in the Corpus Hispanorum de Pace. In addition there is an edition by Karl Deuringer of Suárez’s Roman College lectures De fide, which provides an early version of the material that, subsequently greatly expanded by the author, was published posthumously in 1621 in the treatise on the supernatural virtues. The translations have been checked against these Latin texts, and where necessary some silent corrections have been made. Some explanatory notes have been revised and some further notes have been supplied. The original notes are otherwise retained in square brackets, my additional notes being without brackets.
The bibliography of works cited by Suárez refers to postclassical works, generally in the earliest printed editions. Classical works cited by him can generally be found in Loeb editions. A full list of ancient authors cited can be found in the index to the original Carnegie translation. The further reading includes Scorraille’s life of Suárez and various books and papers that further explain Suárez’s own psychological, moral, and political theory, or the intellectual environment within which he developed his ideas.
I should like to thank Laura Goetz of Liberty Fund for her essential editorial assistance, Professor Knud Haakonssen for his invaluable comments and advice, and Dr. Annabel Brett for her preliminary work on this edition and for very helpful advice.
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CONTENTS (from the Carnegie Edition)
A TREATISE ON LAWS AND GOD THE LAWGIVER
Dedication to D. Afonso Furtado à Mendoça, Bishop of Ejea
PREFACE. Setting Forth the Subject and Plan of the Whole Work
Study of laws a division of theology, 11; God the Universal Lawgiver, 13; Civil jurisprudence as the application of moral philosophy to political conduct of the commonwealth, 14; Aims of canon law, 14–15; scope of theology with respect to law, 15–16.
BOOK I: CONCERNING LAW IN GENERAL; AND CONCERNING ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND EFFECTS
I. The Meaning of the Term ‘Law’ (Lex)
Discussion of St. Thomas’s definition of law, 17; Divisions of law according to Plato, 18; Relation of natural law to natural inclination, 19–20; Lex fomitis, 20; True meaning of law, 22; Difference between law and counsel, 23–24; Etymology of term ‘law’, 24–25.
II. What Ius Means and How It Is to Be Compared with Lex
Etymology of term ius, 26–28; meanings of term ius, 28–33; ius distinguished from the equitable and the good, 33–35; distinction between ius and fas, 35–36.
III. The Extent of the Necessity for Laws, and of Their Variety
Law not necessary in absolute sense, 37–38; Necessary for rational creatures, 38–39; Utility of law, 39; Categories of law, 39; Divine or
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eternal law, 40–41; Natural and positive law, 41–42; Conceptions of natural law, 42; Law in strict sense not attributable to irrational things, 42; Discussion of natural law in strict sense, 43; Human Law, 44; Natural and supernatural aspects of natural law, 45–47; Positive law defined, 47; Division of positive law into divine and human, 47; Necessity of divine positive law, 48–49; Definition of positive human law, 50–51; Necessity for human law, 51–53; Civil and ecclesiastical law, 53–54; Other divisions of law, 54.
IV. What Acts in the Mind of the Lawmaker Are Necessary for the Making of a Law?
Relation of law to the mind, 55; Law based on concrete act, 56; Threefold classification of law with respect to its state or subject, 56; An act of the mind of the subject necessary for existence of law, 57; Acts of intellect and will necessary for lawmaking, 58–60; A will to bind subjects is required, 60–61; Notification of lawmaker’s will to subjects, 61–64.
V. Is Law an Act of the Intellect or of the Will? And What Is the Nature of This Act?
First opinion: law an act of the intellect, 64–65; Authorities and arguments in support of this opinion, 65–70; Second opinion: law an act of lawmaker’s will, 70; Discussion of this opinion, 70–72; Its confirmation in characteristic properties of law, 72–73; In certain characteristic conditions requisite for law, 73–75; Discussion of Bartholomew Medina’s doctrine, 75–76; Incompatible manifestations of will, 76–78; Third opinion: act of intellect and of will necessary for law, 78–80; Conclusions regarding these opinions, 80–82.
VI. Is It Inherent in the Nature of Law That It Should Be Instituted for Some Community?
It is inherent in the nature of law to be instituted for human beings, 83; Whether it is also inherent in its nature to be instituted for a community—conflicting opinions discussed, 83–89; Affirmative opinion preferred, 89; Inductive proof of this affirmative contention, 89–91; Further confirmation drawn from certain properties of law, 91–93; Refutation of arguments in favour of negative opinion, 93–95; Difference between law and precept, 95; Kinds of community, 96–98; Perfect and
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imperfect communities, 98–99; Human laws should be framed for perfect communities, 99–102.
VII. Is It Inherent in the Nature of Law That It Be Enacted for the Sake of the Common Good?
Inherent in nature of law to be enacted for common good, 102–104; Divine laws work for common good, 104–105; Human laws should be enacted for common good, 105; Common good the final end of law, 105–107; Discussion of this theory, 107–108; Necessary that subject-matter of law itself be adapted to common good, 108–111; Privilege, 111; Relation of privilege to law, 112; Taxes relate to common good, 113; Laws to be in absolute form for common good, 113–115; Whether a general law established to harm an individual is unjust, 115–116.
[Chapter VIII omitted from these Selections.]
Suárez’s first assertion: inherent in nature of law to prescribe just things, 116–117; Two interpretations of justice of law, 117; Just things prescribed by divine law, 118–119; Human law prescribing unjust things not binding, 119–120; Formerly indifferent or optional acts may be rendered obligatory by law, 120–122; How a law permitting certain evils may be just, 122; Righteousness inherent
