that the communes played a positive developmental role. They ensured limited industrialization within the commune and provided basic health care, education, and food security (Saith, 2008: 735). The significant progress that China achieved in literacy levels, life expectancy, and other social indicators of development can be traced back to the development of communes which provided basic social security and created the conditions for later social and economic development. Significant poverty reduction had happened by the time the Chinese economy began to liberalize in the 1980s (Bardhan, 2006: 2). The high levels of literacy and life expectancy also laid the foundations of rapid economic growth and industrialization from the 1980s onward, when China abolished the communes, allowed private ownership of land, and liberalized foreign investment. The roots of the ‘Chinese miracle’ after Deng Xiao Ping opened up the Chinese economy in 1978 is traceable to policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
It needs to be recognized that China’s initial path to economic development was the consequence of a revolution in China that brought a Communist Party, committed to elimination of landlordism and capitalist modes of production, to power. China’s relative homogeneity, provided by the dominance of the Han Chinese in its population, also ensured domestic stability (Saith, 2008: 726). In India, by contrast, the government that came to power in 1947, though democratic and socialist in orientation, was dominated by urban elites, indigenous industrialists, and rural landowners. It placed greater emphasis on developing agriculture by incentivizing higher levels of production within existing rural land-ownership structures and in rapid industrialization through a process of planned economic development (Patnaik, 2000). The economy was also affected by violence that accompanied the partition of the sub-continent into two states, India and Pakistan. Land reform measures, though enacted were never implemented, except in a few regions, because of strong organized resistance from rural landlords who were often local leaders of the ruling Congress Party
