Liberal Thought in Argentina, 1837–1940. Группа авторов

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brings upon himself scorn and hatred in place of love and veneration.

      The vicars and ministers of Christ must not take any temporal employment or authority whatsoever; Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo, our divine master said, and he showed thus the limits of the Church’s authority.

      The clergy, as members of the state, are under its jurisdiction and cannot form a privileged body distinct from society. Like all other citizens, they must be bound by the same burdens and obligations, the same civil and penal laws, and the same authorities. All men are equal; only merit and virtue can engender supremacy.12

      X

      12. ORGANIZATION OF THE FATHERLAND ON DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS

      Equality and liberty are the two central axes, or rather, the two poles of the world of democracy.

      Democracy arises from a necessary fact, namely, the equality of the classes, and marches steadily toward the conquest of the broadest kingdom of liberty, of individual, civil, and political freedom.

      [print edition page 40]

      Democracy is not a form of government, but the very essence of all republican governments, or instituted by all for the good of the community or the society.

      Democracy is the rule of liberty based on the equality of the classes.

      All modern political associations seek to establish the equality of the classes, and it can be assured, in observing the progressive movement of the European and American nations, “that the gradual development of equality of conditions is a providential fact; it has the principal characteristics of one: it is universal, it is lasting, it escapes every day from human power; all events, like all men, serve its development.”13

      Democracy is the government of the majorities or the uniform consent of the reason of all men, working for the creation of the law and to decide supremely over all that interests society.

      That general and uniform consent constitutes the sovereignty of the people.

      The sovereignty of the people is unlimited in all that belongs to society, in politics, in philosophy, in religion; but the people are not sovereign as regards the individual, his conscience, his property, his life, and his liberty.

      Association has been established for the good of all men; it is the common foundation of all individual interests or the animated symbol of the strength and intelligence of each one.

      The goal of society is to organize democracy and ensure to each and every one of its members the broadest and most free enjoyment of their natural rights; the broadest and freest exercise of their faculties.

      Therefore the sovereign people or the majority cannot violate those individual rights, limit the exercise of those faculties, which are at once the origin, the bond, the condition, and the goal of society.

      From the moment it violates them, the pact is broken, society dissolves,

      [print edition page 41]

      and each man shall be the absolute owner of his will and his actions and derive his right from his strength.

      It follows from here that the limit of collective reason is the right; and the limit of individual reason, the sovereignty of the reason of the people.

      The rights of man come before the rights of society. The individual under God’s law and the law of mankind is the sole owner of his life, his property, his conscience, and his liberty: his life is a gift from God; his property, the sweat of his brow; his conscience, the eye of his soul and the intimate judge of his actions; his freedom, the necessary condition for the development of the faculties that God has given him so that he might live happily, the very essence of his life, as life without freedom is death.

      The right of the association is therefore circumscribed by the orbit of individual rights.

      The sovereign, the people, the majority dictate the social and positive law with the goal of strengthening and enacting the primeval law, the natural law of the individual. So it is that, far from denying man part of his freedom and rights when he enters society, he has, on the contrary, come together with the others and formed the association in order to ensure and extend them.

      If the positive law of the sovereign follows natural law, that right is legitimate and all must obey it, on pain of punishment as offenders; if it violates it, it is illegitimate and tyrannical and no one is obliged to obey it.

      The individual’s right to resist the tyrannical decisions of the sovereign people or of the majority is therefore legitimate, as is the right to repel force with force, and to kill the thief or murderer who attacks our property or our lives, as this is born from the very conditions of the social pact.

      The sovereignty of the people is unlimited as long as it respects the right of man: first principle.

      The sovereignty of the people is absolute as long as reason is its norm: second principle.

      Only collective reason is sovereign, not the collective will. The will is blind, whimsical, irrational; the will wants, reason examines, weighs, and decides.

      It therefore follows that the sovereignty of the people may reside only

      [print edition page 42]

      in the reason of the people, and that only the sensible and rational part of the social community is summoned to exercise it.

      The ignorant part remains under the protection and safeguard of the law dictated by the uniform consent of the rational people.

      Democracy, then, is not the absolute despotism of the masses, nor of the majorities; it is the rule of reason.

      Sovereignty is the greatest and most solemn act of reason of a free people. How can those who do not know of its importance take part in this act? Those who through their lack of enlightenment are incapable of discerning right from wrong in terms of public affairs? Those who, ignorant as they are of what best suits them, have no opinion of their own and are therefore exposed to yield to the suggestions of the malicious? Those who through their imprudent vote might compromise the liberty of the country and the existence of society? I say, how could the blind see, the crippled walk, the mute speak; that is, how could he who has neither capacity nor independence take part in sovereign acts?

      Another condition for the exercise of sovereignty is industry. The idler, the vagabond, he who has no trade, cannot be part of the sovereign, because he is not tied by any interest whatsoever to society and will easily give his vote for gold or threats.

      He whose well-being depends on the will of another and enjoys no personal independence cannot be entitled to sovereignty, as he would hardly sacrifice his interests for the independence of his reason.

      The tutelage of the ignorant, of the vagabond, of he who does not have personal independence, is therefore necessary. The law does not prevent them from exercising sovereign rights per se, only as long as they remain minors; it does not divest them of these but imposes a condition for possessing them; the condition of emancipating themselves.

      But the people, the masses, do not always have the means in their hands to gain their emancipation. Society or the government that represents it must put it within their reach.

      It should

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