hands, I shall not so much as attempt to abridge what he says on the head. The substance of it is contained in this short sentence of Quintilian, Declam. 13. “Quod omnibus nascitur, industriae praemium est.” “What is common to all by nature, is the purchase, the reward of industry, and is justly appropriated by it.”5 Let us hear how our Harrington expresses himself upon this subject (the original of property) in his art of law-giving, chapter 1. at the beginning in his works, p. 387 “The heavens, says David, even the heaven of heavens are the Lords, but the earth has he given to the children of men: yet says God to the father of these children, in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread, Dii laborantibus sua munera vendunt. This donation of the earth to man, comes to a kind of selling it for industry, a treasure which seems to purchase of God himself. From the different kinds and successes of this industry, whether in arms, or in other exercises of the mind or body, derives the natural equity of dominion or property; and from the legal <197> establishment or distribution of this property (be it more or less approaching towards the natural equity of the same) proceeds all government.”6 Now, allow me to make some very important observations upon this principle, which, as simple as it appears, involves in it many truths of the last importance, in philosophy, morality and politics. 1. That man is made to purchase every thing by industry, and industry only, every good, internal or external, of the body or mind, is a fact too evident to be called into question. This hath been long ago observed. When Mr. Harrington says, “Nature or God sells all his gifts to industry,” he literally translates an ancient Greek proverb: Θεοὶ τα ᾀγαθὰ τοίς πονοίς πολοῦνται,7 (see Erasmi adagia) as did the Latins in their many proverbial sentences to the same purpose, “Labor omnia vincit”: “Omnia industriae cedunt,” &c. See Virg. Georg. 1. v. 121, &c. 2.8 But as ancient and evident as this observation is, yet none of the ancient philosophers ever had recourse to it in the celebrated question, “Unde bonis mala, &c.” i.e. about the promiscuous distribution of the goods of fortune (as they are commonly called) in this life; tho’ this fact contains a solid refutation of that objection against providence, and from it alone can a true answer be brought to it. Mr. Pope in his Essay on Man, ep. 4. v. 141, &c. (as I have taken notice in my Principles of Moral Philosophy, part 1. chap. 1. and chap. 9. and part 2. chap. 3.) is the first who hath given the true resolution of this seeming difficulty from this principle, that according to our constitution, and the frame of things, the distribution of goods internal or external, is not promiscuous; but every purchase is the reward of industry. If we own a blind fortuitous dispensation of goods, and much more, if we own a malignant dispensation of them, or a dispensation of them more in favour of vice than of virtue, we deny a providence, or assert bad administration. There is no possibility of reconciling bad government with wisdom and goodness; or irregularity and disorder with wisdom and good intelligent design, by any future reparation. But the alledgeance is false; for in fact, the universe is governed by excellent general laws, among which this is one, “That industry shall be the purchaser of goods, and shall be generally successful.” And that being the fact, the objection which supposes promiscuous, fortuitous, or bad government, is founded upon a falsity in fact. In fine, there is no way of proving providence, but by proving good government by good general laws; and where all is brought about according to good general laws, nothing is fortuitous, promiscuous or bad. And not to mention any of the other general laws in the government of the world, constituting the order according to which effects are brought about; and consequently the means for obtaining ends to intelligent active creatures; what better general law can we conceive with regard to intelligent active beings, than the general law of industry; or can we indeed conceive intelligent agency and dominion without such a law? Are not the two <198> inseparable, or rather involved in one another? But where that law obtains, there is no dispensation or distribution properly speaking; for industry is the sole general purchaser, in consequence of means uniformly operative towards ends. But having elsewhere fully insisted upon this law of industry, in order to vindicate the ways of God to man; let me observe, 3. in the third place, Mr. Harrington is the first who hath taken notice, or at least fully cleared up the consequences of this general law of industry with respect to politics, that is, with respect to the natural procreation of government, and the natural source of changes in government. Every thing hangs beautifully and usefully together in nature. There must be manifold mutual dependencies among beings made for society, and for the exercise of benevolence, love and friendship; that is, there must be various superiorities and inferiorities; for all is giving and receiving. But dependence, which supposes in its notion superiority and inferiority, must either be dependence in respect of internal, or in respect of external goods; the former of which Mr. Harrington calls hanging on the lips, and the other hanging on the teeth. Now the law of industry obtaining amongst men placed in various circumstances (and all cannot be placed in the same) will naturally produce these dependencies. A greater share of wisdom and virtue will naturally procreate authority, and the dependence on the lips. [This perhaps is the meaning of that ancient saying of Democritus mentioned by Stobaeus, serm. 27.“φὺσει τὸ ἄρχειν ὀικήιον τω κρεισσονι,” “Authority falls naturally to the share of the better, more excellent or superior.”] And a greater share of external goods, or of property, naturally begets power, and the other dependence on the teeth. And hence it will and must always hold as a general law, That dominion will follow property, or that changes in property will beget certain proportional changes in government: and this consequently is the natural seed, principle or cause of procreation and vicissitude in government, as Mr. Harrington has demonstrated fully and accurately.9 I only mention these things here, because we shall have occasion to have recourse to them afterwards, when our Author comes to treat of government. The conclusion that more properly belongs to our present purpose is, 4. in the fourth place, It must necessarily have happened soon after the world was peopled that all was, must have been appropriated by possession and industry: and therefore, at present, our business is to determine how, things being divided and appropriated, the duties of mankind stand. But it is clear, 1. in the first place, that suppose the world just beginning to be peopled, or suppose a considerable number of men just cast ashore upon a desart country (setting aside all compacts and regulations previously agreed upon) every one will have a right to the purchase of his industry; to the fruits of his labour; to improve his mind, and to all the natural benefits and rewards of that culture; and to the fruits of his skill, ingenuity and labour, to get <199> riches, with all the natural benefits and rewards of them; but yet every one will be obliged, in consequence of what hath been already said of the law of love and benevolence, to exercise his abilities, and to use his purchases in a benevolent way, or with tender regard to others. This must be the case with regard to our right and obligation, previous to all compacts, conventions or regulations. 2. And where lands are already appropriated, and civil government settled, this is a true principle still, that one has a right to all the purchases of his industry, with respect either to external or internal riches, (if I may so speak) consistent with the law of benevolence, or the law of not injuring any one, but of doing all the good to every one in our power; and hence it is, that every one in formed society hath a right to his purchases by the arts of manufacture and commerce, &c. Tho’ a state, to fix the balance of dominion or of government, may fix the balance of property in land, and likewise make regulations about money, (as in the Commonwealths of Israel, Lacedemon, Athens, Rome, Venice, &c. in different manners) in consequence of the natural connexion between the balance of property and the balance of dominion: Tho’ this may be done in forming or mending government by consent, yet even where an Agrarian law obtains, this principle must hold true and be untouched, that every one has a right to the purchases of his industry, in the sense above limited: For otherwise, there would be no encouragement to industry, nay, all must run into endless disorder and confusion. 3. And therefore universally, whether in a state of nature, or in constituted civil governments, this must be a just, a necessary principle, that industry gives a right to its purchases, and all the benefits and rewards attending them. 4. And therefore, fourthly, it can never be true, that a person may not, as far as is consistent with benevolence, endeavour to have both power and authority. If we consider what would be the consequences of denying this principle, that is, of setting any other bounds to the purchases of industry but what the law of benevolence sets, we will soon see that this must be universally true. And if we attend to our frame, and reason from it to final causes, as we do in other cases, it is plain, that there