should be given to the injured employee as a result of any perceived negligence.
Aaron remembers a recent safety article that used the phrase Paradigm Paralysis. The focus of the article was a complaint about the tendency we all have of using old (and outdated) approaches to solve current problems. As Aaron reads the blog article he reminisces about a war hero acquaintance, Tom, talking about his career in the armed forces. Tom's observation referenced military leadership's oft‐used approach of employing the same tactics for the next war that they used in the last war. Tom's conclusion was that this approach just does not lead to optimum performance, in war – or in safety.
Our safety profession history began in 1911 with a disastrous, multiple life‐ending tragedy at a New York garment manufacturing sweat shop (Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire). Over the ensuing years “we” have experienced all kinds of research, regulations, techniques, technologies, leadership, education, training, and the like. Much of this information (but not all) has moved us to better downstream indicator safety performance.
Talking with past generation safety people, there is often a great reluctance to try new safety concepts that are outside of their experience comfort zones, ergo, Paradigm Paralysis. Certainly, the foundational approaches which have been developed in the past 100 years still apply. And yet, this decade's safety performance plateau is not satisfactory. We must relentlessly pursue better techniques and tools to eliminate the possibility/probability of injuries/incidents.
Our current war on injuries and incidents is being fought by a new generation with new cultures, different workplaces, and a myriad of other differences from what the older generations experienced. We must be open to considering and trying new approaches which can help us win the important safety battles that face us now and in the future. And yet government and some industry safety bureaucracies seem to often stick to the use of regulations followed by punishment as the predominate model with respect to safety improvement. In truth, a very conservative approach is influenced/hindered by the “standard practice” approach that is greatly influenced (hamstrung) by the litigious nature of society, i.e. not trying something out of the ordinary in order to minimize lawsuits! Such, “Standard Practice” cultures built on conservative tradition can be VERY difficult to change.
Since the 1970s' Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) became law, OSHA has tried a number of approaches in an effort to improve safety in the United States:
The regulations have set a foundational standard that has definite merit.
The punishment by legal fines structure got some corporate attention, but it has led to a negotiating game which does not have its focus on improving safety, merely negotiating cost.
Unannounced on‐site inspections have had little to no discernible impact on personnel safety rates. It appears that OSHA inspectors, with little in‐depth knowledge of a company's real hazards, lack credibility and instead often deliver derision.
The Voluntary Protection Program (VPP)2 system had merit, as it focused on assisting those who were seemingly serious, to improve their regulations compliance.
The shame and blame approach only seems to anger the guilty, while adding glee to the segment that revels in a seeming punishment to corporate entities.
Untold billions of dollars spent on OSHA have resulted in minimal improvement in personnel safety numbers. The plateau in safety performance is not improving with a “trouble equals government/business leadership punishment” model. A number of safety professionals and managers committed to safety excellence, who have experiences in various industries in multiple countries and cultures, have settled on a better working model. This approach is more along the lines of a safety culture where “trouble equals value added assistance.” Subsequently, if the leadership cannot improve performance when given such assistance, their poor performance leads to a change in leadership.
Details from such innovative accountability‐based safety cultures are revealed in a significant number of large global companies. These organizations have done far better in safety performance by definitely employing manufacturing fundamentals while also improving their safety culture. They have discovered the need to go beyond the “one trick pony regs (regulations) and punishment models.” An easily available search approach would reveal the industries, cultures, and locals which need focused assistance. They are likely the same ones that traditional approach only leaders think are in need of more of some kind of punishment. “High injury rate plateau organizations indicate the beatings will stop when the safety performance improves” model, is not effective in the long run.
OSHA birthed the value‐added regulations fundamentals by copying (and adjusting) the policies, processes, and procedures of companies which were successful in safety. The models that successful companies have used in improving their day‐to‐day safety performance work for the laggards as well. Across the board, engaged safety leadership which goes beyond the necessary strong regulations base drives a safety culture of excellence. It is time to try a similar approach for improving safety cultures by copying and adjusting what has been shown to work and applying this model to those company cultures that are in need of value‐added assistance.
Over time I have been faced with a few new OSHA directors who view themselves as “The new sheriff in town.” A common thread of the new sheriff is a promise to punish industries as their way to safety success. At the end of their term I have had difficulty seeing any real statistical difference in safety performance. Since the 1970s there have been incredible continuous improvements in multiple technologies worldwide which have delivered amazing performance improvements in just about all that we experience and do. That is except in safety, where the old, tired, low performing approach of the seventies remains the outdated norm. Continuing the beatings, which have proven to be unsuccessful in improving safety performance, is a kind of leadership (either governmental or industrial) insanity which needs to be changed. Doing the same thing and expecting different results just does not make sense.
As Aaron reflects on the above safety culture reality of his company, he has also reached the conclusion that the union which represents the workers is a part of the poor safety performance culture where he works. They are safety complacent too because of a good technology apprentice program, no critical injuries for a number of years (except for now), and a good company medical benefits system which pays for fixing the injured employees and gets them back to the job. However, in Aaron's company there is a huge separation/gap between frontline employees and upper management. The high injury rate, a lack of caring, along with a focus on punishment with no real action by management, has become an angry boil that keeps the safety department as the object of festering unhappiness by all.
The general feeling across the organization is that: this is a great place to live; the pay is good; the work is not all that hard; and the frontline employees are well trained, highly skilled and have a good work ethic. However, the huge gap and lack of respect between the frontline employees and management have morale in the tank and skilled frontline employees leaving for other companies who need their skills and have a better culture.
Aaron realized doing the same thing and expecting a different result just does not make sense. But he is up from the ranks with little safety background and his upper management just does not seem to care or want to get involved in anything that is troubling. There is no apparent silver lining in the dark foreboding clouds surrounding the safety reality. He reflects on the safety filter3 discussion he had with the Doc.
Figure 1.1 Work on the job site.
