means (i) being able to use noncommunication in the sense of silent or secret communication with the subjectively perceived objects and (ii) the ability to lose contact with the commonly shared reality with the aim of feeling real and of preserving and enhancing the true self. Indeed, the more this incommunicado element (Winnicott, 1965) is under the threat of being revealed and altered, the more primitive are the defenses we employ to deal with this threat, because the protection of the innermost being facilitates the establishment of the true self. In this regard, Winnicott may be viewed as a predecessor of researchers who investigate the beneficial aspects of solitude today (e.g., mindfulness; see Leavitt, Butzer, Clarke, & Dvorakova, Chapter 24).
Every human infant has a true self, expressed through spontaneous gesture and recognized by the good enough mother. Mother mirrors the infant, that is, responds with sensitivity and reliability to his/her needs, thus facilitating the development of the true self in the infant (Winnicott, 1971). The infant feels alive, a psychosomatic entity, with continuity of being (Winnicott, 1958, 1965). This fortunate state is reflected in the infant’s capacity to be creative and use symbols (e.g., language, symbolic play, dreaming), which form the content of his/her time spent alone.1
In the beginning of life, the good enough environment responds to the infant’s needs, and therefore the infant experiences a state of undisturbed isolation, a state of going‐on‐being. The infant leaves this isolation to express his/her spontaneous gesture and explore the environment, without losing his/her sense of self. But if the environment impinges on the infant’s existence (e.g., by intruding or demanding compliance or by inconsistent responding), the experience of being without having to react continually to external stimulation is broken. The infant returns to his/her isolated state, but this isolation is now comprised of primitive defenses. A split occurs between the true self, which needs to be protected from being violently altered by the environment, and a false or compliant self. The individual is incapable both of being with himself/herself due to the terror of isolation and of developing genuine object ties because the true self, not enriched by lived experience, must remain hidden (Winnicott, 1958).
Winnicott (1965) later became more explicit in distinguishing the modes of not‐communicating. Apart from simple not‐communicating (a kind of resting), there exists a mode of active or reactive not‐communicating. Active not‐communicating is a form of voluntary, potentially beneficial aloneness, whereas reactive not‐communicating is a pathological state, the result of environmental impingement. Therefore, it is one thing to be isolated, that is, acknowledging and preserving this core of self, and another thing to be insulated, that is, falsely living in a world devoid of real objects. And Winnicott (1965) beautifully portrays this private universe:
[…] we have to recognize that aspect of health: the non‐communicating central self, for ever immune from the reality principle, and for ever silent. Here communication is not non‐verbal; it is, like the music of the spheres, absolutely personal. It belongs to being alive. And in health, it is out of this that communication naturally arises. (p. 192)
Winnicott’s views reflect a developmental and clinical conceptualization of the origins and first manifestations of aloneness and solitude as well as their vicissitudes. In this conceptualization, the mother plays a crucial role in the quality and destiny of her child’s solitary experiences. Manifestations of voluntary, beneficial aloneness are evident from the first months of life. Aloneness is regarded as a fundamental way of being and is in a dialectical tension with connectedness, which means that both are needed for normal development and enrich each other. However, Winnicott goes as far as identifying a core of the infant’s self (probably a facet of the unconscious) which is – and will always remain – absolutely “solo,” idiosyncratic and isolated, and, thus, has to be respected by caregivers as such.
Schema‐of‐Being‐With‐the‐Self
Another view on the solitary self in infancy is provided by the work of Daniel Stern (1985/2000, 1994, 1995), who, although inspired by psychoanalytic thinking, was one of the main proponents of intersubjectivity – a theory highly relevant to the study of solitude. He introduced a layered model of development that was later revised (Stern, 1985/2000) to include three preverbal senses of self – emergent, core, and subjective (or intersubjective) – all emerging together and in interaction with each other (rather than occurring successively). Under the influence of infant research (e.g., Beebe & Stern, 1977; Trevarthen, 1979), Stern supports the view of the initial dualism, which means that intersubjectivity is present from the beginning of life or that the self is with a differentiated other from the start and gradually develops new forms of relatedness.
Of relevance to beneficial solitude is the self‐in‐the‐presence‐of‐the‐other (Stern, 1985/2000), which reminds us of Winnicott’s notion of the capacity to be alone in the presence of the mother (discussed in the following section). It is a variation of the self‐being‐with‐a‐self‐regulating‐other and refers to the infant’s experience of being alone, with his/her perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and actions, in the physical proximity of the caregiver. Even more relevant to the study of solitude is the schema‐of‐being‐with‐the‐self. This concept is inspired by Winnicott’s (1965) notion of going‐on‐being (see previous section) and Tustin’s (1990) work with high‐functioning autistic children. It represents the way of being with one’s own, without other people around, “a state of mentally floating, alone” (Stern, 1995, p. 108), during which mental activities take place, but the individual does not pay attention to them. Stern (1995) wrote of a friend of his who had such an experience and who seemed to enjoy the beneficial aftereffect of solitary moments: “Such moments are experienced as free mental ambling, quite pleasurable, refreshing, and often productive, because when she breaks the moment and ‘returns’, she often does so with solutions to problems and questions that were pressing just before” (p. 108).
Stern (1995) further argued that when we are alone, “something is always happening” (p. 109), such as intentionally prolonging a peaceful moment in order to keep a state of equilibrium. This is a feeling shape. This moment of lived experience is “a‐way‐of‐being‐with‐the‐self” or, better, “a‐way‐of‐one‐part‐of‐the‐self’s‐being‐with‐another‐part‐of‐the‐self.” It is as if the individual observes his/her complex mental operations from a distance, without interfering, without the need to complete a task and offer a product. The moment is interpersonal in two ways: (i) it is “a‐negative‐way‐of‐being‐with‐someone,” because it reduces consciousness and intrusions and (ii) it is a way for a part of the self to be with another part of the self.
The schema‐of‐being‐with‐the‐self has the same structure as the schema‐of‐being‐with‐an‐other (Stern, 1995). Both schemas use the same kinds of constants, are built around feeling shapes, acquire a narrative form, and are characterized by interpersonal motives and functions. “These experiences structure subjective time, much as music can. Such structuring not only organizes but heightens the sense of existing” (Stern, 1995, p. 108).
Stern’s (1985/2000) conception of intersubjectivity includes the acceptance (influenced by Winnicott) that some experiences are non‐shareable, perhaps because they are never attuned with by the mother. Total psychic transparency leads to psychopathology, as much as the inability to share experiences leads to alienation and loneliness. From infancy, we live in between these two poles. Being‐with‐a‐self‐regulating‐other means co‐discovering a balance between self‐disclosure and privacy. In ill health, the lack of attunement by the mother creates in the infant a feeling of uncanny aloneness. In Stern’s view, loneliness is felt only if sharing has taken place and then has been lost. Finally, with the emergence of language
