have been formed, or who would be so presumptuous and audacious that he would dare to appropriate the second to himself? “A body of doctrine,” says the famous Daunou,1 “supposes that human understanding has made all possible progress, opposes itself to all advancements that remain, draws a circle around all acquired understandings, inevitably includes many errors, opposes the development of the sciences, the arts, and all type of industry.” And who would be capable of having formed it? Even if, for such an unattainable project, the most celebrated men of the universe had been gathered together, nothing would have been achieved. Should their writings be recorded anyway, they will be found full of errors in the midst of some truths they have contributed to public enlightenment. The daily and continuing improvement perceived in all human actions is demonstrable proof that the perfectibility of human mental powers has no limit and of how much would have been lost in holding back their advancement, had this been possible.
We are persuaded that none of the present governments will boast of their inability to err. They and the people entrusted to their leadership are too enlightened to be able to claim and grant such privileges, but if the governments are composed of men who are as fallible as others, through what principle of justice, or by what legal right, will they proceed to determine or prohibit doctrines? How would they dare determine for us those opinions we are to follow and those we are prohibited from professing? Is this not an act of aggression with an unattainable end, which nothing can justify? Without doubt. It, nonetheless, is common and almost always serves as a pretext for classifying citizens and immediately persecuting them. It makes men responsible for the opinions they hold or assume, and these are converted into a reason for hatred and loathing. In this way factions are perpetuated, given that the triumphant dogma will one day be toppled, and it then comes to be a crime to profess it. This is how nations become demoralized, and a forced traffic
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in lies is established that compels the weak to conceal their ideas and makes those with strong spirits the targets of persecution.
Come, now, will it be lawful to express all opinions? Does not the authority have the right to prohibit the enunciation of some? Will many of them, inevitably mistaken, not be detrimental? Yes, but we assert resolutely that opinions about doctrines must be entirely free. No one doubts that the surest means, or, better said, the only means, to arrive at knowledge of the truth is examination that produces free discussion. Then not only one’s own reflections are present but also those of others, and it has happened a thousand times that, upon criticism and perhaps error or someone’s irrelevant observation, the fate of a nation has depended. No understanding, no matter how vast and universal one supposes it to be, can embrace everything or exhaust any subject matter. From this it follows that everyone, in all subject matters, especially those that treat of government, needs the help of everyone else, which they will certainly not obtain if freedom of speech and written expression is not assured, sheltering the opinions and their authors from all aggression that could be attempted against them by those who do not accept these opinions. The government, then, cannot proscribe or grant protection for any doctrine. This is beyond its jurisdiction; it is created only to observe and see that citizens observe the laws.
It is true that, among opinions, there are and must be many erroneous ones; it is equally true that all error, of whatever kind and under whatever aspect it is considered, is highly harmful. But it is not less true that prohibitions are not means of remedying error. The free circulation of ideas and the differences that result from counterviews constitute the only way to correct opinions. If the power to regulate opinions were conceded to some authority, this latter would very quickly abuse such power, and who would be charged with restraining us from error? He who is exempt from it? But governments do not find themselves in this category; very much the opposite. When one searches for causes that have most spread error and contributed to perpetuating error, they are always found in the prohibiting institutions. On the other hand, if governments were authorized to prohibit all errors and punish the foolish, the world would very soon be missing a large portion of humanity, the rest being reduced to eternal silence. We will be told that not all opinions have to be subject to the control of authority, but if one opinion is
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subject, the rest are not safe. Laws cannot make precise classification or exact enumeration of all opinions. Thus it is that such a power is necessarily arbitrary and, most of the time, will be converted into a reason for persecution. These are not unfounded suspicions. Look back at the barbarian centuries and it will be seen that the universities, the parliaments, the chancelleries, and the kings were determined to place proscriptions on the learned who were making physical discoveries and attacking the doctrines of Aristotle. Pedro Ramos Tritemio, Galileo, and innumerable others suffered what would not be believable if it were not made obvious to us beyond any doubt. And what was the fruit of such methods? Did the governments succeed in what they were attempting? Not in the least. Converts increased day by day, perhaps because of that very persecution.
In effect, if one wants to give credence to a doctrine, nothing else is needed but to forbid it. Men naturally suppose, and in this they do not deceive themselves, that a doctrine cannot be fought by reason when it is attacked by force. Strong spirits and courageous souls hold fast to forbidden doctrines, more for show than from conviction, because the spirit of novelty and making themselves the object of public excitement, attracting the attention of everyone, is so lively a passion, and as a final consequence an inappropriate remark that might have remained buried in the corner of a house degenerates into heresy that possibly undermines the supports of the social edifice because of the importance persecution bestows on it.
But does not discrediting the laws make them contemptible and inspire men to transgress them, depriving the laws of their stature? And is this not the outcome of the frank criticism that is made of them? When the laws have been dictated with calm and care, when they are the outcome of a free discussion, and when the spirit of partisanship and the fears that it instills in legislators have not contributed to their preparation, making the general interest subordinate to the private interest for reasons external to them, the fear of such outcomes is very remote; but to prevent it, governments must be very alert and not lose sight of public opinion, favoring it in everything. This is formed only by free discussion, which cannot be maintained when the government or some faction is granted the power of the press and condemns, with no sense of shame, those who either impugn the dogmas of the sect or throw light on its abuses of authority. On the contrary, when one proceeds without
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prejudice and in good faith, when one listens attentively and impartially, everything that is said or written in support of or against the laws is certainly on the road to being right. We never tire of repeating it: freedom of opinions regarding doctrine has never been disastrous for any people; but all the events of modern history prove with the greatest certainty the dangers and risks that nations have run when one faction has managed to take possession of the press, has dominated the government, and, availing itself of it, has silenced by terror those who could educate it.
But governments do not take warning despite such repeated examples. Always fixed in the present moment, they disregard the future. Their principal error consists in believing they can do anything, and it is enough to hint at its will for it to be promptly and faithfully obeyed. Perhaps they turn on themselves when there is no longer any remedy, when they have been discredited and have precipitated the nation into an abyss of evils. We conclude our reflections, then, recommending to the trustees of power that they be convinced that when they make crimes of opinions, they run the risk of punishing talents and virtues, of losing the idea, and of making famous the memory of their victims.
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Discourse on the Means Ambition
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