Lichnowsky,” of August, 1916, which were not intended for publication, but fell into pacifist hands, which soon procured for them a wide underground circulation. After that there came into consideration the publications of Herr Mühlon.
Anyone who still could not see clearly after all this must have had his eyes opened after the November Revolution by Eisner's publication of the Report from the Bavarian Legation in Berlin of July 18th, 1914. Unfortunately Eisner, by this publication, committed the imprudence of treating it rather as a journalist to whom the effect produced was of chief importance, than as a historian who was concerned as to the completeness and the unimpaired condition of his sources. He brought out the Report in extracts only, and left out passages into which some people desired to read the German Government's love of peace.
We shall see how to estimate the love of peace that is supposed to be expressed in the passages omitted.
New material was then contributed by Austrian and German publications of the Foreign Offices, Red and White Books. This Austrian Red Book, “Diplomatic Documents relating to the Events preceding the War of 1914” (Vienna, 1919), which has already been quoted, and which will be referred to as the Red Book of 1919, affords most important explanations on the question of the authorship of the war. On the other hand, the reader must proceed very critically with this material as worked up by Dr. Roderick Gooss in the form of a book which was published in Vienna at the same time as the above Red Book, under the title of “The Vienna Cabinet and the Origin of the World War.” As he was unacquainted with the German documents, the author of the Austrian commentary in places arrives at some very controvertible and even manifestly false conclusions.
Before the Austrian Red Book was published, there appeared in June a German White Book, intended to make an impression on the victorious nations in favour of Germany during the peace negotiations. In reality, it only helped to compromise anew the German foreign policy. The reason for this we shall see later.
There has since appeared another work which forms the chief source of the following exposition, the collection of documents relating to the authorship of the war, brought together under my superintendence.
Any other material that has been published is supplementary in details, but does not alter the general impression.
According to all this material, how did the course of events really proceed?
CHAPTER VIII
SERAJEVO
We have brought our statement in Chapter V. up to the Treaty of Bucharest, and have seen that after this peace Vienna was determined to revise it, with the help of Germany, at the first favourable opportunity.
The Central Powers at that time were continually showing signs of great unrest and eagerness for action. Germany prevailed on Turkey to the extent that a German general, Liman von Sanders, went to Constantinople in December, 1913, at the head of a German military mission, and while he was there was appointed to the chief command of the First Army Corps. Russia protested energetically, but only succeeded in getting Liman's title altered to that of General Inspector of the Turkish Army with the rank of Marshal.
Shortly after this, in March, 1914, the Central Powers had the satisfaction of putting one of their own people, the Prince of Wied, on the throne of the newly-formed kingdom of Albania, a success, to be sure, of a very doubtful character, as the German sovereign no later than May deserted his troublesome subjects, and thereby made himself and his protectors ridiculous in the face of Europe.
At the same time meetings between the Emperor William and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand were multiplied. In April they met at Miramare, and on June 12th at Konopischt in Bohemia.
“The curiosity of the public and the interest of the diplomats are excited by these manifestations of a friendship which was so animated as to make people restless. During the visit to Konopischt the German Ambassador in London was ordered to pacify the British Foreign Office with regard to the presence of Admiral von Tirpitz in the Kaiser's suite. ‘Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.’ The Admiral evidently only intended to take this change of air in order to enjoy the fragrance of the roses in Bohemia.”
That is how a Belgian diplomat, Baron Beyens, derides the innocence of these meetings in his book: “L'Allemagne avant la guerre, les causes et les responsabilites” (Paris, 1915, page 265). Beyens was at the commencement of the war the Belgian Minister in Berlin, and from thence wrote reports so sympathetic to Germany that the German Government, which came across them after the German troops entered Brussels, published a series of them in the volume, “Belgian Official Documents, 1905–1914.” Meanwhile Beyens completely changed his favourable opinion of German policy after the Austrian Ultimatum. The reports he wrote thenceforth have not been published by the Berlin Foreign Office. They are to be found in the “Correspondance diplomatique relative à la guerre de 1914–15” (Paris, 1915).
Notwithstanding Beyens, Herr von Jagow, in his book on “The Causes and Outbreak of the World
War” (Berlin, 1919, page 101), says:
“The Archduke wished to show his imperial friend the rose-blooms on his favourite Bohemian estate.”
As to what was hatched at Konopischt, William himself could alone give authentic information. That the meeting was not merely to enjoy the fragrance of the Bohemian roses is testified to by a report which Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, sent to the Imperial Chancellor on June I7th, 1914. This report begins with the following communication:
“Count Berchtold, after the departure of H.M. the Emperor, had been invited by His Highness the Archduke Francis Ferdinand to Konopischt. The Minister told me to-day that His Highness had expressed himself to him as extremely satisfied with His Majesty's visit. He had exhaustively spoken with His Majesty on all possible questions, and could state that they had come to a complete agreement in their views.”
Unfortunately the report does not inform us what views these were. From the following we only learn that the policy to be followed with regard to the Rumanians was much discussed. Further, that Francis Ferdinand did not approve of Tisza's Rumanian policy, as Tisza refused to allow any more concessions to the Rumanians in the Hungarian State, to which William in a marginal note remarks:
“He must not by his home policy, which in the Rumanian question has influence on the foreign policy of the Triple Alliance, do anything to call the latter in question.”
It is certain that the Rumanian policy of Hungary made it impossible for the Rumanian Government to part company with Serbia and Russia and face these states in Austria's company.
Directly after the meeting at Konopischt the Foreign Office in Vienna set about preparing a Memorandum to show that the state of affairs in the Balkans was intolerable, and that Austria was forced to oppose Russia, who was planning a Balkan League against the Habsburg Monarchy.
To this end Austria sought to win over Rumania. The latter by this time was on very bad terms with her.
“The Monarchy up till now has confined itself to discussing in a friendly manner the vacillation of Rumanian policy in Bucharest; beyond this, however, it does not see any reason to look for serious consequences from this change of
