The American Commonwealth. Viscount James Bryce
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The absence of a closure rule is a fact of great political moment. In 1890 it prevented the passage of a bill, already accepted by the House, for placing federal elections under the control of federal authorities, a measure which would have powerfully affected the Southern states, and might possibly have raised civil commotions.
Divisions are taken, not by separating the senators into lobbies and counting them, as in the British Parliament, but by calling the names of senators alphabetically. The Constitution provides that one-fifth of those present may demand that the yeas and nays be entered in the journal. Every senator answers to his name with aye or no. He may, however, ask the leave of the Senate to abstain from voting; and if he is paired, he states, when his name is called, that he has paired with such and such another senator, and is thereupon excused.
When the Senate goes into executive session, the galleries are cleared and the doors closed; and the obligation of secrecy is supposed to be enforced by the penalty of expulsion to which a senator, disclosing confidential proceedings, makes himself liable. Practically, however, newspaper men find little difficulty in ascertaining what passes in secret session.12 The threatened punishment has never been inflicted, and occasions often arise when senators feel it to be desirable that the public should know what their colleagues have been doing. There have been movements within the Senate against maintaining secrecy, particularly with regard to the confirming of nominations to office; and there is also a belief in the country that publicity would make for purity. But while some of the black sheep of the Senate love darkness because their works are evil, other members of undoubted respectability defend the present system because they think it supports the power and dignity of their body.
The Senate as an Executive and Judicial Body
The Senate is not only a legislative but also an executive chamber; in fact in its early days the executive functions seem to have been thought the more important; and Hamilton went so far as to speak of the national executive authority as divided between two branches, the president and the Senate. These executive functions are two, the power of approving treaties, and that of confirming nominations to office submitted by the president.
To what has already been said regarding the functions of the president and Senate as regards treaties (see above, Chapter 6) I need only add that the Senate through its right of confirming or rejecting engagements with foreign powers, secures a general control over foreign policy; though it must be remembered that many of the most important acts done in this sphere (as for instance the movement of troops or ships) are purely executive acts, not falling under this control. It is in the discretion of the president whether he will communicate current negotiations to it and take its advice upon them, or will say nothing till he lays a completed treaty before it. One or other course is from time to time followed, according to the nature of the case, or the degree of friendliness existing between the president and the majority of the Senate. But in general, the president’s best policy is to keep the leaders of the senatorial majority, and in particular the Committee on Foreign Relations, informed of the progress of any pending negotiation. He thus feels the pulse of the Senate, which, like other assemblies, has a collective self-esteem leading it to strive for all the information and power it can secure, and while keeping it in good humour, can foresee what kind of arrangement it may be induced to sanction. Much depends upon the confidence which the Senate feels in the judgment of the secretary of state and on the tact which he shows in his dealings with senators. The right of going into secret session enables the whole Senate to consider despatches communicated by the president; and though treaties are sometimes considered in open session, important matters having first been submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee, can thus be discussed without the disadvantage of publicity. Of course no momentous secret can be long kept,1 even by the committee, according to the proverb in the Elder Edda— “Tell one man thy secret, but not two; if three know, the world knows.”
This control of foreign policy by the Senate goes far to meet the difficulties which popular governments find in dealing with foreign powers. If each step to be taken must be previously submitted to the ruling assembly, the nation is forced to show its whole hand, and precious opportunities of winning an ally or striking a bargain may be lost. If on the other hand the executive is permitted to conduct negotiations in secret, there is always the risk, either that the governing assembly may disavow what has been done, a risk which makes foreign states legitimately suspicious and unwilling to negotiate, or that the nation may have to ratify, because it feels bound in honour by the act of its executive agents, arrangements which its judgment condemns. Participation by the Senate in negotiations diminishes these difficulties, because it apprises the executive of what the judgment of the ratifying body is likely to be, and it commits that body by advance. The necessity of ratification by the Senate in order to give effect to a treaty, enables the country to retire from a doubtful bargain, though in a way which other powers find disagreeable, as England did when the Senate rejected the Reverdy-Johnson Treaty of 1869. European statesmen may ask what becomes under such a system of the boldness and promptitude so often needed to effect a successful coup in foreign policy, or how a consistent attitude can be maintained if there is in the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee a sort of second foreign secretary. The answer is that America is not Europe. The problems which the State Department of the United States has to deal with have been far fewer and usually far simpler than those of the Old World. The Republic, though her power has now crossed the Pacific, keeps consistently to her own side of the Atlantic; and it is a merit of the system of senatorial control that it has tended, by discouraging the executive from schemes which may prove resultless, to diminish the taste for foreign enterprises, and to save the country from being entangled with alliances, protectorates, responsibilities of all sorts beyond its own frontiers. It is the easier for the Americans to practise this reserve because they need no alliances, standing unassailable in their own hemisphere. The circumstances of England, with her powerful European neighbours, her Indian Empire, and her colonies scattered over the world, are widely different. Yet different as the circumstances of England are, the day may come when in England the question of limiting the at present wide discretion of the executive in foreign affairs will have to be dealt with.2 The example of the American Senate may then be cited, but there is of course this important difference between the two countries, that in England Parliament can dismiss ministers who have concluded a treaty which it disapproves, whereas in the United States a president, not being similarly removable by Congress, would be exempt from any control were the Senate not associated with him in the making of a treaty.
The Senate may and occasionally does amend a treaty, and return it amended to the president. There is nothing to prevent it from proposing a draft treaty to him, or asking him to prepare one, but this is not the practice. For ratification a vote of two-thirds of the senators present is required. This gives great power to a vexatious minority, and increases the danger, evidenced by several incidents in the history of the Union, that the Senate or a faction in it may deal with foreign policy in a narrow, sectional, electioneering spirit. When the interest of any group of states is, or is supposed to be, against the making of a given treaty, that treaty may be defeated by the senators from those states. They tell the other senators of their own party that the prospects of the party in the district of the country whence they come will be improved if the treaty is rejected