This Principle, say we, is false, because such false Consequences follow from it: So there are those, who without reluctance wou’d believe, that some things might have bin reveal’d by God, did they not consider the Consequences of ’em; but when they see what these things lead to, they conclude, they are not from God: and this Argument a posteriori <54> for them has the value of the strictest Demonstration.
Thus about the beginning of the Saracen Empire several Jews renounc’d their Religion, and dedicated themselves to the Pagan Philosophy,37 pretending they had discover’d in the ceremonial Law of Moses a world of unprofitable or absurd Precepts, which they perceiv’d not to be founded on any solid Reasons of their Institution or Prohibition, and thence concluding, that such a Law cou’d not be given by God. Their Consequence without doubt was fairly drawn, but they suppos’d amiss: They had not consider’d the incontestable Proofs which God himself had given of Moses’s Divine Mission, Proofs which will bear the strictest Trial at the Bar of the pure and living Ideas of natural Metaphysicks, in virtue of which each particular Law of Moses implicitly carrys a good Reason with it. Besides, they had not Strength enough or Compass of Judgment, to comprehend the drift of the ceremonial Laws, which, with regard to the Character of the Jewish Nation, and their Proneness to Idolatry, or as they were Figures and Types of the Gospel, were all founded on solid Reasons. Thus they were in an Error as to the point of Fact; and tho the Consequence follow’d justly and necessarily from their false Principle, they were wrong nevertheless. But by this example we see of what importance it is, that natural Light shou’d find nothing absurd in any thing propos’d as Revelation; for that which might otherwise appear most certainly reveal’d, will cease to appear so, when once found repugnant to that primitive, universal, and mother <55> Rule of judging, and of discerning Truth from Falshood, Good from Evil.
Every Philosophical attentive Mind clearly conceives, that this lively and distinct Light which waits on us at all Seasons, and in all Places, and which shews us, That the whole is greater than its part, that ’tis honest to be grateful to Benefactors, not to do to others what we wou’d not have done to our selves, to keep our Word, and to act by Conscience; he conceives, I say, very clearly, that this Light comes forth from God, and that this is natural Revelation: How then can he imagine, that God shou’d afterwards contradict himself, and blow hot and cold, by speaking to us outwardly himself, or sending his Messengers to teach us things directly repugnant to the common Notions of Reason? An Epicurean Philosopher reasons very justly, tho he applies his Principles badly, when he says, that since our Senses are the first Rule of Knowledg, and the original Inlet to Truth, it cannot be suppos’d they are subject to Error.38 He’s wrong in making the Report of the Senses the Rule and Touchstone of Truth; but this once suppos’d, he’s in the right to conclude, they ought to be the Judges of our Controversys, and decide in all our Doubts. If therefore the natural and metaphysical Light, if the general Principles of Sciences; if those primitive Ideas, which carry their own Conviction with ’em, have bin afforded us as a means to judg rightly upon things, and to serve as a Rule for our Decisions, they must of necessity be the Sovereign Judg, and we must submit to their Decisions in all Differences about obscure points of Knowledg: so that shou’d it enter into any one’s head to maintain, that <56> God has reveal’d a moral Precept directly contrary to the first Principles, we must deny it, and maintain in opposition to him, that he mistakes the Sense, and that ’tis much more reasonable to reject the Authority of his Criticisms and Grammar, than that of Reason. If we don’t fix here, farewel all Faith, according to the Remark of the good Father Valerian:* If any one will pretend, says he, that we must captivate our Understanding to the Obedience of Faith, so far as to call in question, or even to believe that Rule of judging which Nature has afforded us, false in some Instances; I affirm, he does by this very Attempt necessarily subvert the Faith, because it is absolutely impossible to believe, upon any Credit whatsoever, without a previous reasoning, which concludes, that the Person on whose Testimony we do believe, is neither deceiv’d himself nor deceives: which kind of reasoning, we see, is of no force, unless we admit that natural Rule of judging which has bin hitherto explain’d.
And here we shall find all the pompous Discourses of Roman Catholicks against the Way of Reason, and for the Authority of the Church, terminate in the end. Without thinking on’t, they only take a larger Circuit to come home at last to the very same point, which others make by a strait Course. These say plainly, and without going about the Bush, that we must keep to that Sense which appears to us the justest: But they tell us, we must have a care of that, because our own Lights may possibly deceive, and Reason is all Darkness and Illusion; we must therefore rest in the Judgment of the Church. What is this but coming a round way about to our own Rea-<57>son? For he who prefers the Judgment of the Church to his private Judgment, must not he do this in virtue of this reasoning, The Church has greater Lights than I, she’s therefore more to be believ’d than I?
Thus we see every one’s determin’d by his own private Lights; if he believe any thing as reveal’d, it’s because his good Sense, his natural Light, and his Reason inform him, that the Proofs of its Revelation are sufficient. But what will become of us, if every private Person must distrust his Reason as a dark and illusive Principle? Must not he in this Case distrust it, even when he says, The Church has greater Lights than I, she’s therefore more to be believ’d than I? Must not he be afraid, that his Reason is deceiv’d here, both as to the Principle and as to the Consequence he draws from it? What will become of this reasoning too? All that God says is true; he tells us by Moses, that he created the first Man, therefore this is true. If we had not a natural Light afforded us, as a sure and infallible Rule for judging upon every thing that can fall under Debate, not excepting even this Question, Whether such or such a thing is contain’d in Scripture; might not we have ground to doubt of the Major39 of this Argument before us, and consequently of the Conclusion? As this wou’d therefore introduce the most fearful Confusion, the most execrable Pyrrhonism imaginable, we must of necessity stand by this Principle, That all particular Doctrines, whether advanc’d as contain’d in Scripture, or propos’d in any other way, are false, if repugnant to the clear and distinct Notions of natural Light, especially if they relate to Morality. <58>
Having dispatch’d these Preliminary Remarks, which I thought fit to present my Reader, in a way of Universality; I come now to the particular Subject, and special Matter of my Commentary, on the Words of the Parable, Compel ’em to come in: and thus I reason.
The literal Sense of these Words is repugnant to the purest and most distinct Ideas of natural Reason.
It’s therefore false.
The Business now is only to prove the Antecedent; for I presume, the Consequence40 is sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter. I say then,
I. That by the purest and most distinct Ideas of Reason, we find there is a Being sovereignly perfect, who rules over all things, who ought to be ador’d by Mankind, who approves certain Actions, and rewards ’em, and who disapproves and punishes others.
II. By the same way we understand, that the principal Adoration due to this supreme Being, consists in the Acts of the Mind; for if we conceive, that an earthly King wou’d not look on the falling down of a Statue in his Presence, either by chance, or by a violent Blast of Wind, as a homage to his Person, or on the Figure of Pup-<59>pets plac’d before him in a kneeling posture; by a much stronger reason ought we to
