Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence. Samuel Pufendorf
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DEFINITION XIII
A law is a decree by which a superior binds one subject to him to direct his actions according to the command of the superior
DEFINITION XIV
Authority is an active moral power by which some person legitimately and with a direct moral effect can perform an action
DEFINITION XV
The affections of a voluntary action are the modes through which it is denominated or defined in a certain manner
DEFINITION XVI
A good action is one which agrees with the law; a bad action is one which disagrees with the same
DEFINITION XVII
A just action is one which of free moral choice is rightly directed to that person to whom it is owed
DEFINITION XVIII
The quantity of moral actions is the estimative measure by which they are said to be of a certain degree
Appendix to Definition XVIII in which the Moral Sphere is explained
DEFINITION XIX
By the effect of a moral action is meant that which is produced by it
DEFINITION XX
Merit is an estimative moral quality resulting to a man from an action which he is not bound to perform, in accordance with which there is owed him an equivalent good on the part of the one in whose favour that action was undertaken
DEFINITION XXI
Demerit is an estimative moral quality resulting to a man from a bad action, through which he is under obligation to make amends for the injury done to a second person thereby
Book II
AXIOM I
Any action whatsoever that may be directed according to a moral norm, which is within a man’s power to do or not to do, may be imputed to him. And, on the contrary: That which neither in itself nor in its cause was within a man’s power, may not be imputed to him (that is, as a matter of desert, yet it is well if that be done as an act of grace on the part of the one who makes the imputation, in case some good has come to pass)
AXIOM II
Any person whatsoever can effectively, or with the obligation to perform them, enjoin on someone subject to himself those things to which his authority over the other extends itself
OBSERVATION I
A man can judge properly of things apprehended by the power of his intellect
OBSERVATION II
From an internal principle a man can move himself to undertake or to leave undone a certain action
OBSERVATION III
A man is destined by nature to lead a social life with men
OBSERVATION IV
Right reason dictates that a man should care for himself in such a way that human society be not thrown into disorder
OBSERVATION V
The law of nature alone is not directly sufficient to preserve the social life of man, but it is necessary that sovereignties be established in particular societies
THE ELEMENTS OF
UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE
BY
SAMUEL PUFENDORF
1. Of a voluntary action which is also moral.
2. The material element.
3. The fundamental element.
4. The formal element.
5. That which is a positive entity.
6. The division of actions.
7. The natural action.
8. Plan of the first book.
1. We call voluntary actions those actions placed within the power of man, which depend upon the will, as upon a free cause, in such wise that, without its decision setting forth from the same man’s actions as elicited by previous cognition of the intellect, they would not come to pass; and, indeed, according as they are regarded not in their natural condition, but in so far as they come to pass from a decision of the will. Now a voluntary action involves two things: One is, as it were, the material element, which is the exercise regarded in itself; the other is, as it were, the formal element, which is the dependence of the exercise upon the decision of the will, and the reason, operating with a kind of freedom of choice, by which the action as decided by the will is conceived.1 The exercise itself, considered apart and in itself for the sake of distinction, is better called an act of the will, or one coming from the will, than voluntary. Now, in truth, an action of the will is further regarded either in itself and absolutely, according