follows from the same principles, that inculpable, invincible, involuntary ignorance cannot justly be imputed to a person; but that an action done thro’ culpable, vincible, and voluntary ignorance is justly imputable: and the same holds with regard to error: much less can ignorance or error be any excuse to one, if the action itself be unlawful, or be done in an unlawful place, time, or manner; because, in such cases, it not only was in the agent’s power not to be ignorant or not to err, but he was absolutely obliged to omit the action.*<74>
SECTION CVIII
Of error in fact and in law.
Further, one may err either in point of fact or in point of law. To the former belong the rules already laid down (§107), because a circumstance in a fact may escape the most prudent persons, and therefore his error, in point of fact, may be inculpable, invincible, involuntary. But error, in point of law, with relation to the law of nature, does not excuse, because right reason promulgates this law to every one, unless, perhaps, when age, stupidity, and the more subtle nature of a particular law dictate a milder sentence. But as for civil law, ignorance of it is so far imputable, as it is so framed and promulgated that the person might know it.†<75>
SECTION CIX
Whether undersigned and forced actions are imputable.
Since the free will of man must concur to render an action such of which one can be called the author and cause (§30); but unintended actions are such, that they do not proceed from the determination of the mind (§58); hence it follows, that an action which one does against his will, or without intention, cannot be imputed to him; on the contrary, whatever is done spontaneously, is imputable, and much more whatever is done of one’s own free accord: yea, what one is forced to do is imputable to him, if he who forced him had a right to force him; but not, if he who forces him was not in the exercise of his right, or if the person forced was, previously to the force used, under no obligation of doing it.* <76>
SECTION CX
Whether bodily constitution, habit, &c.
But seeing neither temperament, affections, propensions, habits, nor external force, hinder the free exercise of the will (§54 & seq.) it is abundantly manifest, that neither bodily constitution, which hath so great an influence commonly on the affections of the mind, nor passions, however impetuous and vehement, nor habit, tho’ become a second nature, can hinder the imputation of an action; tho’ sometimes, in human courts, he be reckoned an object of just commiseration, who was transported into a bad action by the violence of just grief, or any afflictive passion.*
SECTION CXI
Whether actions extorted by some are imputable?
Hence it is easy to see whether one be in any degree excusable, who being overpowered by fear, to which the bravest mind may succumb, commits <77> any action contrary to law. For if the fact be such that there is no room to plead necessity, in vain is it pretended. But in what cases necessity cannot be pleaded, we shall enquire more accurately afterwards.*
SECTION CXII
When and how an action is imputed to the moral cause?
Whensoever the understanding and will, and the physical motion of the body concur to an action, then he who does it is called the physical cause of the action; but if the mind alone acts without any corporeal motion, he is called the moral cause. Since therefore understanding and will are the only principles of human actions (§30), hence it follows, that an action is no less imputable to the moral cause than to the physical cause, if the concurrence of the will and understanding in both be equal; more imputable to the moral than to the physical cause, if one induces another, who is under obligation to obey him, to act, by commanding or compelling him; less imputable to the moral than to the physical cause, if one concurs with the action by advice or approbation only.†<78>
SECTION CXIII
Whether the condition of the agent contributes any thing toward imputability.
To the circumstances of the person to whom an action is imputable (§105), belong his dignity, rank, and quality; and therefore it is indisputable, that when many persons concur in the same action, if the action be just it is less imputable, and if the action be unjust, it is more imputable to him whom relation, prudence, duty, age, dignity, ought to influence to good conduct, and restrain from bad, than to a stranger, an ignorant, stupid person, one under no particular tie, a boy, a stripling, or, in fine, a person of no rank or dignity.*<79>
SECTION CXIV
Occasion being wanting, the action is not imputed.
Since, in the imputation of actions, regard ought to be had not only to the person of the agent, but to all the other circumstances; but that concurrence of circumstances in the object, of time and place, together with sufficient abilities, without which an action cannot be done, is called occasion or opportunity; it follows necessarily, that he is not excusable whom occasion tempts to commit any crime; nor he who loses the opportunity of doing a good action thro’ indolence or negligence; but an omission of an action is not to be imputed to one who had no opportunity of doing it.*
SECTION CXV
Whether the omission of things impossible can be imputed, or how and when?
Much less then can the omission of these actions be imputed to one, which are either impossible in the nature of things, or contrary to laws and good manners, or at least which he had not sufficient ability to perform, except so far as one had weakened the abilities with which he was endowed by his own fault, or had rashly, with bad intention, promised what he might have foreseen to be impossible for him to perform.†<80>
SECTION CXVI
What actions are good, and what are evil?
Moreover, actions compared in this manner with a rule of action, take different names. If they, in all their circumstances, be agreeable to right reason, not obliging by external obligation, or to internal obligation merely (§7), they are good; but if in one or more circumstances they deviate from right reason to whatever side, they are bad. From which definitions it follows, that an action must be both materially and formally good (as the schools speak) in order not to be classed with bad actions.*
SECTION CXVII
What actions are just, and what are unjust?
Again, if we compare actions with a law, those which are in all things agreeable to law are just; those which are, in any one circumstance, disagreeable to law, are unjust, and are therefore called sins. Whence we may learn why St. John places all sin in ἀνομἰα, i.e. a transgression of a law.
SECTION CXVIII
The difference between just and honest actions, and between unjust and dishonest actions.
Finally, since the divine law or will obliges us to love (§79), and love is either love of justice, or love of beneficence (§82), an action agreeing in<81> all circumstances with the love of justice, is a just action, and one ever so little repugnant to it, is an unjust action; but those which proceed from the love of humanity and beneficence, are called honest, and those which are not agreeable to that love, are called dishonest, base, inhumane; and hence it is easy
