in terms of lesson learning because the Vichy French had had no air forces, the enemy strength had been known and the ports had been swiftly captured. For HUSKY, hastily developed landing craft could deliver a certain amount of supplies directly on to beaches, but this was considered a temporary measure at best. The swift capture of ports was recognized to be essential.
Yet in this respect the island was poorly served, despite its long history as a maritime base. Shipping had grown massively in recent decades and so had armies, yet Sicily, still centuries behind the times in many ways, had not caught up. Without Messina, it was estimated the east coast ports could manage around 3,400 tons a day, while western harbours – Palermo plus Trapani and a couple of other smaller ones – could collectively cope with around 4,700 tons. The tiny southern coast ports together could handle possibly as much as 1,400 tons each day. And that was assuming the ports had not been wrecked first and would be open for business almost immediately.
A horrible planning conundrum was very quickly rearing its ugly head. Key to success was air power, and yet a mass of enemy airfields were stretched along both sides of this awkward triangular and really quite large Mediterranean island. Fighter aircraft from Malta could cover the eastern side of Sicily, but not the west. From Cap Bon in Tunisia, Palermo was at the outer reach of effective fighter cover. The much-needed ports were in both the west and the east, which implied the need for landings at the geographical and logistical extremes in both directions. That was all very well, but risked the two invasion forces being effectively independent of one another and therefore not mutually supporting, and so being exposed to defeat in isolation. Since planning was taking place from February – and starting at the very moment of a reversal in fortunes in Tunisia – it was impossible to know what enemy strength they might face when they finally landed in Sicily. It was anyone’s guess in February 1943, and even more so by the beginning of May when a plan was finally agreed. It made the entire operation the most terrible risk.
Historians have not been kind to the Allied planners for HUSKY. Everyone, it seems, has had it in the neck from those sitting in the comfort of their armchairs many decades after the events took place. Eisenhower has been accused of being too weak, Alexander for not gripping the process, everyone else for being at one another’s throats, and Montgomery, especially, for being brash, arrogant and selfish. Really, it’s been extraordinary how deep the criticism has run; yet because most of the key decision-makers already had their hands full fighting a bitter battle in Tunisia, it’s hard to think of a more challenging set of circumstances in which to prepare such an enormous undertaking.
A different point of view on the planning of HUSKY is that it was always going to be a mind-bogglingly difficult operation to prepare, and that an evolving plan was entirely normal and understandable for such an enterprise in such challenging circumstances. Furthermore, what is remarkable about the HUSKY planning is not the levels of discord involved, but rather, how well the new coalition partners were operating and rubbing along together.
It is all too easy to be seduced by a choice one-liner in a diary taken in isolation. The journals and letters of these senior commanders need to be read and understood within the context in which they were written: by men with overwhelming amounts of responsibility and as a means of letting off steam as much as to set down a record for posterity. Most people, at some point in their lives, have argued vociferously for something they care about, whether with colleagues, friends or family. So it was with the Allied commanders, but for them the consequences of making the wrong decision were potentially catastrophic – including the loss of many young men’s lives – so of course, at times, matters grew heated. It was to be expected. But this really does not mean the coalition was crumbling at the seams. Far from it; that the senior commanders could debate such matters so openly was both healthy and a demonstration of how much they cared about the mission they had been given.
In this new partnership, Eisenhower was the chief executive answerable to a board of Joint Chiefs, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Alexander, Tedder and Cunningham were the CEOs of subsidiary arms. The difference was that their results would be judged not in terms of share price, but in success in battle and numbers of casualties.
Alexander wrote to General Brooke on 5 April from his tactical headquarters near the Tunisian Front. Despite having to give much of his attention to current operations, he had, he told the CIGS, been giving time to the study of HUSKY. ‘I think we are on a good wicket,’ he wrote, ‘provided certain obvious conditions are fulfilled – such as air and naval superiority and not too many good German formations in the way.3 The latter we cannot prevent, but the former we can influence and I want to put it quite plainly. The margin between success and failure is small. If the Navy and the air forces, especially the latter, will go all out 100% in their backing the Army, we should pull off a great victory.’ He was keen to use the airborne forces being assembled in helping to secure the beachheads. Alex was also aware of the shortfall in shipping caused by the continued and growing battle in Tunisia. ‘LSTs are short – other shipping is short,’ he acknowledged. ‘But it must be found, even if people at home go short. Half measures or half-hearted measures will spell defeat for certain – we must go all out 100% for a win. RN, RAF and Army.’
What he meant was, HUSKY was not the operation on which to take any avoidable risks. Stalingrad, Tunisgrad – as it was now being called – the start of the all-out strategic air offensive against Germany by Bomber Command, and the battle against the U-boats in the Atlantic which was about to reach a peak in favour of the Allies: all pointed to a dramatic reversal of fortunes for the Axis. It was on its knees and there was, realistically, no way back now for Nazi Germany. What was uncertain was how much longer the war would continue and how many more lives would be lost in the process. For the Allies to attack Sicily and be thrown back into the sea would not mean losing the war but it would be a terrible setback. It would also unquestionably push back OVERLORD, the cross-Channel invasion that had been agreed for 1944. Far better to cover all bases, cut out as much risk as possible and make sure HUSKY was a success. Alexander’s assessment was spot-on.
The date for HUSKY had been set for early July when the moon was favourable, and although both Churchill and Marshall repeatedly urged Eisenhower and Alexander to bring it forward a month if at all possible, as time marched on, and the Tunisian campaign continued, it became increasingly clear they would have to stick with the July date. This was because even once victory had been won in North Africa on 13 May, time was needed to properly train the assault battalions and also the airborne forces who were seen as a key component of the invasion. So Eisenhower stuck to his guns. The day of invasion, D-Day – the day – would be Saturday, 10 July.
The British chiefs of staff in London had already developed a speculative plan, which they passed on to Alexander’s Force 141 in Bouzarea. With Alex off at the Tunisian front, it was left to Major-General Charles Gairdner, his new chief of staff, to oversee the multinational planning team and try to make some sense of the complex issues that faced them. One particularly ominous line in the London plan warned: ‘We are doubtful of the chances of success against a garrison which includes German formations.’4 Alexander felt this was massively overstating the threat but made clear to Gairdner, in the brief moment he was able to give it his attention, that the first plan was a starting point only. None the less, at this early stage of the planning, it seemed a good idea to try and find a way to make landings in both the east and the west, possibly staggered, so as to both knock out key concentrations of airfields and also swiftly capture Palermo as well as Catania, Augusta and Syracuse, and so solve the issue of how to build up strength rapidly.
‘The month of February and the early days of March were the most critical periods in Tunisia,’ noted Alexander, ‘and it was impossible for me to give the plans for Sicily any detailed attention.’5 That was more than understandable, albeit far from ideal; but even so, he was able to make some suggestions and modifications to the plan. His biggest concern with the early drafts was the distance between the divisions and brigades that were landing – they were clearly too far apart, not mutually supporting and in danger of being picked off in isolation. Nor were the burgeoning airborne forces of
