a general understanding of culture could apply just as much to the value of personal development, gender equality, family, and solidarity as it could to professional achievement, historical awareness, and certain practices of education, technology, and sports. It could apply to the way that we deal with nature, as well as to the way that we interact in public or digital space. The value of art, books, architecture, and other cultural artifacts could also be universalized in this sense. In principle, this will always involve an unending effort of working toward the universal – an incessant act of “doing universality,” which will always require revisions. Unlike cultural essentialism, such a culture of the general is not based on the (existing or desired) homogeneity of a community but, rather, on the inescapable cultural heterogeneity of late-modern society, which provides the reservoir for negotiating the general.32 Here, the heterogeneity of the cultural is simply a fact that has to be dealt with and not, as in the case of diversity in hyperculture, an occasion for unconditional appreciation. The culture of the general therefore does not follow a market logic; it fosters neither antagonism between collectives nor apathy about their differences. Instead, it follows a logic of universal participation, though at the same time it requires that all sides make an effort toward enculturation.
This raises the question of the extent to which “doing universality” (on the part of a culture of the general) can go beyond being a theoretical construct and achieve actual relevance. Even under late-modern conditions, one central medium of working toward cultural generality is the sphere of the law – and especially constitutional law – given that it is concerned not only with neutral procedures but also with the matrix of value itself. Another potential medium could be the media-based and political public sphere, even though the digital revolution has done much to place its legitimacy under question. Finally, and above all, educational and cultural institutions – schools, universities, museums, the theatre, etc. – can also play a role in achieving this end.
The practical challenges of working toward cultural generality become especially clear in the case of museums. Museums represent a booming nodal point of the global creative economy, with its markets, its selective cultural consumers, and its celebration of diversity. At the same time, they have also, in certain places, become the focus of cultural essentialists and their identity politics. Could they become a locus of cultural generality that encourages critical reflection about the common features within heterogeneity – about the commonalities within global society, the commonalities within Europe, or the commonalities within a political nation?33 Here, working toward what is collectively shared in common concerns the past and its vestiges, as well as the present and the future. Of course, museums can fixate on propagating a homogeneous group identity, or they can celebrate cultural diversity and things of individual interest. Yet they can just as well participate in working toward the general by acknowledging the heterogeneity of culture while simultaneously reflecting the common reference points of social praxis by focusing on commemorative culture, the shape of the future, and aesthetic shortcomings, or by thematizing current problems. The educational system, too, faces the challenge of promoting a culture of the general. Since the 2000s, schools have become the venue of numerous cultural conflicts, especially in Europe and North America. Steered by the model of hyperculture, they have had to foster values such as individual talent and cultural diversity, and yet cultural essentialism has demanded that they bolster the formation of national identities. In contrast to this, schools could work toward cultural generality by respecting the heterogeneity of their pupils and functioning as commonly shared places of learning in which everyone – regardless of his or her ethnic, religious, or social background – is taught the same norms and practices that are educationally valuable, socially valuable, and conducive to peaceful coexistence.34
In late-modern society, a third form of culturalization – Culturalization III (oriented toward cultural universality) – will certainly not be able to replace the powerful and dominant Culturalization I of hyperculture or the strongly identity-based Culturalization II of cultural essentialism. However, it could function as a critical counterforce that constructively engages with both the cultural reservoir of hyperculture and that of cultural communities. It remains an open question, however, whether the culture of the general will be able, within the framework of the society of singularities, to transcend the boundaries of socio-political debate and have an actual effect on social practices and institutions. Until then, it appears as though the conflict between hyperculture and cultural essentialism will continue to dominate our social reality.
Notes
1 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
2 2 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1780–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
3 3 On these various concepts of culture, see Andreas Reckwitz, Die Transformation der Kulturtheorien: Zur Entwicklung eines Theorieprogramms (Weilerwist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2000), pp. 64–90.
4 4 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. Ralph Manheim, 3 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955–7).
5 5 See Reckwitz, The Society of Singularities, pp. 19–80.
6 6 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1915).
7 7 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930).
8 8 On the relevance of “culture” in postmodernity, see Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991); and Scott Lash, Sociology of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1990).
9 9 For a model of culture as a “resource,” see also George Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).
10 10 On the particular structure of markets for cultural goods, see also Pierre-Michel Menger, The Economics of Creativity: Art and Achievement under Uncertainty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
11 11 For further discussion of cultural capitalism, see Scott Lash and Celia Lury, Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); and Chapter 3 below.
12 12 Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class (New York: Routledge, 2005).
13 13 Georg Simmel, Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms, trans. Anthony J. Blasi et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
14 14 On the new middle class, see Chapter 2 in this book.
15 15 This tendency is the impetus behind the postcolonial critique of the cultural appropriation of the powerless by the powerful.
16 16 On the concept of diversity, see Steven Vertovec, “‘Diversity’ and the Social Imaginary,” European Journal of Sociology, 53:3 (2012), pp. 287–312.
17 17 On the concept of hybridity, see Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” in Global Modernities, ed. Mike Featherstone et al. (London: SAGE, 2002), pp. 45–68.
18 18 See Bernhard Giesen, Kollektive Identität: Die Intellektuellen und die Nation 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999); and Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1997).
19 19 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd edn. (London: Verso, 1991).
20 20 For further discussion of this phenomenon, see Reckwitz, The Society of Singularities, pp. 286–309.
21 21 Of course, identity conflicts
