But Pons’s edition includes only the first two paragraphs of the article. A reading of the full article, as translated below, will provide a fuller opportunity to gauge the author’s endorsement of democracy. See also the article FEDERAL REPUBLIC, below, for further discussion of the possibilities of popular government in large states.
DEMOCRACY (Political law) is one of the simple forms of government, the one in which the people as a body have sovereignty. Every republic in which sovereignty resides in the hands of the people is a democracy; and if the sovereign power is found in the hands of only part of the people, it is an aristocracy. See ARISTOCRACY.
Although I do not think that democracy is the most convenient or most stable form of government, although I am persuaded that it is disadvantageous for large states, I nonetheless believe it to be one of the most ancient forms among nations that have followed as equitable this maxim:
“That whatever the members of the society have an interest in should be administered by all in common.”1
The natural equity that exists among us, says Plato (speaking of Athens, his Country), makes us seek in our government an equality consonant with
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the law, while at the same time making us submit to those among us who have the most ability and wisdom.
It seems to me not without reason that democracies boast of being nurseries of great men.2 In fact, since there is no one in popular governments who does not have a part in the administration of the state—each according to his status3 and his merit—since there is no one who does not participate in the fortunes or misfortunes of events, all individuals vie with each other in applying themselves and interesting themselves in the common good, because there are no revolutions that are not useful or harmful to all. Moreover, democracies lift spirits, because they show the way to honors and glory, which are more open to all citizens, more accessible and less limited than under government of a few or government of one, in which countless obstacles prevent them from appearing. It is these happy prerogatives of democracy that fashion men, great deeds and heroic virtues. To be convinced of it, one need only cast one’s eyes over the republics of Athens and Rome, which by their constitutions raised themselves above all the world’s empires. And wherever one follows their conduct and their maxims, they will produce virtually the same effects.
It is thus not a matter of indifference to seek the fundamental laws that constitute democracies, and the principle that alone can preserve and maintain them; this is what I propose to sketch here.4
But before going any further, it is necessary to remark that in a democracy, each citizen does not have the sovereign power, or even a part of it; that power resides in the general assembly of the people convoked according to the laws. Thus, the people in a democracy are in certain respects sovereign, and in other respects they are subjects.5 They are sovereign by their votes, which are their wills; they are subjects as members of the assembly vested with sovereign power. Since, therefore, democracy is only properly formed when each citizen has entrusted the right of settling all common
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affairs to an assembly composed of all, there arise several things absolutely necessary for the constitution of this sort of government.
(1) There must be certain settled times and places for common deliberation over public affairs. Otherwise, the members of the sovereign council might not assemble at all, and then nothing would be dealt with; or else they would assemble in different times and different places, giving birth to factions that would rupture the essential unity of the state.
(2) It must be established as a rule that the plurality of votes will be considered the will of the whole body; otherwise, no affair can ever be brought to conclusion, because it is impossible that a large number of persons will always be of the same opinion.
(3) It is essential to the constitution of a democracy that there be magistrates charged with convoking the assembly of the people in extraordinary cases, and with having the decrees of the sovereign assembly executed. Since the sovereign council cannot always be on the alert, it is obvious that it cannot deal with everything by itself. For as concerns pure democracy—that is, the one in which the people in themselves and by themselves perform alone all the functions of government—I know of none like that in the world, unless perhaps it’s a little dump6 like San-Marino in Italy, where five hundred peasants govern a wretched rock whose possession is envied by no one.7
(4) It is a necessary part of the democratic constitution to divide the people into certain classes, and upon this the duration and prosperity of democracies have always depended. Solon divided the people of Athens into four classes. Guided by the spirit of democracy, he created these four classes to determine not those who could elect, but those who could be elected. And leaving to each citizen the right of suffrage, he decreed that judges could be elected in each of these four classes, but only magistrates in the first three, composed of leisured8 citizens.
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The laws establishing the right to vote are therefore fundamental in this government. Indeed, it is as important in this case to regulate how, by whom, for whom, and on what issues votes should be cast, as it is in a monarchy to know the monarch and how he should govern. At the same time, it is essential to set the age, condition, and number of citizens that have the right to vote; otherwise, it might not be known whether the people have spoken, or only a part of the people.
The method of casting one’s vote is another fundamental law of democracy. One may cast one’s vote by lot or by choice, and even by both. Lot leaves to each citizen a reasonable expectation of serving his Country. But since it is imperfect by itself, the great legislators have always applied themselves to remedying it. With this in mind, Solon determined that only those who presented themselves could be elected; that whoever was elected would be examined by judges, and that each one could accuse him without being unworthy.9 This applied to both lot and choice. On completing his term, the magistrate had to go through a second judgment regarding the way in which he had conducted himself. People without ability, M. de Montesquieu observes here,10 must have been very reluctant to offer their names to be drawn by lot.
The law that determines the way votes are cast is a third fundamental law in democracy. A great question is debated on this score, namely, whether the votes should be public or secret, for both practices are in use in different democracies. It seems they cannot be too secret (to maintain their liberty), nor too public (to make them authentic), so that the lesser people may be enlightened by the leaders and contained by the gravity of certain eminent men. In Geneva, in the election of first magistrates, the citizens cast their votes in public but write them in secret, so that order is then maintained with liberty.11
The people, who have sovereign power, should do by themselves everything they can do well; and what they cannot do well, they should have done by their ministers. But the ministers are not theirs if they do not name
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them. It is thus a fourth fundamental law of this government that the people name their ministers—that is, their magistrates. Like monarchs, and even more so, they need to be guided by a council or senate. But to have confidence in it, they must elect its members, either by choosing them themselves as in Athens, or through some magistrate they have established to elect them, such as was practiced in Rome on occasion. The people are quite fit to choose those in whom they are to entrust some part of their authority. If there could be doubts about their capacity to discern merit, one need only remember that continual series of excellent choices made by the Greeks and Romans, which will surely not be attributed to chance. However, just as most citizens who have enough capacity
