Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, with Selections from Foundations of the Law of Nature and Nations. Christian Thomasius
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constantly—unless you believe that to live blessedly is something other than to enjoy what is truly and certainly good. See book 1 of the work On Free Will, chapters 12, 13, and 14, On the City of God, chapter 20.81 But the law of nature in corrupt man does not know what this love of the true Deity—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—is, nor does it know this sincere and perfect love of our neighbor; it does not give birth to truly good works, but—if you consider the evil within the soul—only to the appearance of virtue, nor does it lead to eternal beatitude. Otherwise pagans could, by constantly observing the rules of external honesty, aspire to the goal, the ultimate end, which exceeds all of nature after the fall of Adam and all the natural powers [i.e., eternal life]. That would also be contrary to the explicit words of Christ in Mark 16, verse 16. It is the case, therefore, that the law of nature in the state of innocence is not the same as the law of nature in the state of corruption, since the former draws attention to a more sublime dominion and binds humans to it; the latter, however, exists in an inferior sphere: it does, of course, take care that humans do not degenerate into beasts, but does not in any way stimulate the search for and the veneration of God. It is also the case that the law of nature which had informed the mind of Adam was repeated in the Decalogue which corresponded to it exactly; it required that perfection which shone forth in Adam and demanded the highest and most extensive love of God and one’s neighbor, as interpreted by Christ, Matthew 22, verse 37.
§49. In §§125ff. of chapter 282 I stated that the divine positive laws, which direct the duty of man concerning the worship of God, have eternal beatitude as their immediate purpose, and I immediately related ceremonial law to this. Yet I sensed later that there were some theological arguments which could be put forward against me on that matter. One is that the ceremonial law did not have eternal beatitude as its aim in the sense of being a means to acquiring it, so that whoever rigorously observed the Decalogue would achieve salvation. The ceremonial law was also imposed after man had become corrupt and incapable of being saved through a law, and
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divine wisdom would never have imposed a law for a purpose that could never be achieved. The purpose of this law was rather that the Israelite people and the church, from which the Messiah was to be born, should be distinguished from other nations and that the law should be a guide to this end for those people who were subject to it and had that particular promise. The ceremonial law as law therefore did not save anyone, even if it was adhered to rigorously, but it did contribute to salvation, insofar as it furthered belief in the Messiah. For it cannot be denied that the sacrifices and the other sanctions of the law relate to the faith in Christ, but that the law and its sanctions are one thing, the faith they encourage is another. God, therefore, did not have either temporal well-being or eternal salvation in mind when he framed the ceremonial law, in the sense that it would be obtained through this law. But he prescribed a form of worship which on the whole led humans toward faith and the Messiah and directed them toward him, so that they might achieve salvation through him and by these means. If God intended something with a law, this would be obtained by adhering to the law. In that case God would have done better if he had not given corrupt human nature any law at all and had tried to bring about their salvation without a law, because the honor of saving humans, according to his own order, is due to his grace and to faith alone, etc. What do we reply? To put it briefly: We agree completely that, by observing the ceremonial law, humans cannot acquire eternal beatitude, but we deny that therefore it cannot be said that God intended the eternal beatitude of man in this law. We argue, rather, that because God in imposing this law wanted to provide guidance toward faith in Christ, he thereby intended to save humans. We believe it also has to be said that in the very imposition of this ceremonial law God intended the salvation of man, not immediately, but eventually, insofar as it contributed toward faith. Therefore we note that this phrase that “God had a purpose in the law” is to be understood in two ways: first to refer to an intention, which supplies the law as an immediate means to achieve this end; second, it is understood to refer to an intention, which looks to achieve an end in such a way that the law itself does not supply the means, but only leads us to the means to achieve the end. The former meaning is that used in the objection, but we are concerned with the latter sense in our Institutes. I will
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illustrate through a simile that the latter sense is not inappropriate. Thus it is not inappropriate for me to say that he who studies physic because he wants to later devote his efforts to medicine intends to cure the human body, even when he learns in physic the imperfections to which the body is subject. This is so even though the knowledge of these imperfections is not the means to achieve this cure, but only leads to another discipline which does show the cure, namely, medicine. Yet I can forgive someone who has skimmed my Institutes or read them superficially and then raises this objection, because I realize that my choice of words encourages it. For I had said that in the laws which concern the worship of God, including the ceremonial law, God immediately intended the eternal beatitude of humans. How did God intend this salvation in a law if the law itself is not a means to achieving it? The ceremonial law and all the other laws that were published after the fall do not dictate beliefs that are to be held, but actions to be performed, and regulate some matters concerning divine worship. We admit that they look toward eternal life only in the last instance and to the extent that they offer guidance toward faith. But we thereby clearly assert that these same laws are concerned mediately with eternal beatitude. If this is the case, surely, one of the main principles on which our Institutes rest would be overturned. Thus, in order both to support my principles and to put to rest this grave doubt, it is all-important that I resolve another ambiguity which is contained in the phrase “to intend something immediately.” The word immediate is taken either in an absolute sense as a negation of any other means, or conditionally as a negation of certain means. If someone wants to examine accurately what we have discussed in our Institutes in the said chapter [2 of book 1], §§125ff., it will be clear to him that when we say that “laws regulating divine worship have eternal beatitude as their immediate end,” it is not our intention to deny all means, such as faith, but to deny only that these laws concern eternal salvation via temporal well-being, or that they concern temporal well-being and the tranquillity of humanity in the first instance and eternal life in the second. We will explain our meaning again with a simile. If I compare the study of nature with ethics I say correctly, and certainly not inappropriately, that the immediate aim of ethics is the care for the mind; the study of nature, however, has as its immediate end the care of the
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body. Apart from this