to publicize the cause and their efforts, through newspapers and broadcast media. The modes of communication change over time, of course, and social media provide more accessible ways to reach people directly and wholesale (Bennett and Segerberg 2014; Earl and Kimport 2011; Rohlinger 2015, 2019; Tufekci 2017). Similarly, recruitment often comes one individual at a time, building new organizations, but the most efficient way to build a movement is to recruit and engage the already organized. Speaking at a meeting at a church or sports team or professional association allows an organizer to reach people who are already able to do something beyond the work of maintaining their lives, and people who already share some kind of connection.
Social movements arise only after governance structures are in operation, and those structures or governments come with strategies to contain discontent, which also comprise a set of political opportunities. These opportunities constrain what issues can be contested, who can engage in making claims, and how they can try to advance their beliefs. Authoritarian leaders, for example, claim infallibility and legitimacy by default. If God had wanted someone else to be king or pope, someone else would be doing it. In joining in a challenging movement, individuals have to confront their own beliefs about the vulnerability of a government to their claims. What’s more, authoritarians usually also enjoy the capacity to inflict severe punishment on dissenters. Challengers risk fines, imprisonment, isolation, and even their lives. It’s not that there are no people with grievances in authoritarian states like North Korea, for example; it’s just that there’s no available space for organizing or expression. With few dissenters and no qualms about respecting due process or civil liberties, authoritarian states can brutally repress incipient movements, eliminating the challenge and demonstrating a cautionary example for other would-be dissidents.
Take, for example, the abbreviated White Rose campaign in Nazi Germany. Domestic resistance to Hitler evaporated relatively quickly, but in the summer of 1942, a handful of Christian students at the University of Munich drafted and distributed six leaflets, sometimes through the mail, sometimes by hand delivery, and sometimes just leaving the papers where someone might pick them up. The papers criticized Hitler and the Nazis and called for “passive resistance.” Later, they escalated to posting political graffiti near the university (Nuborn and Dumbach 2007 [1986]). Once identified and reported by a custodian, the members of the collective were arrested, interrogated, summarily tried, and executed.2 A moral exemplar perhaps, the tragic story was a deterrent to others who might criticize the regime from within. The key to understanding the extremely limited influence of the White Rose campaign lay not in its integrity or its strategies, tactics, or ideas, but in the larger political context.
At the other end of the spectrum, democracies invite and channel participation in politics to less threatening means of engagement. The minority that loses an election will always hear that they can organize and compete more effectively … next time. Campaigning for office entails accepting the rules and restrictions of governance, and managing conflicts with an idea toward winning elections, in which the identification of a person or a party can trump any connection to issues. It can also entail an acceptance of unfavorable policies in the moments in between. Learning to live with losses is somewhat easier if you believe that they are temporary and reversible through your efforts.
The rules of political engagement vary greatly across democratic polities, and those rules also shape available opportunities for activists pushing a cause. Some governments strictly regulate the funding and conduct of electoral campaigns, whereas others allow longer and more expensive efforts. In systems that offer single member district representation, we’ll generally see two dominant political parties, and specialized concerns that attract a smaller share of the electorate, say workers or the environment, have to make their peace with one of the major parties (Duverger 1954). In contrast, in states that host proportional representation systems, starting a new political party based around particular constituents – like Israeli Arabs or German Greens – is always a possibility.
Some elements of opportunity, like the electoral system or the nature of government institutions, tend to be pretty stable over time. Others, however, like the positions of people in power and their coalitions of support, are far more dynamic. The savvy organizer pays attention to all of this. Her job is to find the most effective route to political influence, after assessing both available opportunities and the resource of her supporters.
Resources are the tools and assets that a movement can deploy in support of its ideas, and they vary tremendously across movements and contexts (McCarthy and Zald 1977). It’s inspiring to talk about “people power,” for example, but it depends upon large numbers willing to take on risks in collective action. What’s more, all people don’t count equally in a political system. Individuals with disproportionate wealth, status, or knowledge can generate more attention, and potentially exercise greater influence, than far larger numbers of less elite people.
Such resources are not stagnant, and skillful deployment of assets can leverage other assets. A movement with a great deal of money can start with paid advertising and paid supporters, which, carefully deployed, might recruit more volunteers. A movement that starts with a committed few can take dramatic action to generate political attention to its issues of concern and its actions, thus leading to more public support. A movement with broad support at the grassroots can mobilize that support effectively to demonstrate the capacity to affect elections, and thereby recruit institutional allies. None of this, of course, is automatic, and organizers’ success in leveraging resources effectively depends not only on skill and context, but also tactics.
A tactic is a way to send a message. Organizers can send a message clearly and directly by holding a press conference or sending a letter. Enlisting others to send the same message in letters or phone calls represents an effort to increase its visibility. Organizers can amplify their message with larger numbers by holding a demonstration, march, or rally. They can demonstrate the depth of their commitment by taking more dramatic action, ranging from nonviolent and symbolic civil disobedience to vandalism and violence against property and persons. In choosing a message, organizers generally draw from a familiar “play list” of tactics, familiar to both supporters and authorities. In choosing tactics, movement organizers need to be cognizant of at least three distinct audiences: authorities, supporters, and potential supporters. To make sense of the range of possible approaches to strategic action, Tilly (1978) suggested that a tactic is a performance that sends a message to all about activists’ worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. Costumes, like the faux Indian disguises donned by the Boston Tea Partiers, the animal costumes worn by animal rights activists, or the naked displays of crusaders against gender violence, are a frequent tactical addition. Importantly, although organizers enjoy direct means of communicating with all of their audiences, larger numbers can be reached through mediated communication, when mass media choose to cover and define an event. The ideal tactic affirms supporters, attracts bystanders, and gets authorities to worry about what else these protesters might do (Rochon 1998). A savvy organizer is mindful of developing approaches that are likely to engage all potential audiences, and to be attractive enough to mass media to extend beyond the movement’s network.
Protest movements are organized. Although events, a crystallized combination of tactics, constituencies, and claims, often include elements of spontaneity, like the bystanders who decided to join the patriots clambering on the tea ships, there is always an element of planning underneath. Organizers try to engage supporters, pick places, promote particular grievances and alternatives, and try to figure out what happens next. The continuing relationship among people committed to a particular vision of social change can broadly be thought of as an organization.
Here too, there is an enormous range of organizational forms and commitments. A small group that meets regularly in a church basement or around a kitchen table, where no one is paid, and participants get to know each other very well, can be the basis of an ongoing campaign for massive political change. At the other end of the organizational spectrum, social movements are often staged by well-established and well-resourced groups whose efforts span long periods of time and decades of engagement. Such organizations develop complicated bureaucratic
