certain other men.
13. To understand the use and application of the precept on cultivating sociability more clearly, we think that one should take note of three points which define the limits of what should be done and what not done in cases in which men’s differing interests seem to prompt them to different courses.
14. In the first place we note that there are certain advantages or pleasures which men can get either from their own actions or from external objects or from the actions of other men, and which it is to the interest of human society to secure to them in certain circumstances, and which should not be obstructed, withdrawn, or intercepted, since they contribute to preserving and strengthening social inclination and social life among men. This is why these advantages and pleasures are fortified by the general precept of cultivating sociability, and become rights, either perfect or imperfect, according as they are necessary for preserving sociability or merely conduce to strengthening it.
15. Secondly, we note that these rights are equal for all in similar circumstances; hence, if they are given by nature, they belong to all men equally so far as they have not forfeited them; or if they are acquired by means of some human act, they can be acquired equally by all in similar circumstances, by means of similar acts.
16. Thirdly, we note that it is not contrary to the nature of social life but is essential for sustaining it, even in cases where men’s interests conflict, that each man should take a certain particular care of himself and his own, though subordinate to the cultivation of sociability. If this were not so, there would be massive general confusion, since most men would rely on someone else to help them, while idling their time away and neglecting to cultivate the resources which nature had given them. Hence, from the other point of view, it would follow that no one could have a firm expectation of anything from other people or count on their help in advancing his own claims.
17. We conclude, therefore, that the right cultivation of social life consists in each man protecting his own right with due consideration for every man’s right, perfect or imperfect, in accordance with the assumption of the natural equality which belongs to every other man. It follows that, in order to define the duty which is incumbent on each man with respect to other men, we cannot pursue a better course than to weigh carefully, in due order, the various rights which belong or may belong to individuals, to groups of men, or even to the human race as a whole, and the different foundations on which each rests. For it will be immediately evident what obligations correspond to each right.
18. In the appendix6 we have given a general idea of the method which we think should be followed in doing this; it is rather different from that of Pufendorf.
Worship of God the first law of nature7
It is clear from what we have said that Pufendorf’s method of deducing our duties toward God [i.e., indirectly from sociability] ought by no means to satisfy us. On the contrary, it is a prior and more evident principle that God is to be worshipped than that one should live sociably with men. This is particularly so since, as the distinguished author admits at section 10 of this chapter, for the precept on cultivating sociability to obtain the force of law, one must necessarily presuppose that there is a God, and that he rules all things by his Providence. And it is not true, as the author adds here, that reason alone can progress no further in religion than so far as it serves to promote the peace and sociability of this life. For even though the religion which effectively procures the salvation of souls originates in a particular divine revelation, yet reason itself teaches that in worshipping God and offering universal obedience to the divine laws, one must have before one’s eyes something more than the good things of the present life, especially if these good things are only regarded as flowing by a certain natural consequence from the performance of those duties. See pp. 22 and 24 and compare p. 30. [I.3.13.i]
Care of self the second law of nature
There is no reason to deduce care of self from sociability, for any man would be bound to care for himself even though he were alone in the world. Similarly there seems to be no better reason why care for self should be deduced from religion in the narrow sense more than sociability should. Obviously duties of both kinds must be performed with regard for God; but despite that, all duties, apart from direct worship of God, are appropriately deduced from their own principles established above. Thus one must admit that there is such a close bond between the duties of man toward God, toward himself, and toward other men that there will always be a temptation to change the order and try to deduce them from any one of the three principles given above.8 [I.3.13.ii]
Among the duties owed to God, our author is right to give first place to correct beliefs about him. Beneath the first elements of moral doctrine we must set a sure and certain knowledge of God, of his attributes, and of the dependence of all things upon him. (In this sense the distinguished Gerard de Vries in the last paragraph of the final chapter of his Pneumatological Determinations, section 3,2 has rightly observed that the end of pneumatology is the beginning of moral philosophy.) Consequently these beliefs are not put forward here so much to establish their truth as to emphasize every man’s duty of supporting and protecting them. [I.4.1.i]
The older writers may profitably be read on this argument [to the existence of God from “reflection on the fabric of the universe”]; we will realize that nature clearly confessed its author even before it was explored. But we should give particular attention to those who have recently written on this question: for the greater the progress that has been made in the science of nature, the more brightly the signs of the Divine Workman shine.3 [I.4.2.i]
Conviction of the existence and providence of the Supreme Deity should be planted deep in our minds as the immovable foundation of all religion and morality. And therefore, we must very much beware of those who oppose this belief and must root them out of our midst, as they have an utterly destructive effect on men’s very morals.
Particularly pernicious in this way (apart from atheism and Epicureanism, both of which, as the author notes, equally attack in a very direct way all religion and morality) is the opinion of those ancients, whether philosophers or poets, who taught that all things and actions are necessarily determined by a certain inevitable fate, antecedent to the determination of the divine will; they subjected even Jove to fate.
Nor is it a correct understanding of the absolute dominion of God to think that the network of secondary causes and effects is so firm and inviolable that even God himself could not abolish it once he had established the original frame of things, or suspend it in a particular case. Innumerable examples of miracles fully prove the falseness of this doctrine. It is a mistake to object, as our author does at Of the Law of Nature and Nations, II.IV.4, that if you accept this belief, you seem to destroy the effect of prayers, penitence, and moral reform. For God could connect the moral actions of men with these moral effects both by his decree and also, if he willed, by the pre-established harmony of things. And it is reasonable to believe that this is the case, since experience proves that divine providence often reveals its splendor in attuning the outcome of events to our moral actions, even when there is no reason to believe that a miracle has occurred. Others may wish to argue for a physical concatenation of causes and effects in order to exclude the moral connection of which we have
