and demerit, as attributed to human actions, but also contrition and remorse, are inconsistent with necessity; and must be founded on the same delusive sense of liberty of indifference. From these premises, I was led though reluctantly to admit, that some of our moral feelings and emotions must be founded on a delusion. I was sensible of the odium of a doctrine that rests virtue in any measure upon such a foundation; but so firm is my reliance on divine wisdom in the formation of man, that I was not apprehensive of harm in adhering to truth, however unpalatable it might be in some instances. Before a second edition was called for, I discovered for tunately that the feelings and emotions of the moral sense are perfectly consistent with moral necessity; and I gladly laid hold of that opportunity to acknowledge my error. Having so far rescued the moral system from this pretended delusive sense, I was strongly inclined to think, that we had no notion of being able to act against motives; and in the second edition I ventured to say so. But upon reviewing the subject for the present edition, I clearly saw that we really have a notion of being able to act against motives; which renewed my perplexity, till it occurred to me, that that notion is suggested by the irregular influence of passion, and that we never have it in our cool moments; consequently, that it is not a delusion of nature, but of passion only. Candour I shall always esteem essential in addressing the public, no less than in private dealings; and now I am happy in thinking that morality rests on a foundation that has no delusion in it.
In the second edition however, there is another error that I was not able to disintangle myself from. In the Essay of Liberty and Necessity, our notions of chance and contingency are held to be delusive; and consequently, that so far we are led by our nature to deviate from truth. It is a harsh doctrine that we should be so led astray in any instance. As that doctrine never sat easy upon me, I discovered it to be also erroneous; and the error is corrected in the present edition, where I hope it is made clearly out, that the notion we have of chance and contingency, is intirely conformable to the necessary chain of causes and effects. And now, rejoice with memy good reader, in being at last relieved from so many distressing errors.
In correcting the Essay on Personal Identity, having discovered its intimate connection with the moral system, I transferred it from the second Part to the first. And in its place are put several new Essays contributing in some degree to the demonstration given of the Deity.
HENRY HOME.
1779.
CONTENTS
ESSAY I. Our Attachment to Objects of Distress
ESSAY II. Foundation and Principles of Morality
Chap. I. Foundation of Morality
Chap. III. Duty and Obligation
Chap. IV. Different Ranks of Moral Virtues
Chap. VI. Justice and Injustice
Chap. VII. Primary Laws of Nature
Chap. IX. Various Opinions concerning the Foundation of Morality
ESSAY III. Liberty and Necessity
Appendix. Containing the substance of a pamphlet wrote in defence of the third Essay
Sect. I. Perceptions of External Sense
Sect. II. Substance and Quality
Sect. III. Primary and Secondary Qualities
Sect. IV. Veracity of the External Senses
ESSAY III. Different Theories of Vision
ESSAY V. Power, Cause and Effect
ESSAY VI. Knowledge of Future Events
ESSAY VII. Dread of Supernatural Powers in the Dark
ESSAY VIII. Knowledge of the Deity
Power and Intelligence of the Deity
ESSAYS
ON THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
MORALITY
