these extremist groups access to the public through their own venues, wholly excluding tech-smart users from social media is difficult. When Twitter sought to purge Islamic State messaging, it closed down more than 100,000 accounts in just one month, but it was far from certain that this effort had been as comprehensive as intended, and many of these accounts may have been swiftly reconstituted, either on Twitter or in “darker” recesses of the internet. Dealing with terrorist information initiatives will become more important if Islamic State concentrates on a virtual, rather than physical, caliphate, and if groups such as Boko Haram and Al Shabaab become more adept in their online efforts.26
Gatekeepers have always been present in one form or another to govern information flows. In some cases, such as in China, these are government censors who rigidly oversee content before it can reach the public. In countries where information freedom is respected, newspaper editors, television producers, and other media professionals make decisions about newsworthiness based on criteria ranging from basic moral values to commercial interests such as keeping advertisers happy.
These gatekeepers were particularly influential when the media universe was more finite. Fifty years ago in the United States, consumers of television news had only three national channels to choose from, and newspapers served only limited geographic areas. Today, in much of the world, there is no such thing as local, or even national, news in terms of limitations on distribution to an audience. Even many small community newspapers rely on their websites to deliver their product, and so people anywhere in the world with internet access may read about town council doings and school lunch menus. On a grander scale, online news and satellite television are largely unconstrained by national borders. Citizens of most nations can read, listen, or watch how news media in other countries cover their own and others’ homelands. Governments that don’t want this coverage to reach their populations must struggle mightily to choke off incoming material that they find uncongenial.
Although gatekeepers still make decisions about newsworthiness and appropriateness of content of their own products, much of the information universe today is populated not by traditional providers but rather by websites, videos, and text content carried by the likes of Twitter, Facebook, Weibo, QQ, YouTube, and many others. For the most part (with the exception of extreme content, such as child pornography, that government regulators or communication companies themselves ban), the material that citizens around the world see on social media passes through limited or no review processes. Most gateways for information are wide open, and damaging material might not be flagged except post facto. Artificial intelligence systems that rely on screening algorithms are useful, but not foolproof.27
Is the result of this openness information democracy or information anarchy? Probably some of both. For refugees in Congo wanting to tell their story to the world, having direct access to global publics is invaluable. For the workers in a Russian troll farm using false information to provoke conflict in a foreign country, their access is similarly vital.
Chapter 5, “Russia and New Dimensions of Information at War,” analyzes disinformation. This kind of war-by-influence has existed for many years. In 1940 and 1941, while Edward Murrow was broadcasting from London about the plight of the British under attack by Nazi Germany, British agents operating in New York City were producing information – much of it false – designed to push America toward entering the war.28
Their efforts pale by comparison with those orchestrated today by the Kremlin, which has made information warfare a principal element in its military doctrine while it relies on troll factories and other content generators to disseminate largely false information that serves the purposes of Russian foreign policy.29 The key to their efforts is volume, with hundreds of trolls producing thousands of online messages every day.
Measuring the effects of contemporary political information warfare is still a developing science, but it is reasonable to assume that Russian disinformation efforts had at least some impact on the 2016 US presidential election and the 2016 British “Brexit” referendum. Further, such self-serving information tactics can be used to influence public attitudes about kinetic measures such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014.30
Just as major militaries have had to expand their expertise beyond grand battlefield scenarios and adjust to the demands of combatting insurgencies and terrorists, so too must they develop strategies to address the exigencies of information-centric conflict. For now, Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin and Islamic State stand out as having relied heavily on information-enhanced tactics, but they will almost certainly be joined by others. The United States has responded, targeting terrorists’ online recruitment efforts and, in November 2018, launching a preemptive electronic attack on a Russian troll farm to prevent possible disruption of that month’s US congressional elections.31
Nevertheless, it is more than likely that state and non-state actors will continue to develop their information war capabilities. The Putin government has shown – in Ukraine, the Baltic States, and elsewhere – that it is committed to mastering the human–machine combination of hybrid warfare that relies heavily on information tactics. In addition to using information in armed conflict, Russia vigorously uses information to disrupt political processes within rival countries, such as the United States, as well as in Europe. One question this book addresses is whether such activity can reach a point at which it constitutes “war,” even if no bullets are fired. NATO has adopted a policy that expands the definition of “attack” beyond conventional armed conflict and now includes cyberattacks. Individual nations might soon do the same.32
Chapter 6, “From Media Manipulation to Media Literacy,” examines cases related to information at war in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and addresses how the flow of information can shape public attitudes about those who fight. This chapter also considers how publics around the world might adjust to the threats posed by information warfare. On their own and through broad-based education programs, citizens need to enhance their media literacy. They must know when to greet information with skepticism, and they must understand how to go about verifying news and other material, particularly online content delivered from unfamiliar sources. Truth is a powerful weapon to be used against malign information, and the public must become far more proficient at wielding that weapon.
Anticipatory information at war is present even when armed conflict is unlikely. Disinformation about the Covid-19 virus, vaccinating children against measles and other illnesses, and similar topics can be used to foster uncertainty and disunity among publics of nations that are considered long-term adversaries. Probing and softening a country’s resolve are parts of the long game of information at war – laying a foundation for possible future conflicts.
Chapter 7, “Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going,” pulls together elements from past and present and considers what might lie ahead. Shakespeare wrote “What is past is prologue,” and another way to say that is “Nothing is new.” The preceding chapters presented numerous examples of how information has been used in war, and these instances provide some guidance about what the future might hold.
This final chapter also focuses on the giant looming over the future of information at war: China. This material appears near the end of the book because dealing with China and its information-oriented “three warfares” strategy will be so crucial to the future of so many aspects of global affairs moving forward in the twenty-first century. This will be the next great challenge for those who address issues related to information at war.
A note about the focus of this book: many of the examples cited relate to American journalistic and military issues, although there are substantial explorations of topics grounded in experiences of the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Ukraine, Finland, the Baltic States, Middle Eastern countries, and numerous others. The author, being
