and his Apostles, as what only can recommend with any advantage to the Divine favour and approbation here, or hereafter.” And consequently to attack the true and genuine doctrine of JESUS CHRIST, is indeed to fight against a belief the most comfortable and beneficial.
’Tis certainly meer enthusiasm, to think that society can subsist without a publick leading in religion.* And if the Christian religion <3> is the best publick one that can be devised, is it friendly to undermine and destroy it? why diminish the obligations to virtue, which at least are the most easily conceived by the vulgar, and are the fittest to work upon those who cannot enquire, or philosophize: but are powerfully struck and over aw’d by the belief of miracles and inspiration.
I have often had it in my head to publish, for the use of modern unbelievers, a dissertation upon the religion of Cicero, that I have had by me some time; it is certainly fit to put them in mind, how that Academic examines the various opinions concerning Deity and providence; his way of treating the publick established superstitions in his time; and his sentiments† of those philosophers who endeavour’d to destroy the belief of
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immortality and future rewards and punishments, tho’ it was no article of the publick religion. Socrates, and abundance of other examples, might very seasonably be set before them. For my part, was I an unbeliever, I would look upon myself as obliged to confute such false notions and representations of the Chri-<4>stian doctrine, as tend to the hurt and ruin of true morals, and consequently of society and mankind; but at the same time to support genuine Christianity to the utmost of my power, for society’s sake.
But I believe, and am to give you at present the reason of my belief, for you are curious, it seems, to know at full length, what I meant th’other day when I said, “That the works of CHRIST were natural proper samples of his doctrines; and that I was not a little surprised, none of the Apologists for Christianity had considered his miracles in that view; the connection is so simple, and obvious.”
To proceed regularly in this enquiry, one ought to consider, what doctrines may be proved by works; and what doctrines cannot; or stand in no need of such a confirmation.
SECTION I
Beautiful and natural fables, parables, or allegories, are so in themselves independently of any works the teacher may perform. And no works can prove an allegory, parable, or fable, to be natural and elegant, if it is not indeed so: if its beauty and fitness does not discover itself to every discerning hearer or reader. For would it not be reckoned very odd and ridiculous for a Poet, who happened at the same time to be an able Physician, to appeal to the wonderful cures he performed, to prove his poetry elegant; or a Painter to prove his painting true and judicious. <5>
’Tis therefore evident, that works of the most extraordinary kind, can be of no other use, with regard to fables, allegories, and parables; except to excite the attention of the hearers; to gain authority to the teacher; get him a hearing; and make every body attend with due care; the vulgar especially
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who stand much in need of instruction in that familiar insinuating way, and yet are not to be moved without an extraordinary awakening.
The parables of our SAVIOUR justify themselves abundantly; nor did he work miracles to prove their propriety and beauty.
SECTION II
Common sense is certainly sufficient to teach those who think of the matter with tolerable seriousness and attention, all the duties and offices of human life; all our obligations to GOD; and our fellow-creatures, all that is morally fit and binding. And there is no need of works, to prove that to be morally fit and obligatory, which common sense and reason clearly shews to be so. Nor can any work on the other hand, prove that to be morally fit, and becoming, which common sense and reason proves to be the reverse. The moral fitness or unfitness of actions can only be deduced from the nature of the actions and agents; their constitution, situation, and relations. And therefore works of the most extraordinary nature can be of no further use, with regard to precepts and lessons of morality, except to beget attention, and to make the spe-<6>ctators and hearers reflect seriously upon that moral fitness, which common sense clearly points out to every thinking person.
But if at any time common sense is quite asleep or buried; or if by the cunning of corrupt designing teachers, false notions of religion and virtue are become universal; and the vulgar especially, who are easily misled by crafty deceivers, can hardly be brought to attend to the wholsome instructions of undebauched pure sense and reason; extraordinary works are certainly fit in such a case; nay almost necessary to give sufficient weight and Authority to a reformer; and to rouse mankind to that attention which is necessary, in order to their being undeceived and soundly instructed. Their eyes must be opened, their sleeping understandings awakened, their prejudices and false notions must be quite rooted out, before truth can enter into their minds with any success, or produce any desired change. And hardly can a talk so difficult, be performed by a teacher with no more than ordinary skill or authority.
Such was the condition of mankind in general, of the Jews particularly,
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when our divine Reformer appeared in the world. And even his extraordinary, marvellous, works, scarcely were sufficient to create attention to the moral doctrines and precepts he taught; which however are evidently in themselves of the most excellent kind: in every respect wholsome, true, just, perfect. He did not work his miracles to prove the moral fitness; the reasonableness and excellency of these; these prove themselves sufficiently: whoever will but attend to them must <7> necessarily discover their natural, immutable, eternal truth, and fitness.
SECTION III
Doctrines that can be demonstrated to be worthy of GOD and the divine perfections; and their opposites, or contraries, inconsistent with our natural and just conceptions of GOD and his moral qualities, are necessarily true. Thus, for instance, could it be proved that the immortality of human souls is worthy of GOD; and their mortality inconsistent with the true idea of GOD and the divine perfections; it would follow necessarily, that our souls are immortal; and no works, of whatever kind, could prove that they are mortal. Nor would there be upon that supposition, any need of works to shew that they are immortal. All that any works could do in that case would be, to excite attention to the necessary connexion of that doctrine, with the true notion of GOD and his moral attributes.
The argument holds equally good with regard to the reunion of our souls with bodies, or any other doctrine; supposing that the doctrine could be proved, by necessary consequences, to be worthy of GOD, and its contrary utterly repugnant to the divine nature and perfections. But however probable and likely these doctrines, of immortality and the reunion of our souls with bodies, may be in themselves, upon several considerations; yet hardly will any one say, that their truth is demonstrable. How these therefore may be proved to be true by works, is to be enquired. <8>
SECTION IV
But it must also be observed, before we go further; that no works of whatever kind, however surprising or extraordinary, can prove reasonings to be
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just and conclusive which are evidently false; and solid, accurate reasonings stand firmly upon their own bottom; there is no need of any works to prove that they are so. There are indeed certain reasonings from facts or works; as from experiments, for instance, in physical philosophy. But in that case the facts, works, or experiments are the principles; the premisses, as the schools speak, from which the conclusions are inferred. And therefore with regard to such reasonings, the works may be said to prove the conclusion. But
