doubt helped to perpetuate it in all the states. But there is a reason for it in Congress, the federal Senate not being directly representative of equal numbers of citizens, which is not found in the state legislatures; it is in these last a mere survival of no present functional value. Money bills may, however, be amended or rejected by the state Senates like any other bills, just as the federal Senate amends money bills brought up from the House.
In one point a state Senate enjoys a special power, obviously modelled on that of the English House of Lords and the federal Senate. It sits as a court under oath for the trial of state officials impeached by the House.19 Like the federal Senate, it has in many states the power of confirming or rejecting appointments to office made by the governor. When it considers these it is said to “go into executive session.” The power is an important one in those states which allow the governor to nominate the higher judges. In other respects the powers and procedure of the two houses of a state legislature are identical;20 except that, whereas the lieutenant-governor of a state is generally ex officio president of the Senate, with a casting vote therein, the House always chooses its own Speaker. The legal quorum is usually fixed, by the constitution, at a majority of the whole number of members elected,21 though a smaller number may adjourn and compel the attendance of absent members. Both houses do most of their work by committees, much after the fashion of Congress,22 and the committees are in both usually chosen by the Speaker (in the Senate by the president of that body), though it is often provided that the House (or Senate) may on motion vary their composition.23 Both houses sit with open doors, but in most states the constitution empowers them to exclude strangers when the business requires secrecy.
The state governor has of course no right to dissolve the legislature, nor even to adjourn it unless the houses, while agreeing to adjourn, disagree as to the date. Such control as the legislature can exercise over the state officers by way of inquiry into their conduct is generally exercised by committees, and it is in committees that the form of bills is usually settled and their fate decided, just as in the federal Congress. The proceedings are rarely reported. Sometimes when a committee takes evidence on an important question reporters are present, and the proceedings more resemble a public meeting than a legislative session. In some states when a bill is referred to a committee any citizen of the state may appear and give evidence for or against it, so that ample security is taken for the ascertainment of public sentiment and for enabling all private interests affected to state their case. This liberty is largely used in Massachusetts, and with excellent results. It need scarcely be added that neither house separately, nor both houses acting together, can control an executive officer otherwise than either by passing a statute prescribing a certain course of action for him, which if it be in excess of their powers will be held unconstitutional and void, or by withholding the appropriations necessary to enable him to carry out the course of action he proposes to adopt. The latter method, where applicable, is the more effective, because it can be used by a bare majority of either house, whereas a bill passed by both houses may be vetoed by the governor, a point so important as to need a few words.
One state only, North Carolina, still vests legislative authority in the legislature alone. All the rest now require a bill to be submitted to the governor, and permit him to return it to the legislature with his objections. If he so returns it, it can only be again passed “over the veto” by something more than a bare majority. To so pass a bill over the veto there is required:
In one state (Connecticut) a majority in each house
In eight states a majority in each house of all the members elected to that house
In three states a majority of three-fifths in each house of all the members elected
In eight states a majority of two-thirds in each house of all the members present
In twenty-seven states a majority of two-thirds of all the members elected
In one state (Massachusetts) two-thirds of the elected members of the house in which the bill originated, and two-thirds of the members present in the other house
In one state (Virginia) two-thirds of the members present and a majority of those elected in each house
Here, therefore, as in the federal Constitution, we find a useful safeguard against the unwisdom or misconduct of a legislature, and a method provided for escaping, in extreme cases, from those deadlocks which the system of checks and balances tends to occasion.
I have adverted in a preceding chapter to the restrictions imposed on the legislatures of the states by their respective constitutions. These restrictions, which are numerous, elaborate, and instructive, take two forms.
I. Exclusions of a subject from legislative competence, i.e., prohibitions to the legislature to pass any law on certain enumerated subjects. The most important classes of prohibited statutes are:
Statutes inconsistent with democratic principles, as, for example, granting titles of nobility, favouring one religious denomination, creating a property qualification for suffrage or office.
Statutes against public policy, e.g., tolerating lotteries, impairing the obligation of contracts, incorporating or permitting the incorporation of banks, or the holding by a state of bank stock.24
Statutes special or local in their application, a very large and increasing category, the fulness and minuteness of which in many constitutions show that the mischiefs arising from improvident or corrupt special legislation must have become alarming. The lists of prohibited subjects in the Constitutions of Missouri of 1875, Montana and North Dakota of 1889, Mississippi of 1890, and Oklahoma, 1907, are the most complete I have found.25 Oklahoma enumerates twenty-eight topics, special legislation on which is forbidden.
Statutes increasing the state debt beyond a certain limited amount, or permitting a local authority to increase its debt beyond a prescribed amount, the amount being usually fixed in proportion to the valuation of taxable property within the area administered by the local authority.26
II. Restrictions on the procedure of the legislature, i.e., directions as to the particular forms to be observed and times to be allowed in passing bills, sometimes all bills, sometimes bills of a certain specified nature. Among these restrictions will be found provisions:
As to the majorities necessary to pass certain bills, especially appropriation bills. Sometimes a majority of the whole number of members elected to each house is required, or a majority exceeding a bare majority of those present.
As to the method of taking the votes, e.g., by calling over the roll and recording the vote of each member.
As to allowing certain intervals to elapse between each reading of a measure, and for preventing the hurried passage of bills, especially appropriation bills, at the end of the session.
As to reading of bills publicly and at full length.
As to sending all bills to a committee, and prescribing the mode of its action.
Against secret sessions (Idaho).
As to preventing an act from taking effect until a certain time, e.g., ninety days after the adjournment of the session.
Against changing the purpose of a bill during its passage.
As to including in a bill only one subject, and expressing that subject in the title of the bill.
Against reenacting, or amending, or incorporating, any former act by reference to its title merely, without setting out its contents.27
The last two classes of provisions might
