I, my Lord,—the Morn is far advanced, and all your Friends are up, preparing for the House.
North. Oh! Mungo, I have had such Horrid Dreams!
Mungo. Shadows! My Lord—below the Statesman’s heeding
North. Now, by my every hope—shadows to Night have struck more terror to the soul of North, than could the whole of ten minorities, armed all in proof and led by noisy Chatham.
Mungo. Be more yourself, my Lord; consider, were it but known a Dream had frightened you, how would your animated Foes presume on it.
North. Perish that thought!—no—never be it said that Fate itself cou’d awe the soul of North.
Hence babbling Dreams you threaten here in vain
Conscience avaunt, North is himself again!
With this*, and with my gracious Sovereign’s ear,
I’ll act determined—free from ev’ry fear.
Printed and published for the Authors, by T. W. SHAW, in Fleet-Street, opposite Anderton’s Coffee House, where Letters to the Publisher will be thankfully received.
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THE
CRISIS
| NUMBER VII | To be continued Weekly. |
| SATURDAY, MARCH 4, 1775 1 | [Price Two-pence Half-penny. |
To the Right Honourable LORD APSLEY, Lord Chancellor of England.2
MY LORD,
Feb. 16, 1775.
I Was a Bye-stander this Day, when your Lordship and the House of Lords decided the very important Cause of PHILIP THICKNESS, Appellant, and PETER LEIGH and Others, Respondents: and though unconnected with the Parties, and consequently uninterested in the Event, I must own, I was forcibly struck—BY A SCENE so NOVEL AND UNEXPECTED.—I stood, my Lord, with silent Awe, at the Bar of
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that Tribunal, which I had ever been accustomed to consider—as the Last Refuge of INJURED JUSTICE.3—I expected to hear a Question of Law, of infinite Nicety, discussed with Wisdom, and decided with Integrity.—Judge then, my Lord, my Astonishment, when, instead of that Decency in Debate, which ought to be observed, even in the lowest Courts of Justice, and which I had ever thought, in a Peculiar manner, characteristic of the House of Lords, I saw Proceedings that would have disgraced a POLISH DIET!—Yes, my Lord, in all my Experience of Courts of Justice, I never saw Judges, so avowedly corrupt, so indecently profligate, as YOUR LORDSHIP and LORD DENBIGH!4—LORD CAMDEN delivered HIS Opinion on the Question, in an Argument, that will carry to the latest Times HIS FAME and Your Disgrace.
Your Lordship, in Answer to him, delivered your Sentiments, I cannot call them an Argument, because there was nothing that resembled a Chain of Reasoning; and indeed your Lordship seemed more to rely
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on the Letter you had received from Sir WILLIAM DE GREY,5 and the Conversation YOU SAID you had had with Sir Eardley Wilmot, and Sir Stafford Smythe, than on any Reasons you could advance in Support of your Decree!
When LORD CAMDEN, with a Decency becoming the Occasion, and the Place in which he spoke, reminded your Lordship how improper it was for a Judge—deciding so nice and difficult a Question of Property in the highest Tribunal of the Kingdom—to talk of Opinions of Men, not Judges in that Court, who had given their Sentiments in Private, probably, without much Consideration of the Subject, most certainly, without hearing the Facts stated, and the Question discussed by Council—WHAT TREATMENT DID HE MEET WITH?—LORD DENBIGH’S Attack upon him was the Attack of a Ruffian, hired to carry through a profligate Measure, by assassinating every Man who should attempt Opposition.—YOUR LORDSHIP’S Language was somewhat more decent:—it was the Language of Ignorance, delivered with that Insolence, which a weak and vain Man feels, confident in a corrupt Majority.
Has your Lordship still to learn, that the Opinion of a Judge, though delivered in the Course of a Cause in open Court, and handed down in Print; yet if it is on a Point NOT before Him, as a Judge, is never allowed to be cited even by Counsel in Argument? And wisely so established, my Lord: For the Law of this Country gives Credit to the Opinions of the Judges, only on those Points, which are necessarily brought before them in the Course of Judicial Proceedings. On these Points, when they have heard the Arguments of Counsel, they decide;—if erroneously, the Injured Party has his Remedy by Appeal;—if corruptly and iniquitously, the Decision of the Judge appears on the Record, and he is amenable to his Country’s Justice.—Is your Lordship ignorant that this is the Law? or can your Lordship say—or will any other Man say for you—that in
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the Course of his Attendance on Courts of Law, he ever before knew a Private Letter, and Private Conversation, adduced by a Judge, not as ARGUMENTS, furnishing REASONS for an Opinion, but as AUTHORITIES IN LAW, to warrant his Decision?—My Lord, I will defy your Lordship, with all your long List of Advisers, from the hollow-hearted Lord, who made you Chancellor, down to the lowest Driveller who feeds your Vanity with Flattery, to say, that such a Sight was ever before exhibited in a Court of Justice.
From the Existence of Courts of Law in this Island, no Man ever, before this Day, saw a private Letter produced, read, and relied on, as Authority by a Judge, pronouncing Judgment.—Are the Arguments of counsel Mockery? or, are they supposed to suggest Matter, to be weighed by those who are to decide?—The Judgement of your Lordship, and the House of Peers, this Day, was avowedly founded on the Authorities of Men, who had never heard the Question discussed by Counsel.—If this mode of deciding is to prevail in Courts of Justice, Arguments by Counsel are useless: Your Lordship can decide, without hearing them: Nothing more is requisite, than for your Lordship to write a Letter to some Friend: His Answer, read in Court by your Lordship, will stand in the Place both of Authority and Argument.—Is this the Way, in which Justice is to be dispensed to the Subject, in the Supreme Tribunals of the Country—the Chancery, and House of Lords?
O. SEATS of TALBOT and of HARDWICK:6 from whence those GREAT and GOD-LIKE Men, with a pure Heart, and Wisdom more than human, shed on this happy Land the fragrant Dews of Justice,—from whence the vanquished Suitor was wont to retire, satisfied, by the Arguments he had heard, that he had been mistaken in his Claim—HOW IS YOUR GLORY FADED!—The WRETCHED THING, who now fills the Place of your late bright Inhabitant, attempts not to give Reasons
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for his Decisions, but tells the Suitor in Plain Terms, that he decides the Cause, on the Authority of a Letter from one of his Friends, who had never heard the Facts openly stated, or an Argument from Council on the Subject!
My Lord, were I to tell a Man, bred up in the Courts of TALBOT and of HARDWICKE, that a Chancellor of this Country had decided a Question, on an Executory Devise, on the Authority of a Letter from Sir William De Grey, who had never heard an Argument on the Question—he would tell me, IT WAS A LYE—IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE TRUE;—It would be as repugnant
