1774
1775
COLONEL WASHINGTON took a decided part against the claims of supremacy asserted by the British parliament; and was elected a member of the first congress. He was soon distinguished as the soldier of America, and placed on all those committees whose duty it was to make arrangements for defence. When it became necessary to appoint a commander-in-chief, his military character, the solidity of his judgment, the steady firmness of his temper, the dignity of his person and deportment, the confidence inspired by his patriotism and industry, and the independence of his fortune, combined to designate him in the opinion of all for that important station. Local jealousy was suppressed by the enthusiasm of the moment, and, on the 14th of June, 1775, he was unanimously chosen “general and commander-in-chief of the armies of the united colonies, and all the forces now raised or to be raised by them.”
On the succeeding day, when this appointment was communicated to him, he modestly expressed his high sense of the honor conferred upon him, and his firm determination to exert every power he possessed in the service of his country and of her “glorious cause.” Declining all compensation for his services, he avowed an intention to keep an exact account of his expenses, which he should rely on Congress to discharge.
He hastened to the American army, which was encamped around Boston, in which place the British troops commanded by General Gage were besieged. It consisted of fourteen thousand five hundred men, but several circumstances combined to render it less effective than its numbers would indicate.
In the hope of avoiding open hostilities, the time for preparing to meet them had passed away unemployed, and this neglect could not be remedied. In the essential article of ammunition, it was discovered, soon after the arrival of the General in camp, that the magazines1 would furnish only nine cartridges2 for each man. Powder was to be obtained, not from officers under the control of Congress, but from committees and other local powers, who had collected small parcels for local defence. Arms, too, were deficient in number, and inferior in quality. The troops were almost destitute of clothing, and without tents. A siege was to be carried on without engineers, and almost without intrenching tools. In addition to these defects, many were discontented with the general officers appointed by Congress: and the mode of appointing regimental officers, in some of the colonies, where they were elected by the soldiers, was extremely unfavorable to discipline.3 Yet, under all these disadvantages, the General observed with pleasure, “the materials of a good army.” There were “a great number of men, able-bodied, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionable courage.” Possessed of these materials, he employed himself indefatigably in their organization.
The commander-in-chief felt the full importance of destroying the army in Boston, before it should be reinforced in the spring. The result of his assiduous inquiries into the situation of the enemy, seems to have been a strong inclination to the opinion that, to carry their works by storm, though hazardous, was not impracticable; but, a council of general officers being unanimous against making the attempt, it was abandoned.
To relieve the wants of his army, produced by the rigorous blockade of Boston, the British general frequently detached small parties by water, in quest of fresh provisions. The task of repelling their incursions became so burdensome to the inhabitants of the sea-coast, that the several governors pressed for detachments from the main army, for their protection; and the manifest danger of granting the request did not appease the irritation excited by refusal. Congress was at length induced to pass a resolution, declaring that the army before Boston was designed solely to oppose the enemy in that place, and ought not to be weakened by detachments. At Newport, in Rhode Island, the committee sought security by entering into a stipulation with the officer commanding the ships of war on that station, to furnish the requisite supplies on condition of his sparing the place. General Washington thought it necessary to remonstrate against this dangerous measure.
While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, other events of considerable importance occurred elsewhere.
In July, Georgia joined her sister colonies, and chose delegates to represent her in Congress; after which, the style of “the thirteen United Colonies” was assumed.
After a recess of one month, Congress reassembled at Philadelphia.
Sept. 6
The scarcity of arms and ammunition, and the importance of a maritime force, engaged their immediate attention. It was more forcibly attracted to the latter object, by an event which, at the time, excited no ordinary degree of resentment.
Orders had been issued to the commanders of the British ships of war to proceed against those seaport towns in which any troops should be raised, or military works erected, as in the case of actual rebellion. Under color of these orders, a small naval force, commanded by Captain Mowat, was detached against Falmouth, a flourishing village on the coast of Massachusetts. After reducing the town to ashes, an attempt was made to penetrate into the country; but the militia and minute-men soon drove the party back to their ships.4 This measure was immediately followed by a resolution of the Convention of Massachusetts for issuing letters of marque and reprisal;5 and by an addition of some ships of war, on the part of Congress, to the existing naval force.
The re-enlistment of the army, next to the supply of arms and ammunition, was the subject most deeply interesting to the American government.
On the 29th of September, at the earnest solicitation of General Washington, a committee had been appointed by Congress, with directions to repair to the camp at Cambridge, there to consult with the commander-in-chief and the governments of New England, “on the most effectual method of continuing, supporting, and regulating a continental army.” On the return of this committee, Congress determined that the new army should consist of twenty thousand three hundred and seventy-two men, including officers. Unfortunately, an essential error was committed in constituting this first military establishment of the Union, the consequences of which ceased only with the war. The soldiers were enlisted for the term of one year, if not sooner discharged by Congress. This fatal error brought the American cause more than once into real hazard.
Other resolutions accompanied that for raising the new army, which exhibit the perilous condition of the country. The arms of those who refused to re-enlist, though private property, were detained at a valuation; two dollars were offered to every recruit who would supply himself with a blanket; clothes for the privates, (the price to be deducted from their pay,) were purchased without regard to color; and they were required to furnish their own arms, or to pay for the use of those which might be supplied by government.
That enthusiastic ardor which had brought such numbers into the field after the battle of Lexington, was already beginning to dissipate; and though the orders of the day contain the most animating exhortations to the army, and the strongest appeals to its patriotism, an ominous hesitation in forming new engagements was displayed.
At length, with much labor, the officers were arranged, and recruiting orders were issued; but the sufferings of the army had been so great, that this service advanced slowly.
General Washington had earnestly urged Congress to offer a bounty;6 but this expedient was not adopted till late in January; and, on the last day of December, when the old army was disbanded, only nine thousand six hundred and fifty men had been enlisted for the army of 1776.
The General viewed with deep mortification the inactivity to which he was compelled to submit. His real difficulties were not generally known; his numbers were exaggerated; his means of acting on the offensive were magnified; the expulsion of the British army from Boston had been long since anticipated by many; and those were not wanting
