Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century. Anthony King

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      I cannot remember precisely when it was. It may have been in 2001 or 2002, or it might have been in 2004 or 2005, after I had already started to work on the armed forces. However, the memory itself remains quite distinct. In my first years at Exeter University my office was directly opposite that of Barry Barnes, who held the professorial chair of the department. I was very lucky. Our proximity in the department was congenial and instructive for me. As an eminent sociologist, Barry was a very fine mentor and friend. I met Barry frequently, as a result, and we talked about many things, including sociology and social theory. In one of those conversations, as was common, he invited me into his room and, as we chatted, he showed me a small, yellow booklet, the reading list from an old course on ‘Social Order’ which he had taught at Edinburgh. On the cover of this booklet was the photocopy of an engraving of a late fifteenth- or early sixteenth-century siege, in which cannon had breached a wall, while soldiers attacked a gate as defenders poured burning oil upon them. Barry motioned excitedly at the image and cried: ‘Look at all the social stuff going on there.’ His point was, of course, that once humans were able to form social groups and cooperate with each other, there was almost no limit to their powers – for good or ill.

      As always, many friends and colleagues helped me with this book. I am grateful to them all. I offer special thanks to the following. I could not have conducted the military research I have without the support of the British Army and the Royal Marines, and especially 40 and 45 Commando Royal Marines. I am personally grateful to: Ben Baker, James Bashall, Jules Buczacki, Matt Cansdale, Alec Case, Innes Caton, James Cook, Kevin Copsey, Mike Cornwell, Gerry Ewart-Brookes, Adam Fraser-Hitchen, Paddy Ginn, Stephen Greenberg (USMC), Paul Hammett, Sigolene Hobson, Rupert Jones, James Martin, Nick McGinley, Charles ‘Jack’ Nicholson, Nick Perry, Jamie Powell, Dan Reeve, Clo O’Neill, Dom Rogers, Simon Rogers, Dickie Sernberg, Jolyon Simpson, Al Speedie, Zac Stenning, Andrew Stuart and Matt Taylor. Stephen Bowns, Peter Dixon, Robert Goodin and the Royal Anglian Regiment were extremely generous in their support for my research on Belfast in 1972 and the permission to use some images. I would also like to thank Ben Barry, Virginia Comolli and Antonio Sampaio at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Marcus Geisser at the International Committee of the Red Cross; and James Denselow at Save the Children. At Warwick, Jon Coaffee and Stuart Elden provided very useful guidance, as did Randall Collins and Jeremy Black.

      At Polity, I am very grateful to John Thompson, who initially saw potential in the project; Louise Knight, who has been a brilliant editor; Inès Boxman for her assistance; and Sarah Dancy. Will Crosby helped check the references. As always, I am indebted to those who read and commented on the manuscript. Charles Heath-Saunders and Patrick Jackson at the MOD confirmed that the book did not breach operational or personal security and provided useful comments. The feedback from Christopher Dandeker, Chris Torchia and two anonymous reviewers at Polity was very helpful indeed. I am particularly grateful here to Patrick Owen, an excellent student from my first cohort at Warwick. Finally, as always, Patrick Bury provided perceptive and very pertinent guidance about how to improve the manuscript.

      Mosul

      On 16 July 2018, the last bombs fell on Mosul. A battle, which some American generals described as ‘the most significant urban combat since World War Two’, was over.1 After nine months of bitter fighting, ISIS was defeated, but the city was also destroyed. Homes, government and commercial buildings, factories, shops, mosques and hospitals had been ruined; the streets were choked with rubble and the detritus of war. The civil infrastructure – water, electricity, sewage – had collapsed. The fighting had been truly terrible. One of the American commanders of the operation, General Stephen Townsend, recalled: ‘The battle of Mosul was the most disorganized, chaotic, debrislittered place I’ve ever seen. Large swathes of the city were damaged. Some parts, especially the west side, were completely levelled – entire neighbourhoods destroyed.’2 Other US officers, closer to the combat, were shocked: ‘You can’t replicate how stressful it was: how bad the slaughter was in Mosul.’3

      In June 2014, ISIS advanced on Mosul. The city of over 1.5 million, the second biggest in Iraq, was a major strategic prize. Although Mosul was defended by an American-equipped Iraqi division of some 20,000 soldiers, the entire force fled in the face of a bold advance by only 1,500 ISIS fighters. The ISIS force, mounted in Toyota trucks, entered the city all but unopposed. With the capture of Mosul, the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, declared the creation of the caliphate. For more than two years, ISIS imposed a reign of terror on their territory in eastern Syria and northern Iraq. Remarkably, they were able to unite the entire international community against them. The war against ISIS converged inexorably on Mosul.

      On 16 October 2016, the Iraqi Security Forces, under the supervision of a US Combined Joint Task Force based in Baghdad, began its campaign to retake Mosul with a force of 94,000 Iraqi soldiers.5 Initially, the Iraqi 1st Infantry and 9th Infantry Divisions attacked the eastern part of the city from the east and south-east, though the Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Service, an elite special forces formation of about 10,000 soldiers, led most of the attacks. The Iraqi Security Forces were accompanied by about 1,000 American advisers with a further 2,000 supporting them.6 They were opposed by an ISIS force of some 5,000–8,000 active fighters, supported by locally recruited young militants; ISIS probably fielded a force of about 12,000 in the city.

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