is so- called “horizontal escalation” of a crisis triggered elsewhere on the fringes of Europe, rapidly growing into a wider conflict that threatens Norwegian waters, airspace and territory. In this regard all eyes are on the Kremlin, for there is a sense that Russia has been demonstrating hostile intent with its continued build-up of Arctic military capabilities that threaten the ability of Norway and its allies to operate armed forces, secure critical infrastructure and waterways, protect civilian populations, and come to each other’s assistance.
Specifically, improvements to Russia’s Northern Fleet, including surface vessels and submarines armed with modern cruise missiles, pose an increased threat to NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea, to undersea internet cables and to sea lines of communication essential to reinforcing Norway from North America or Europe. And since the High North holds strategic importance to Russia’s Bastion Defense in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean, NATO feels it must plan for possible future operations in an increasingly contested environment. What’s more, the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 has brought an increased threat from new medium-range ballistic missiles, requiring Norwegian and allied defense planners to adjust to novel threats to the homeland and region.
Norway, though small in size, is undoubtedly “punching above its weight” when it comes to security; it does so thanks to high-tech capabilities and its ability to engage all of society in a “total defense” effort. Despite these perceived strengths of its military capabilities, the country still faces pressing challenges. Not only does Oslo need to enhance the readiness and resilience of Norwegian forces to deter aggression, it has to manage the consequences of an increasingly complex international (Arctic) environment and the climate challenge, too.58
Given Norway’s geographic location—it is intimately connected to the sea, with long coastlines on the Atlantic and Arctic oceans—maritime resources have always formed the basis of its national economy and defined the very identity of its northern coastal communities. Significantly, 80 percent of ship traffic in the Arctic takes place in waters under Norwegian jurisdiction, much of it related to oil and gas exploration and production as well as to fisheries. Now that the sea ice is melting, Norwegian businesses and industries are also seeking to take advantage of emerging opportunities—albeit they postulate in a safe and environmentally sound way.59
Here it must be noted that Norway does not actually use much of the hydrocarbons it pumps out from under the seafloor. Instead, it exports the oil and gas while using the income to provide free health care and education and to save for the future. As a result, despite the fact that its wealth is generated largely by oil and gas, Oslo likes to promote a reputation for environmental leadership. Therein lies a paradox, for global warming caused by carbon pollution from fossil fuels produced by Norway (and other countries) is harming also the Indigenous at home, some 50–60,000 Sámi people.60 Across the region of Troms og Finnmark, the Sámi are fighting “sustainable development and economic growth” policies that they see as being disruptive to local reindeer-herding operations. These include obvious areas such as the expansion of mines, railroads, and logging, but also wind farms, which are believed to be disturbing grazing habits and disrupting reindeer migration through habitat fragmentation. And while being presented by European governments generally as a climate solution paving the way for sustainable future, the Sámi consider them as programs of “green colonialism” due to their destructive effects on their ways of life. In short, relations between Sámi and the Oslo government are tenuous, raising questions of adequate representation and sovereignty over Sápmi, the Sámis’ ancient lands spanning from the Kola Peninsula via Finland, Sweden to Norway.61
Similar to the issues of political participation and self-determination at stake in Arctic Europe between the Nordic capitals and the Sámi, the ICC (representing Inuit from Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka) and the governments of the United States, Canada, Denmark and Russia disagree whether the rightful meaning of ‘sovereignty’ is either a fundamental “binary concept” (internal/external, national/global, legal/factual, formal/material, abstract/territorial) or increasingly, in these globalized times, a “contested concept” in flux.62
Greenland is situated between those two opposite views, as a state-in-the-making with almost 90 percent of its population of 56,000 being Inuit. On the one hand, their self-government is part of the transnational Inuit community; on the other hand, Greenlanders yearn for independent statehood from Denmark. In this striving, the ongoing development of more foreign policy sovereignty is an important factor in the enhancement of Greenland’s international status and in its ability to attract external investments. Yet, the latter combined with more political emancipation also raises the problem of novel dependencies; alongside economic and political opportunities lurk new dangers to ecology and cultural heritage but also to the budding polity. Put another way, protecting the environment and traditional livelihood and rapid industrial development (in part facilitated by rising temperatures) are potentially mutually exclusive goals.63
To be sure, with greater navigability of Arctic waters because of thawing sea-ice and with raised expectation for easier access to its rich mineral deposits as the Greenland ice sheet is dissolving ever faster,64 Greenland’s strategic importance has grown. Thus, its voice will be heard. But exogenous actors such as China in particular are pushing onto the scene—increasingly aggressively looking to realize ambitious infrastructure and mining projects (in exchange for supporting the local wilderness tourism industry) as Beijing seeks to expand is global influence under its Silk Roads strategy—also in the Arctic. China’s growing engagement with Greenland (as well as Iceland, Norway and Finland) may have a broader security dimension, given their relevance for U.S. global policy and NATO defense strategy. As a result, in fall 2019, Denmark—keen to remain a player at the top table in the North—has now made Greenland its number one priority on its national security agenda.65
Nowhere is the complexity of the interplay of climate change and geopolitical power games, of national interests and of the interests of Indigenous people more palpable than in Greenland. Largely overlooked as a frozen wasteland and zone of peace since the Cold War ended, Nuuk is rapidly being forced into playing it big, moving to center stage, all the while Copenhagen is looking to consolidate its strategic cooperation with Washington.66
This has not been easy given the erratic nature of the Trump administration. In April 2020, news of an American offer to the self-governing territory of $12 million in financial support and the slated re-opening of the U.S. consulate in Nuuk sparked outrage among many politicians in Copenhagen, coming barely a year after the Danish and Greenlandic governments rebuffed U.S. president Donald Trump’s awkward expression of interest in buying Greenland. And while Greenlanders appear delighted at the most recent U.S. overtures, stating that “our work on building a constructive relationship with the United States is [proving] fruitful,” the Trump administration left doubt that strategic calculations were behind its “provision of assistance:” to counter, as a Senior U.S. State Department official put it, Russia’s “military build-up in the Arctic” and Chinese efforts to “winkle their way” into Greenland.67
Since the Cold War, the United States has been the least active and least assertive of the littoral Arctic nations and has lacked a clear, comprehensive and consistent Arctic strategy for much of the post-Soviet era. U.S. administrations have not treated the Arctic region as a U.S. national security priority on par with Europe, Asia and the Middle East, nor did they pursue comprehensive or well-resourced policies towards the region. In fact, U.S. officials actively sought to keep Russian-U.S. frictions out of the Arctic. However, since Moscow annexed Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in 2014 and launched a proxy war in eastern Ukraine, Western governments have suspended most dialogue with the Russian military.
Today, the Arctic, peripheral to U.S. security policy for almost three decades, has returned to the forefront of American politics, though not entirely in its own right. Alaska appeared in the news because the Trump administration promoted its off- and onshore hydrocarbon agenda as well as pledging drilling lease sales
