less than 7 + 5. Secondly, the successive addition on the fingers is equivalent to saying 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 5. This transforms the expression, 7 + 5 = 12, into this other, 7 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 12; but the conception, 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, has the same relation to 5, as 7 + 5 to 12; therefore, if 7 + 5 are not contained in 12, neither are 7 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 contained in it. It may be replied that Kant does not speak of identity, but of intuitions. This intuition, however, is not the sensation, but the idea; and if the idea, it is only the conception explained. Thirdly, we know this method of intuition not to be even necessary for children. Fourthly, this method is impossible in the case of large numbers.
281. Kant adds that this proposition, "a right line is the shortest distance between two points," is not purely analytic, because the idea of shortest distance is not contained in the idea of right line. Waiving the demonstrations which some authors give, or pretend to give, of this proposition, we shall confine ourselves to Kant's reasons. He forgets that here the right line is not taken alone, but compared with other lines. The idea of right line alone neither does nor can contain the ideas of more or less; for these ideas suppose a comparison. But from the moment the right line and the curve are compared, with respect to length, the relation of superiority of the curve over the right line is seen. The proposition is then the result of the comparison of two purely analytic conceptions with a third, which is length.
282. If Kant's reasoning were good, even this judgment, "the whole is greater than its part," would not be analytic; for the idea of greater enters not into the conception of the whole until the whole is compared with its part. Thus, the judgment, four is greater than three, would not be analytic, because the idea of four until compared with three does not include the conception of greater.
The axiom: "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other," would not be analytic, because the conception, equal to each other, does not enter into the conception of things which are equal to the same thing, until we reflect that the equality of the middle term implies the equality of the extremes.
The x, of which Kant speaks, would be found in almost all judgments, if we could not form total conceptions involving comparison of partial conceptions: in this case we should have no analytic judgments except such as are wholly identical, or directly contained in this formula, A is A.
283. The comparison of two conceptions with a third, does not take from the result the character of analytic judgment, as a predicate cannot be seen in the idea of the subject, without the aid of this comparison. This comparison is often necessary, because we only confusedly think of what is contained in the conception which we already have; and sometimes it even happens that we do not think at all of it. One often says a thing and then contradicts himself, not observing that what he adds is opposed to what he had already said. We often ask, in conversation, do you not see that you suppose the contrary of what you just said; that the conditions you have just established imply the contrary of what you now assert?
284. A conception includes not only all that is expressly thought in it, but all that can be thought. If, on decomposing it, we find in it other things, it cannot be said that we add them, but that we find them. It is not a synthesis, but an analysis. Otherwise we must admit no analytic conceptions, or only such as are purely identical. Except in this last case, of which the general formula is, A is A, there is always in the predicate something not thought in the subject, if not in substance at least in form. The circle is a curve; this undoubtedly is one of the simplest analytical propositions imaginable; still the predicate expresses the general conception of curve, which may be contained in the subject, in a confused manner, with relation to a particular species of curve. Following a gradation in geometrical propositions, we may observe that there is nothing in one proposition not in the preceding, except the greater or less difficulty of decomposing the conception, so as to see in it what before we had not seen.
If we say, the circle is a conic section, evidently any one ignorant of the terms, or who has not reflected on their true sense, will not think of the attribute in the subject. No addition is made to the conception of the circle; only a property not before known is discovered, and this discovery results from comparison with the cone. Is there any synthesis here? No. There is only an analysis of the two conceptions, the circle and the cone, compared. As this error destroys the foundation of Kant's doctrine on this point, we will develop it and place it on a more solid foundation.
285. Synthesis, properly so called, requires something to be added to the conception, which in nowise belongs to it, as the example brought by Kant shows. The conception, extension, is contained in the conception, body; but heaviness is an entirely foreign idea, which we can unite to the conception, body, only because experience authorizes it. Only with this addition is there properly synthesis. The union of ideas which results from the conception of the thing, although comparison may be necessary in order to fecundate them, does not make a synthesis. The conceptions are not wholly absolute, they contain relations, and the discovery of these relations does not give a synthesis, but a more complete analysis. If it be said that in this case there is something more than the primitive conception, we answer that the same thing happens in all not purely identical. We may also add that by the comparison a new total conception is formed resulting from the primitive conceptions; and the properties of the relations are then seen, not by synthesis, but by the analysis of the total conception.
According to Kant, true synthesis requires the union of things so different from one another, that the bond uniting them is a sort of mystery, an x, whose determination is a great philosophical problem. If this x is found in the essential relation of the partial conceptions constituting the total conception, the problem is resolved by a simple analysis, or, to speak more exactly, it is shown that the problem did not exist, because the x was a known quantity.
We know of no judgment more analytical than that in which we see the parts in the whole, since the whole is only the parts united. If we say, one and one are two, or, two is equal to one plus one; it cannot be denied that we have a total conception, two, in the decomposition of which, we find one plus one. If this be not an analytic conception, that is to say, if the predicate be not here contained in the idea of the subject, it will be hard to tell what is. But even here there are different conceptions, one plus one; unite them, and they form the total conception. The relation, although most simple, exists; and whether it be more or less, simple or complicated, and, consequently, seen with more or less facility, does not alter the character of the judgments, or from synthetic convert them into analytic.
286. We will complete this explanation with an example from elementary geometry. "The surface of a rhomboid is equal to the surface of a rectangle having the same base and altitude." First: in the idea of the rhomboid, we do not see the idea of its equality with the rectangle; and this we cannot see, because the relation does not exist when there is no other term to which it may relate. The idea of the parallelogram does not contain that of the rectangle, and consequently not that of equality. Second: the relation results from the comparison of the rhomboid with the rectangle; and, consequently, it must be found in a total conception containing them both. It cannot, therefore, be said that we add any thing to the conception of the parallelogram which does not belong to it. On the contrary, we see this equality flow from the conception of the rhomboid and that of the rectangle, as partial conceptions of the total conception, formed by the combination of them both. The analysis of this total conception opens to us the relation we are now in quest of; for it must be observed that when the simple union of the conceptions compared does not suffice, we make use of another including them, and also something more; and from the new conception, duly analyzed, we deduce the relation of the parts compared.
287. In the geometrical construction, that serves for the demonstration of the above theorem, which we have used as an example, may be seen what we have just explained with regard to total conceptions containing other conceptions besides those compared. If we place the rectangle and the rhomboid upon the same base, we at once see that there is something common to both, namely, the triangle formed by the base, a part of one side of the rhomboid, and a part
