the tainted green;
Of hearing, from the life that fills the flood,
To that which warbles through the vernal wood:
The spider’s touch, how exquisitely fine,
Feels at each thread, and lives along the line:
In the nice bee, what sense so subtly true,
From pois’nous herbs extracts the healing dew.<109>
How instinct varies! in the groveling swine,
Compar’d half reas’ning elephant with thine.
’Twixt that, and reason, what a nice barrier,
For ever sep’rate, yet for ever near:
Remembrance, and reflexion, how ally’d;
What thin partitions sense from thought divide:
And middle natures, how they long to join,
Yet never pass th’ insuperable line!
Without this just gradation, could they be
Subjected these to those, or all to thee?
The pow’rs of all subdued by thee alone,
Is not thy reason all those pow’rs in one?
Essay on man, Epist. 1.38
It is our guiding principle, and ought to be exerted as such.
But if reason be acknowledged to be a perfection or power superior in the scale of life to meer sensitive being, the consequence must be, “That reason ought to be upon the throne within us, set up and maintained by us, as the judge and ruler, from which all appetites, fancies, affections and pursuits ought to receive their commands, and to which they ought to be subject and accountable.”a This seems to need no proof. One may as reasonably ask, why we ought to open our eyes, make use of them, and take care to preserve them from all diseases and imperfections; as why, having reason, we ought to exert it, give it its proper place, and preserve it pure and untainted, and in full possession of its natural right, to guide, direct, and command all our inferior appetites and all our associations. It is as evident, that our appetites and affections are made to be guided by reason, as that reason is a<110> judging power, and as such, our distinguishing, our supreme excellence. If reason be our natural dignity, or that which constitutes us a superior rank of beings above those which have no such governing principle; it must be true, that we only maintain our natural dignity in proportion as reason presides and rules within us; and that we fall below the rank of men, in proportion as reason is weak, impotent, over-powered, and unable to act as a ruling or commanding faculty, in truth, to ask, why man is obliged to act according to his reason, or to be ruled by it, is to ask, why reason is reason. It cannot be denied, without asserting, that it is not a higher rank of life to be endowed with it, than to want it; upon which supposition, man is not one step removed in dignity or perfection above meer animals and a gradation or scale of being, are words without any meaning.
There are two things to be considered with respect to our guiding principle and our rule of conduct.
Our sense of right and wrong.
And our sense of happiness.
That these do not disagree shall be shewn afterwards.
But there are two things which deserve our particular attention with regard to our natural capacity and furniture for directing our conduct, or for the regulation of our appetites, desires, affections and actions. “We have a moral sense, or a sense of right and wrong. And we have a sense of interest and happiness.” Now if it shall appear, that these two senses do not contradict one another; but that they agree in pointing out to us the same course of management and action; then must it be granted, that our nature is very well constituted with respect to our moral conduct. Were these, indeed, at variance, our frame would be very unaccountable, or rather monstrous; but if virtue and interest be really the same, then is every part of our moral frame consonant to every other part of it; and so it is a good or well composed whole. I have used the word virtue, to express what our sense of right and wrong recommends to our choice, because it is universally so used and understood: to use that term, in that sense, is not to beg the question; or to suppose a difference between virtue and vice before we have proved it: it is no<111> more than forewarning, that we are to use virtue and vice, with these other words right and wrong in the same sense, because we think these words are very generally employed as equivalent terms. That we have a sense of virtue and vice, or of right and wrong, is now to be proved.
Our sense of right and wrong, or our moral sense.
Election distinguished from approbation.
We have an approving and disapproving sense.
The qualities that excite approbation or disapprobation.
This is a question about fact, and consequently it can only be resolved in the same way, that other faculties or powers may be proved to belong to our nature. But I am apt to think, that every one shall immediately perceive, that he has a moral sense inherent in him, and really inseparable from him; if he will reflect, “Whether he is not so constituted as to be necessarily determined by his nature, to approve and disapprove certain affections and actions?” For if that be owned, then are there certain affections and actions which he is necessarily determined by his nature to pronounce right, and certain affections and actions which he is necessarily determined by his nature to pronounce wrong. The question now under consideration can be no other than whether we have a determination in our nature to approve and disapprove affections and actions; and what we are thus determined to approve and disapprove. For if there are certain affections and actions which we are constantly so determined to approve or disapprove that we cannot chuse but approve the one kind and disapprove the other; then, whatever these may be, they are with respect to us necessary objects or motives, the one kind, to approbation, and the other, to condemnation or disapprobation. Hardly will any one say, that we have no determination to approve or disapprove. “Approbationa is a simple idea known by consciousness, which can only be explained by synonimous words, or by concomitant or subsequent circumstances. Approbation of our own action, denotes or is attended with a pleasure in the contemplation of it, and in reflexion upon the affections which inclined us to it. Approbation<112> of the action of another is pleasant, and is attended with love toward the agent. And that the qualities exciting to election, or moving to action, are different from those moving to approbation, every one upon reflexion must feel. For we often do actions which we cannot approve, and approve actions which we omit. We often desire that an agent had omitted an action which we approve, and wish he would do an action which we condemn. Approbation is often employed about the actions of others where there is no room for our election.”b But if we experience approbation and disapprobation, then must we have an approving and disapproving faculty; a determination to approve and disapprove: and there must likewise be objects to excite our approbation, and objects to move our disapprobation. So that the remaining question is, what these objects are?
Actions must be done with freedom, affection and reflexion, to excite approbation or condemnation.
I. Now
