Will of both people and prince required for establishment of such custom, 686–687; Universal custom necessary to abrogate general law for the whole Church, 687; Privative custom (one arising from repeated omission of an act) sufficient to effect such abrogation, 688–689; Consent of prince to abrogation, 689; Nature of the reason in support of custom abrogating law, 689; Prescriptive period for custom abrogating law: ten years in case of civil law, 691; Forty years in the case of canon law, 692–694; Not essential that prince be aware of prescriptive custom abrogating law, 694–695; Non-prescriptive custom and the abrogation of law, 695–697; Time required for abrogation of law through custom of which prince has no knowledge, 698; Judgment of prudent man the criterion, 698; Reply to argument based on passage in Decretals, 699–701; Suárez meets difficulties raised at the beginning of the chapter: as to whether a municipal statute can abrogate a general law, 701–702; Whether a custom can prevail in opposition to will of prince, 702; Whether a reasonable custom contrary to law may be established by morally good actions, 703–704; How a custom arising out of actions legally forbidden may derogate from law, 704–705.
XIX. Does the Abrogation of a Law through Custom Admit of Any Exception or Extension?
Whether custom may abrogate penal laws imposing penalty by fact of transgression, 706–707; Whether custom may derogate from the penalty attached to a law, leaving that law still binding in conscience, 707–710; The effect of unreasonable custom with respect to such penalties, 711–714; Whether custom may relax the direct obligation of law without affecting the penalty attached thereto, 714–717; Suárez rejects the theory that laws invalidating certain acts cannot be abrogated by custom, 717–720; How a disqualified person may become legally qualified through custom, 720–721; Revocation of a custom by law does not prevent derogation from that law by a subsequent custom, 722; Effect of law forbidding future customs contrary to it, 722–727; How custom reprobated by law can prevail against such law, 727–729; Whether a law of the Church relating to the Sacraments can be abrogated by prescriptive custom, 729–731; Suárez finds no exceptions to the general rule that custom may abrogate law, 731; A custom abrogating law is not to be extended, 731; So held by Panormitanus, Jason, Innocent, and Rochus, 731; Whether custom may not only derogate from law but introduce new contrary law, 732; Suárez holds that both of these results may be brought about at the same time by the same custom, 733–734.
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XX. In What Ways Custom May Be Changed
Modes of changing custom, 734–735; Revocation of custom, 735; May take place by passage of subsequent law in opposition thereto, 736–738; Requirements of such a law if it possesses no revoking clause, 738; General custom revoked by general law, 738–740; Universal law framed for whole Church revokes particular customs of dioceses, &c., only if it has clause to that effect, 740; To what customs this rule applies, 741–745; Whether a particular law enacted for a locality by a ruler of universal authority derogates from a particular custom in opposition thereto, 745–747; Clause added to general law to abrogate custom, 747; To abrogate immemorial custom, 747–749; When an ancient custom is abrogated by a subsequent one, 749–750; Determination of the validity of such subsequent custom, 750–752.
A DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC FAITH
—In Refutation of the Errors of the Anglican Sect with a Reply to the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance and to the Admonitory Preface of His Most Serene Majesty James, King of England
Dedication
[Of this treatise, only the following Chapters are included in these Selections: Book III, chaps. V and xxiii; Book VI, chap. IV.]
BOOK III: CONCERNING THE SUPREMACY AND POWER OF THE POPE OVER TEMPORAL KINGS
V. Do Christian Kings Possess Supreme Power in Civil, or Temporal Affairs; and [If So] by What Right?
Nature of the question regarding supreme temporal power explained, 761; Two forms of subjection, direct and indirect, 762–763; Whether the temporal power of Christian kings is supreme, 763; The opinion that the Pope is supreme in both temporal and spiritual domains, 764–766; Suárez’s assertion that Christian kings possess supreme civil power within
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their own order, 766; Denial of the Emperor’s temporal supremacy over the Church, 766–767; The doctrine that the Pope does not wield supreme temporal jurisdiction, 768; This doctrine supported by authority of Popes, 768–770; By reason, 770–771; It is proved that the Pope has never acquired such jurisdiction through election or other human title, 771; Further proof in connexion with canon and divine law, 772–776; Whether the Pope can be a temporal as well as a spiritual ruler, 776–777; Suárez rejects the argument that the Pope possesses supreme temporal jurisdiction, though he exercises it only indirectly, 777–780.
XXIII. The Pope May Use Coercive Power against Kings, Even to the Point of Deposing Them from Their Thrones, If There Be a Valid Cause
Coercive power of Pope chief point of controversy with King of England, 780; Necessity for the Pope to have coercive power over wicked kings, 781; This doctrine supported by Scriptures, 782–784; Its application to contentions of King of England, 784; The power of the Church to bind includes coercive power, 784–785; Means of coercion, 785; Use of excommunication as a coercive power, 785–788; Power resides in Pope to chastise kings with temporal punishments, 788–789; Confirmation of this conclusion from Scriptures and ecclesiastical authorities, 789–792; Further confirmation from papal practice and conciliar approval, 792–795; The truth of the conclusion is demonstrated by reasoning, 795–797; Power to punish by means of temporal penalties is necessary to the Church, 797; Such power is even more necessary for the correction of kings than for the correction of other Christians, 798–799; For the protection of Christian subjects the Pope may deliver them from dominion not only of heathen but of Christian kings, 800–801; Other grounds on which the Pope may intervene in temporal matters, 801.
BOOK VI: CONCERNING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE EXACTED BY THE KING OF ENGLAND
IV. Does the Third Part of the Oath [Exacted by King James] Contain Any Requirement in Excess of Civil Obedience and Contrary to Catholic Doctrine?
Third part of oath exacted by King James, 803; Two kinds of tyrants distinguished, 804; Lawful prince who rules tyrannically cannot be slain on private authority, 804; Contrary proposition condemned as
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heretical, 805; Grounds in defence of this contrary proposition analysed and rejected, 807–808; Permissible to slay unjust prince in defence of one’s life, 809; And in defence of the state if such a prince is attempting to destroy it, 809–810; Permissible to slay tyrant whose title is tyrannical, 810–812; Various limitations upon this doctrine, 812–814; The opposing opinion is refuted, 814–815; In connexion with the doctrine of tyrannicide certain important distinctions are pointed out between the two kinds of tyrants, 815–817; A king who has been lawfully deposed because of his tyranny may be slain by a private individual, 818; Deposing of heretical kings, 819–821; Power to depose king lies in the state itself and in the Pope, 821; A Christian kingdom is dependent on the Pope in deposing its tyrannical king, 821–822; Legal punishment of the king after he has been lawfully deposed, 822–825; Suárez demonstrates the errors involved in third part of the oath exacted by King James, 825–827; Proof that the oath exacts more than civil obedience, 827; That it involves erroneous doctrine, 828.
A WORK ON THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES: FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARITY
—Divided
