Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind. Francis Hutcheson
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There are innumerable degrees of likelihood, from the slightest probability to full and stable assent; from the judicious appreciation [of their degrees] grave men are more likely to earn a reputation for prudence and wisdom than from cleverness in the sciences.
“Assent given to arguments which are probable but do not achieve the highest likelihood” is called opinion. Where either of the premisses is uncertain, there is only a probable conclusion; hence in a long chain of arguments, the result will be a very weak assent.
Arguments which create belief are either artificial and involve the use of reasoning, or inartificial, from testimony. “In recent [writers]16 assent resting on testimony is belief (par excellence).” Belief is either divine or human, depending on whether the assent rests on the testimony of God or of men.
Divine belief will be a fully firm assent when it is clearly established that God has revealed something, since a superior nature cannot deceive or be deceived.
Human belief too, although often hazardous, may sometimes attain full certainty, when it is clear that the witnesses could not have been deceived, and could not have intended to deceive others, so that neither their knowledge nor their reliability nor their truthfulness is in doubt.
Sometimes the knowledge of witnesses will be evident from the nature of the matter in hand; and their reliability will be established if they have not been induced to give testimony about the question in hand by any reward or other inducements; even more so when they testify to their own peril or loss, and could not expect to persuade others, if they themselves knew that the thing was otherwise.
If testimony is not liable to any suspicion of fraud or ignorance, belief may be given (1) to facts which cannot be known in any other way; (2) also to things totally different from what we have previously observed, if indeed there are no internal arguments that prevent belief; (3) and third, even to things that are strange and contrary to all our experience or observation, provided the testimony deals with material and circumstances that are different and remote from our own affairs.
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