could save Philadelphia. Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in resisting, and the opinion of Congress, required a battle; but Washington came to the wise determination of avoiding one for the present. His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had not yet joined the army; the continental troops ordered from Peekskill were approaching; and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under General Dickenson, was also expected.
A council of war concurred in his opinion not to march against the enemy, but to allow his harassed troops a few days of repose on their present ground.
The members of Congress separated on the 18th of September, in the evening, and reassembled at Lancaster on the 27th. The British army entered Philadelphia on the 26th.
A Stubborn Contest in the Middle Colonies (September to December 1777)
Measures to cut off the communication between the British army and fleet.—Battle of Germantown.—Attack on fort Mifflin.—On Red Bank.—The Augusta blown up.—General Washington takes post at White Marsh.—Fort Mifflin evacuated.—Fort Mercer evacuated.—The British open a communication with their fleet.—General Howe marches to Chesnut Hill.—Returns to Philadelphia.—General Washington goes into winter quarters.
Sept. 1777
TO PREVENT the co-operation of the fleet with the British army in Philadelphia, works had been erected on Mud island, a low marshy piece of ground near the junction of the Schuylkill with the Delaware, and at Red Bank, on the opposite Jersey shore, which were defended with heavy artillery. In the deep channel, under cover of these batteries, several ranges of frames, resembling chevaux-de-frise,1 had been sunk, which were so strong and heavy as to destroy any ship that might strike against them. No attempt to open the channel could be successful until the command of the shores on both sides should be obtained.
Other ranges of machines2 had been sunk about three miles lower down the river; and some considerable works were in progress at Billingsport, on the Jersey side, which were in such forwardness as to be provided with artillery. These works and machines were farther supported by two floating batteries, several galleys, a number of other armed vessels, and some fire-ships.3
The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive importance to these works. Cutting off the communication of General Howe with his fleet, they intercepted his supplies by water; while the American vessels in the river above fort Mifflin, the fort on Mud island, opposed obstacles to his foraging in Jersey; and General Washington hoped to render his supplies on the part of Pennsylvania so precarious as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia.
These advantages were considerably diminished by the capture of the Delaware frigate.
Lord Cornwallis, the day after entering Philadelphia, commenced three batteries for the purpose of acting against any American ships which might appear before the town. While incomplete, they were attacked by two American frigates, assisted by several galleys and gondolas.4 The largest, the Delaware, being left by the tide, grounded, and was captured. This event was the more interesting, as it not only gave the British general the command of the ferry, and free access to the Jersey shore, but also enabled him to intercept the communication between the forts below and Trenton, from which place the garrisons were to have drawn their military stores.
Sept. 30
The expected reinforcements, except the state regiment and militia from Virginia, being arrived, the American army amounted to eight thousand continental troops and three thousand militia. With this force General Washington determined to approach the enemy, and seize the first opportunity of attacking him. The army took a position on the Skippack road, about sixteen miles from Germantown. The British line of encampment crossed this village near its centre, and Lord Cornwallis, with four regiments of grenadiers, occupied Philadelphia. Colonel Stirling had been detached with two regiments to take possession of the fort at Billingsport and destroy the works, after which service he was directed to escort a convoy of provisions from Chester to Philadelphia. For the security of this convoy, another regiment was detached from Germantown.
General Washington determined to avail himself of this division of the British force, and to attempt to surprise the camp at Germantown. His plan was to attack both wings in front and rear at the same instant.
The divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway’s brigade, were to march down the main road, and attack the left wing; while General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, should turn its left flank and attack in the rear. The commander-in-chief accompanied this column.
The divisions of Greene and Stephens, flanked by M’Dougal’s brigade, were to take a circuit by the Limekiln road, and attack the right wing.
The militia of Maryland and Jersey, under Generals Smallwood and Forman, were to march down the old York road, and, turning its right, to fall on its rear.
The division of Lord Sterling, and the brigades of Nash and Maxwell, formed the reserve.
Parties of cavalry were silently to scour the roads, and to keep up the communication between the heads of the several columns.
Oct. 4
The army moved from its ground about seven in the afternoon, and before sunrise the next morning, the advance of the column led by Sullivan drove in a piquet. The main body followed close in the rear, and engaging the light infantry and the fortieth regiment, forced them to give way. Though closely pursued, Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave, with five companies, threw himself into a large stone house belonging to Mr. Chew, which stood directly in the way of Wayne’s division, and poured on the Americans an incessant and galling fire5 from the doors and windows.
After some unsuccessful and bloody attempts to carry the house by storm, and battering it with field artillery, which was too light to make any impression on its walls, a regiment was left to observe the party within it, and Wayne moved forward, passing to the left of the house.
In rather more than half an hour after Sullivan had been engaged, the left wing came also into action, and drove the light infantry posted in front of the British right from its ground. While pursuing the flying enemy, Woodford’s brigade, which was on the right of this wing, was arrested by a heavy fire from Chew’s house, directed against its right flank. The brigade was drawn off to the left by its commanding officer, and the field-pieces attached to it were ordered to play on the house, but were too light to be of service. The advance of that brigade being thus retarded, this part of the line was broken, and the two brigades composing the division of Stephens were not only separated from each other, but from the other division which was led by General Greene in person. That division, consisting of the brigades of Muhlenberg and Scott, encountered and broke a part of the British right wing, entered the village, and made a considerable number of prisoners.
Thus far the prospect was flattering. Had the American troops possessed the advantages given by experience, there is yet reason to believe that the hopes inspired by this favorable commencement would not have been disappointed. But the face of the country, and the darkness of the morning produced by a fog of uncommon density, co-operating with the defective discipline of the army, and the derangements of the corps by the incidents at Chew’s house, blasted these flattering appearances.
The grounds over which the British were pursued abounded in small and strong inclosures,
