and political scientists. They refer to multilevel governance as “the study of the ‘crossroads of vertical (intergovernmental) and horizontal (state-society) relations,” a general description that is widely embraced by European Union officials and students. Their objective is to “build a [theoretical] bridge between these two academic and practitioner communities and their respective ‘cognitive maps’” (Ongaro et al., eds. 2010:1).
Is it possible to bridge the two very different streams of research into US federalism/intergovernmental relations and EU multilevel governance? Theo A.J. Toonen strongly believes that it is. He argues that the modern MLG model of internal intergovernmental relations and public administration is based on two new major approaches in this economically globalised post-modern age: 1) a focus on multidisciplinary and cross-sectional institutional clusters and 2) concentration on networked regions. MLG can foster “an ability to collaborate in a varied institutional context [by] using member-states, regional and local government institutions as partners and agents for joint policy-making and implementation.” It thereby places greater emphasis on “networks” and on “governance arrangements” than on “hierarchies” and “government” (Toonen 2010: 30). Toonen proposes to combine the perspectives of MLG and IGR by “organising at least part of the European debate on the utility of systems of MLG along American lines.” He proposes to incorporate the US public administration concepts of intergovernmental constitution (IGC), intergovernmental relations (IGR) and intergovernmental management (IGM) into the analysis of the internal intergovernmental relations of the EU.
Toonen also notes perceptively that the simple dichotomy and “juxtaposition of federal and unitary systems breaks down when it has to face the variety of administrative systems that need to be addressed today” (Toonen 2010: 35). “Federalism” is now generally understood to be “an abstract and multi-interpretable concept”. And “unitarism” is likewise viewed as highly contentious and ambiguous in meaning. If one distinguishes the analysis of federal and unitary systems of governance and public administration – the governance perspective – from the study of actual states, then “the actual relative subsystem [41] autonomy within a unitary state might be as large or as small as within a federal structure” (Toonen 2010: 36). He contends that “unitary states may actually operate as federalised systems from a sociological, political or administrative point of view,” which he labels “sociological federalism.” And he argues that “conversely, a governance and administratively-oriented ‘implementation’ federalism within a unitary state structure is also possible,” particularly where there is an “informal, bottom-up ‘participative management’” (Ibid.) In short, according to Toonen (2010:36), “the main a priori difference among unitary and federal states is that due to their different legal frameworks, the relative autonomy of subsystems has a distinctive legal expression.” This may not, however, have important practical consequences. It follows, then, that it is both possible and legitimate to study federal and unitary systems from various conceptual perspectives: sovereign or power theory, network analysis or interdependency theory.
In our view, Toonen’s effort to combine the theoretical perspectives of the IGR and MLG frameworks is promising in its potential contribution to the current debate about the utility of MLG as a comparative analytical tool. We shall consider in the concluding section below to what extent it may be used to gauge the value of the multilevel governance concept in the analysis of intergovernmental relations in the current economically globalised world.
A Schematic Comparison of Contemporary UK and German Intergovernmental Relations With Respect to Multilevel Governance Theory
The United Kingdom: Post-Devolution (1998 to the Present)
What do British scholars take the concept of “multilevel governance” to mean and what do they see as its underlying causes in the UK? In applying MLG in the UK context, Bache and Flinders (2004) note that the concept can be “strengthened by the insights of the concept of the ‘differentiated polity”2. They also borrow the term “multilevel polity” from Gamble to describe the post-devolution UK state. Gamble defines this concept in rather broad terms as “a form of MLG that stresses the variety of institutions and processes through which societies are governed” (Gamble 2000: 290). Bache and [42] Flinders offer a view of MLG that they characterise as an “organising perspective” or “framework for analysis” (Bache and Flinders 2004: 33). They contrast this perspective with what is generally called the “Westminster Model” (WM), which is the most frequently applied approach to the study of British governance. Bache and Flinders (2004) acknowledge that the WM has provided a valuable framework for academic research in the past, a useful behavioural guide for politicians, and a significant influence on public perceptions. It has also served as a meaningful normative standard. But in recent years it has shown a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the political elite, to adopt narrow and simplistic assumptions about politics, and to be too insular in its focus. Moreover, it reflects a resistance to adopting broader, foreign (non-British) approaches and methodologies and epistemological/ ontological philosophical views on political questions. MLG, on the other hand, offers an alternative approach both to the WM and the state-centric model of the intergovernmentalists.
Hogwood et al. (2000) provide a detailed nuanced view of “asymmetrical devolution,” and its impact on UK EU policy-making. They emphasise more than Bache and Flinders the uneven manner in which constitutional and institutional change deriving from devolution occurs. Unlike Bache and Flinders, Hogwood et al. believe that it is important to place their analysis of UK devolution within a wider picture of reciprocal relationships between the constitutional context and the actual patterns of participation of territorial actors in multilevel governance. Therefore, they argue that the constitutional and institutional changes stemming from devolution do not take place in an even manner throughout the polity. Hogwood et al. (2000) nevertheless conclude optimistically, like Bache and Flinders, that trends to increasing manifestations of MLG will continue and ultimately dominate in UK politics.
Bulmer at al. (2006) provide an elaboration of an intermediate position between the polar extremes of the intergovernmentalists and more dogmatic MLG theorists. They point to the need to place the relationship between these UK “devolveds” into a broader context involving interactions between European subnational authorities and EU decision-makers, a “significant field of study … [which is] generally termed multilevel governance” (Bulmer et al. 2006: 76). Within this field of study, they acknowledge the strong disagreements as to whether power is concentrated within the EU on the member state (or national) governments (as alleged by intergovernmentalist theorists), or whether it is shared by these national governments with supranational and subnational governmental authorities (as claimed by proponents of MLG theory). Bulmer et al. (2006), cite the work of Jeffery (2000) in declaring their preference for an intermediate position between these two points of view.
Gamble (2006) takes a historical and constitutional-institutional approach to devolution. He views the British state since devolution very differently from strong MLG exponents such as Bache and Finders (2004). In fact, he makes [43] no mention of this concept, and does not cite its literature, either in the article or in his bibliography. With respect to the historical context, he notes that, “Britain has never been a pure type of unitary system, in which all power is concentrated and centralised” (Gamble 2006: 21). In this way, he separates himself from the staunch exponents of the UK state as a pure manifestation of the ideal type Westminster Model. A major reason for this is the practical constraints imposed on the central government by the “informal territorial constitution” (Gamble 2006: 22). He considers these territorial arrangements to be “at best quasi-federal”, but prefers to label the UK type of quasi-federalism a “federacy”. He defines it as “a large political unity to which smaller units are federated, even though the larger unit is not itself a federation.” However, he concedes that, “Britain has been a multinational state rather than a single-nation state.” Therefore, the UK has sometimes been described as a “union state”, or “state of unions”, rather than as a unitary state. For Gamble, the political and institutional context of devolution is best
