for if it had not, the faction would have perished when it was first arising.
But to what must this willingness to oblige be attributed? What interest can the government have in pretending not to notice destructive factions? This is clear to anyone who knows that in free governments there must be a persistent conflict between them and their subjects. The power exercised by men, no matter how broad it might be, always brings with it an irresistible drive to extend itself more and more, becomes annoyed with the obstacles that the law puts up against it, and, like a torrent, constantly pushes and hollows out the dikes in which the general will keeps it contained, always watchful and ready to invade if there is no resistance. As it cannot openly and clearly trample on the laws, it avoids them, glosses them in accord with its intentions, varnishes its transgressions with lovely names, hypocritically takes as a motto what society most esteems, that is, its independence and tranquility, pretends dangers, feigns or exaggerates conspiracies, and uses the vague and insignificant name of circumstances (when it is not possible to have them because of injustice) as a veil to hide its lies and as a weapon to destroy all social benefits.
But the personal interest of each member of society, spurred on by the danger that threatens it, claims offenses on the part of the authority, demands observance of the laws, cries out against abuses, criticizes the conduct of those who govern, and, with the weapons of reason and
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justice, encircles its guarantees against the assaults of the power, calls the nation to its aid, and because of this valiant resistance they end up thwarted.
It also happens that in their weakness, those who govern never believe it possible to advance by the well-worn path of the laws; they suppose that their powers are not sufficient for emergencies, all beneficial measures are paralyzed in their trembling hands; they do not dare uphold legal methods with vigor and integrity, fearful of everything and everyone, and in vacillation and uncertainty regarding all and everything, those who govern lose the favorable opportunity, squander the best elements; the edifice is worn away, and everything dies under their slow and collapsed administration, those being the first who are submerged in nothingness, where they should always hide themselves.
In both cases, which are common among recently constituted peoples, in which the public spirit has neither progressed nor formed customs, the government, not finding in itself means to triumph or resources not to die, casts its covetous eyes on the various classes that make up the nation; but the virtuous citizens are not capable of helping injustice triumph, and they are also very open in telling those imbeciles who govern that the only thing they have to do is entrust the post to whomever knows how to execute it. It is, then, a certain consequence that an evil or weak government will depend on factions composed of corrupt characters, those who, in exchange for commanding the government itself, lend themselves to the most iniquitous goals, and as a reward they immediately request and obtain jobs, pensions, wealth (all spoils of a sacrificed nation); as collaborators, they set themselves up as essential, they identify themselves with the government, one is their interest, the other their goal; disorder, injustice, oppression. In this case the agitators believe and consider themselves to be the government itself, and when the public voice cries out against their lies, they respond with insolence that doing so is to discredit the government, that to attack them is to attack it, as if the name of government could justify iniquities, or as if a government that has made itself factious would still merit respect and esteem, which in a republic is the reward for virtues. Meanwhile dull or perverse rulers degrade themselves, making themselves blind and passive instruments of their own and the general ruin. And here is the first and most terrible characteristic of a devastating faction.
The majority of a nation is always just and reasonable, for men, although
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they might individually be bad, gathered together or collectively are virtuous, according to Montesquieu’s observation. Men gathered together inevitably identify themselves with what is useful to all, a clear instinct makes them sense that any injustice whatsoever redounds against them, and if they do the evil deed thinking they can escape its consequences, they never put into practice the evil deed that hangs over their heads.
Never, then, can disastrous projects be the work of any but a small group that, tenaciously pursuing its own prosperity, will impudently tread on the laws, do away with all barriers that oppose virtue, the most wicked methods costing it nothing so long as they lead to the venting of its revenge or the insatiable yearning of its ambition or avarice, it will defy public opinion and will abjure all decency. The agitators themselves will be amazed at having arrived where they did not foresee, for, drunken with their first triumphs, they will have embarked upon and achieved excesses that cannot have happened to anyone, except when that one is involved in enormous crimes that it is necessary to cover over with other, even more atrocious crimes. For them, morality (the only true politics) is an impediment that they have removed from their course, growing deaf to its clamors, and by force of combating it, they have managed to harden themselves against remorse and honor. What must be the fate of the unhappy nation whose destiny is in such hands? What fortunes will be enough to gratify the ravenous swarm of catilinarians? What laws, what equity, what rights will be respected by those who forsake order?
The difference between the methods of a faction and those of a sound part or majority of a people is palpable. This latter knows no other methods than guarantees, laws, justice, because these methods can never ever be contrary by their nature to the end to which they aspire; there are between them intimate relations that can hardly exist between injustice and benevolence, which is universal justice. How can those who violate the principles of justice, then, argue that they love the nation, that they promote the general good, the only foundation for justice? Are people so stupid that they come to believe that they can be saved only by trampling on the venerable principles of virtue? Will those who offend this essential principle and soul of the republic be republicans? Will the nation ever think that its situation is such that the political dogmas to which it has consecrated reason and experience of all the centuries have
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nothing to do with it? Has the nature of things changed? And so, if it suits a faction, must we abjure the most evident and holy truths and violate reason, this support and asylum of man? You who make a show of saving us by crushing the rights of humanity, know that if it were possible that our existence and honor were incompatible with justice, we would rather choose to die in disgrace. But it does not depend on you to change what is disinterested and eternal, and it is much easier to believe and even feel that your tricks and processes are what is incompatible with the good and honor of men; their future will depend on and be secured forever by justice. If you were fair you would say that ambition, vengeance, avarice . . . are the true motives for your conduct; give up fraud and histrionics that no one believes and everyone detests.
But despite everything, haughty with the experiment they have made of their power, they try to make good use of the moments, knowing that their fatal influence will last only until the nation, terrified by upheaval, deploys its irresistible resources against this handful of vipers that eat away at its core; so they try to lull the nation with deceitful snares and to intimidate and persecute those men who, with wisdom and character, can unmask them and make their crimes evident to the people, lead a reaction in support of the constitution and the laws, and oust them. From here emanates the spirit of intolerance and persecution, another innate characteristic of factions.
“Of all the proscriptions,” says the famous Bignon,1 “the most terrible are those stirred up by a minority. The majority, which knows its strengths, can be momentarily cruel; but neither is it for a long time, nor is it always. The minority, on the contrary, believes that it increases its number by multiplying its harsh acts. . . . Proscription has a frightening character when it attempts to repress the dominant spirit of nations, for inasmuch as it then originates from a fragment that wishes to subjugate the majority, it is inevitable that it be more violent
