June, and the publications of Dr. Gooss.
It cost me much self-denial not to bring out my work in view of the flood of revelations about the war which were poured forth during the past few months. It was not easy to be silent where I had so much to say.
In view of the constant delays of the Government, I should have felt myself justified in letting my book appear even before the publication of the documents, the collection of which had been so long completed.
Since I laid down my post as Collateral Secretary, I had not worked in the archives of the Foreign Office as one of its officials, but as an independent historian. As proof of this, I may observe that since that date I have received no salary or remuneration of any kind.
An historian who makes use of archives owes no account to any superior authority of the use he may make of the fruits of his labours.
If, in spite of all this, I kept silence, it was not due to any juristic but rather to political considerations. The whole political advantage which might accrue to the German people in the eyes of its former enemies through the publication of these documents was only to be looked for if they were published by, not against, the Government. No doubt, in the last resort, the publication would have had to take place, even in the latter case. The situation of our internal politics would have demanded it. But so long as there was any possibility that the Government would itself publish these documents, I did not wish to anticipate it with my elaboration of the material.
And now they have in fact appeared, and I have no longer any reason for delay.
I have no doubt that my views will be much contested—there can be no view of the war to which everyone would assent. And no language is more ambiguous, none is so much intended to be read between the lines, as that of diplomacy, with which we are here almost exclusively concerned. The Kaiser alone discards all diplomatic methods of expressing himself. The clearness of his utterances leaves nothing to be desired. And his marginal comments afford the rare satisfaction to a people of seeing, for once, an Emperor in undress.
Yet, in spite of all diplomatic disguises, the Austrian documents have brought about an almost unanimous agreement as to the guilt attaching to Austrian statecraft. For anyone who has reached the point of rightly estimating this fact, the language of the German documents will not present much difficulty in enabling him to pass judgment on German statecraft as well.
In view of all that has now become so clear, the temptation was strongly felt to show how sorely the German people were misled, especially by those in the ranks of the Majority Socialists, who so violently attacked the position of myself and my friends during the war, and who defended most strongly the war-policy of the Imperial Government. Truly, of their conceptions there remains to-day nothing but a heap of broken crockery.
But just for this reason it is hardly necessary at the present day to do battle with David, Heilmann, and others. Moreover, if one did so, it would be at cost of the strict exposition of the facts, and it was to be feared that a publication which appeals to all who sincerely desire to know the truth about the origin of the war might, through such a polemic, take on the partisan or even personal character, which I desired to avoid. I have, therefore, confined polemics to cases where it was required, in order to make clear the situation of affairs, and have as far as possible avoided recrimination. That this work will, nevertheless, involve me in fresh controversy, I am well prepared to discover.
But whatever attitude one may take towards it, I trust that every reader of the documents here published will keep one thing in mind: They testify to the thoughts and deeds of German statesmen, not of the German people. The guilt of the latter, so far as they are guilty, consists only in this, that they did not concern themselves sufficiently about the foreign policy of their rulers. But this is a fault which the German people shares with every other. It was in vain that more than half a century ago, at the foundation of the first International, Marx proclaimed it to be the “duty of the working classes to master for themselves the mysteries of international statecraft, in order to keep an eye on the diplomatic proceedings of their Governments.”
Hitherto this has only been achieved in very imperfect measure. The present war, with its dreadful consequences, points the working classes more sternly than ever to the fulfilment of this duty.
As a slight attempt in that direction, I offer the present work.
K. Kautsky.
Berlin, 1st November, 1919.
The Guilt of William Hohenzollern
CHAPTER I
WHO ARE THE GUILTY?
Since the outbreak of the world-war one question has exercised every mind: Who brought upon us this frightful calamity? In what persons or what institutions are we to find its originating cause?
This is not merely a scientific question for the historian; it is eminently a practical one for the politician. Its answer is a death-sentence for the guilty—not in the physical sense but certainly in the political. Persons and institutions whose power has produced anything so fearful must be politically flung to the dead; they must be divested of all power.
But just for this reason, because the question of the origination of the war is not an academic but a highly practical one with far-reaching consequences for the organization of public life, the real authors of it have from the beginning sought to cover up their traces. In this attempt they have found eager helpers in all those who, though not themselves involved in any responsibility, have an interest in maintaining the power of the guilty persons and institutions.
This fact has long operated to render very difficult the discovery of the true authorship of the war. On the other hand, a practical interest in the cause had its effect in sharpening the critical insight of the opposing parties, so that there were not a few who came on the right track at the beginning. Thus the fog began slowly to dissolve, until the latest publication of documents by the Austrian and German Foreign Offices dispersed it altogether. We are now in a position to see clear.
And yet one cloud lies still before our eyes. It is alleged to be a profound piece of Marxian philosophy. Marx taught that the course of history is guided not by particular persons or institutions, but in the last resort by economic conditions. Capitalism in its most developed form, that of finance, everywhere creates imperialism—the impulse towards forcible extension of the territory of the State. This law governs all States—all are warlike by nature, and from this condition the world-war proceeded. No individual persons or institutions are guilty, but Capitalism as a whole: this it is that must be combated.
That sounds very radical, and yet it works in a very conservative sense wherever this idea governs practical effort. For Capitalism is merely an abstraction, derived from the observation of numerous individual phenomena, and affording an indispensable aid in the attempt to investigate these in the law of their mutual relations.
But one cannot fight an abstraction except theoretically. It cannot be fought in the field of practice. Practically, we can only fight the individual phenomena. The theoretic comprehension of the nature of Capital does not relieve us from the necessity of this practical struggle—on the contrary, its function is to further
