as already noted, there is little controversy about the seriousness of the need to prevent genetic diseases, it is doubtful that gender preference on the basis of other social and psychological desires should be given as high a priority. The distinction between medical needs and nonmedical desires is particularly relevant if PGD is done solely for sex selection based on nonmedical preferences. The greater the demand on medical resources to achieve PGD for no other reason than sex selection, as in descending order in (b) through (d) above, the more questions surround it regarding its appropriateness for medical practice. If, on the other hand, PGD is done as part of infertility treatment, and the information that allows sex selection is not gained through the additional use of medical resources, it presumably is free of more serious problems of fairness in the allocation of scarce resources and appropriateness to the practice of medicine.
The ethical issues that have emerged in this document’s concern for PGD and sex selection are in some ways particular to the uses and consequences of a specific reproductive technology. Their general significance is broader than this, however. For example, the concerns raised here provide at least a framework for an ethical assessment of new techniques for selecting X‐bearing or Y‐bearing sperm for IUI or IVF (ongoing clinical trial reports of which appeared while this document was being developed). Here, too, sex selection for the purposes of preventing the transmission of genetic diseases does not appear to present ethical problems. However, here also, sex selection for nonmedical reasons, especially if facilitated on a large scale, has the potential to reinforce gender bias in a society, and it may constitute inappropriate use and allocation of medical resources. Finally, although sperm sorting and IUI can entail less burden for parents, questions of the risk to offspring from techniques that involve staining and the use of a laser on sperm DNA remain under investigation.
Recommendations
Of the arguments in favor of PGD and sex selection, only the one based on the prevention of transmittable genetic diseases is strong enough to clearly avoid or override concerns regarding gender equality, acceptance of offspring for themselves and not their inessential characteristics, health risks and burdens for individuals attempting to achieve pregnancy, and equitable use and distribution of medical resources. These concerns remain for PGD and sex selection when it is used to fulfill nonmedical preferences or social and psychological needs. However, because it is not clear in every case that the use of PGD and sex selection for nonmedical reasons entails certainly grave wrongs or sufficiently predictable grave negative consequences, the Committee does not favor its legal prohibition. Nonetheless, the cumulative weight of the arguments against nonmedically motivated sex selection gives cause for serious ethical caution. The Committee’s recommendations therefore follow from an effort to respect and to weigh ethical concerns that are sometimes in conflict – namely, the right to reproductive freedom, genuine medical needs and goals, gender equality, and justice in the distribution of medical resources. On the basis of its foregoing ethical analysis, the Committee recommends the following:
1 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis used for sex selection to prevent the transmission of serious genetic disease is ethically acceptable. It is not inherently gender biased, bears little risk of consequences detrimental to individuals or to society, and represents a use of medical resources for reasons of human health.
2 In patients undergoing IVF, PGD used for sex selection for nonmedical reasons – as in (a) through (c) above – holds some risk of gender bias, harm to individuals and society, and inappropriateness in the use and allocation of limited medical resources. Although these risks are lower when sex identification is already part of a by‐product of PGD being done for medical reasons (a), they increase when sex identification is added to PGD solely for purposes of sex selection (b) and when PGD is itself initiated solely for sex selection (c). They remain a concern whenever sex selection is done for nonmedical reasons. Such use of PGD therefore should not be encouraged.
3 The initiation of IVF with PGD solely for sex selection (d) holds even greater risk of unwarranted gender bias, social harm, and the diversion of medical resources from genuine medical need. It therefore should be discouraged.
4 Ethical caution regarding PGD for sex selection calls for study of the consequences of this practice. Such study should include cross‐cultural as well as intracultural patterns, ongoing assessment of competing claims for medical resources, and reasonable efforts to discern changes in the level of social responsibility and respect for future generations.
10 Sex Selection and Preimplantation Diagnosis: A Response to the Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine
Julian Savulescu and Edgar Dahl
Introduction
In its recent statement ‘Sex Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’, the Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine concluded that it is ethically appropriate to employ these new reproductive technologies to avoid the birth of children suffering from X‐linked genetic disorders (Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, 1999 [see chapter 9 in this volume]). However, to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis and sex selection solely for non‐medical reasons, the Committee claims, is morally inappropriate. The Committee ‘does not favour its legal prohibition’, but it strongly advises that sex selection and preimplantation genetic diagnosis for non‐medical reasons ‘should be discouraged’.
Why does the Ethics Committee think that sex selection and preimplantation genetic diagnosis for non‐medical reasons is ethically inappropriate and ought to be discouraged? Although the Committee acknowledges that individuals enjoy procreative liberty and that ‘serious reasons must be provided if a limitation on reproductive freedom is to be justified’, it claims that the social risks of sex selection outweigh the social benefits. What are these ‘social risks’ supposed to be?
The reservation against sex selection for non‐medical reasons is often based on the assumption that it will invariably lead to a serious distortion of the sex ratio. The Committee has certainly been wise not to rely on this highly speculative objection. According to the available empirical evidence, individuals in Western societies do not have a preference for a particular sex. Most couples still wish to leave the sex of their children ‘up to fate’. And those few who would want some control over the gender of their children desire to have a ‘balanced family’, that is a family with both daughters and sons, most often one daughter and one son (Statham et al., 1993).
While sex selection in the West is unlikely to disturb the sex ratio (Simpson and Carson, 1999), more openly available sex selection would further distort the sex ratio in Asia. The male to female ratio is nearly 1.2 in China and some parts of India. In 1990, there were 100 million women ‘missing’ as a result of various forms of discrimination (Benagiano and Bianchi, 1999). But some have argued that disturbed sex ratios may not be detrimental to women. Advantages which have been postulated include increase in influence of the rarer gender, reduced population growth and interbreeding of different populations (Sureau, 1999). In a practical sense, sex selection employing preimplantation genetic diagnosis may be preferable to the alternatives. It would be morally preferable to many people to termination of ‘wrong sex’ pregnancies or female infanticide (Sureau, 1999) and is preferable to increasing population burdens in an attempt to have a child of the desired sex (Simpson and Carson, 1999).
The Committee also does not base its reservation about sex selection on vague ‘slippery slope’ arguments. The Committee is well aware that it is perfectly possible to draw a legal line between the selection for sex and the selection for other characteristics, such as eye colour, height or intelligence. Thus, if there is consensus that selection for sex is morally acceptable but selection for, let us say, intelligence is not, professional
