was but love of God, and this of man.
Who first taught souls enslav’d, and realms undone,
Th’enormous faith of many made for one?
That proud exception to all nature’s laws,
T’invert the world, and counterwork its cause?
Force first made conquest, and that conquest, law;
Till superstition taught the tyrant awe,
Then shar’d the tyranny, then lent it aid,
And gods of conqu’rors, slaves of subjects made:
She, midst the lightning’s blaze and thunder’s sound,
When rock’d the mountains, and when groan’d the ground,
She taught the weak to bend, the proud to pray
To pow’r unseen, and mightier far than they:
She, from the rending earth, and bursting skies,
Saw Gods descend, and Fiends infernal rise;
Here fix’d the dreadful, there the blest abodes;
Fear made her devils, and weak hope her gods:
Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,
Whose attributes were rage, revenge, or lust,
Such as the souls of cowards might conceive,
And form’d like tyrants, tyrants would believe.<210>
Zeal then, not charity, became the guide,
And hell was built on spite, and heav’n on pride;
Then sacred seem’d th’ aethereal vault no more;
Altars grew marble then, and reek’d with gore:
Then first the flamen tasted living food,
Next his grim idol smear’d with human blood;
With heav’n’s own thunders shook the world below,
And play’d the God an engine on his foe.
Essay on man, Epist. 3.77
But no argument can be brought from thence against a moral sense in our nature.
Now, If it is asked how men, notwithstanding their moral sense, came to suffer themselves to be so grosly imposed upon to their disadvantage? May I not reply, 1. That such an imposition being not more repugnant to a moral sense and a benevolent principle, than it is to self-love, or a desire of private good and happiness; no argument can be brought from its taking place against a moral sense, that does not equally militate against the reality of self-love in our nature; the being and power of which principle was never on that or any other account called into doubt. 2. It appears from history, that such hath always been the care of providence to save, guard against, or deliver men from such pernicious errors, so contrary at once to private interest and to moral sense, as far as could be done consistently with making knowledge progressive and dependent on ourselves: That in all ages of the world, there have appeared true philosophers of generous public spirit, who taught true virtue and religion,<211> and boldly opposed corruption, superstition, and all enslaving doctrines about government; such were Pythagoras, Thales, Solon, Lycurgus, Socrates, Plato, Confucius, Zoroaster, and others: and such must Moses, the Jewish prophets, and JESUS CHRIST be allowed at least to have been. But leaving those with other objections to another place, I shall only add now, that to ask why nature has not prevented all error, all falshood, all imposition, all false opinions and prejudices, all credulity, all wrong associations of ideas and bad habits; is in reality to ask, why nature has not done more than can possibly be done for making us capable of attaining to true knowledge, just ideas and opinions, rational conclusions, improved powers and good habits. For it has been already proved, that we are furnished and qualified for the pursuit of and attainment to knowledge, and for arriving at moral perfection, with all the provision that these ends require in our situation: or with regard to such beings as mankind are and must be, to render the scale of life full and coherent.
Religious contemplation is a very pleasant exercise.
I shall therefore proceed to observe on the head of religion, 1. That every exercise of contemplation, admiration, and love towards an all-perfect creator and governor of the world, is in its nature exceeding pleasant and delightful. All beauty is naturally agreeable to our mind, but chiefly moral beauty. And therefore the contemplation of an all-perfect mind, compleatly wise and good, as well as omnipotent and infinitely removed from all imperfection,<212> must greatly raise, transport and exhilerate the mind. This is the necessary consequence of a moral sense.
And highly improving to virtue.
2. Such contemplation must be highly assisting to and improving of the virtuous temper. It must strengthen our love of virtue; and redouble our emulation to improve and excel in it. It is indeed nothing but the love of virtue in its highest degree. And how doubly satisfying must the conscience of sincere endeavours to advance in virtue be, when one reflects that it is the way, the only way to be like our Creator, and to recommend ourselves to his favour here or hereafter: That it is imitating him, and acting in concert with him.
But good affections may become too strong or vehement.
3. But as every self-affection may be too strong as well as too weak, so may every generous affection be.
This is what Horace means when he says,
Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui,
Ultra quam satis est, virtutem si petat ipsam. 78
Into what religious admiration is apt to degenerate.
If any other guide is set up in our mind superior to natural reason, and not to be tried by it, our whole frame is unhinged.
The best affections may not only be too weak to gain their ends; but by misguidance, or too great indulgence, they may become too strong and vehement. The love of mankind may thus become romantic. And, in like manner, religious contemplation and admiration, tho’, on the one hand, it may be too little exercised in order to our happiness,<213> and the improvement of our temper; yet, on the other hand, it may become too ardent; and thus it may degenerate into such excessive delight in raptorious contemplation, as may render averse to action, the great end of knowledge and of religion. And when one abandons the world to give himself up to religious contemplation, mankind being naturally made for social exercise and communication with one another in many acts of benevolence and friendship, the right ballance of the mind will be lost: action not being duly mixed with contemplation, the imagination will become visionary and romantic. And hence it is, that such persons are apt to imagine
