Adam Smith expected consumers to make rational choices with an eye on their wellbeing, long production chains made such impossible. Globalization became like a smoke screen instead of a facilitator of the enlightened selfishness that Smith and others had in mind. There also existed a widening chasm between the capacity of scientists to find solutions for challenges, like environmental degradation, and the extent to which they were implemented. Hence, for all the technological possibilities, pollution increased, precious resources were exhausted in more precarious environments, and hundreds of millions of citizens still suffered from famine. These were in a way good times, but certainly not the best of times, and for many they were still just bad times.
A last theme is the limit of learning. One of the most interesting observations of the post-Cold War period is that many of the challenges were identified at an early stage, that experts described them in their publications, that governments promised to respond, but that the response was often slow or absent altogether. There was unprecedented information about problems. Yet, action remained underwhelming or mechanical.10 This had been the case with reports about the erosion of society in the West, the neglect of education, low civic engagement, and destabilizing inequality. It had been the case with studies about the dangers of excessive speculation and the ignoring of investment in key infrastructure. It had been the case also about foreign policy objectives, the fact that the West was making dictators rich only to find them more opposed to Western values. Consider the insight that global warming would cause insecurity and that polluting consumerism was as detrimental to the environment as it was to the strength of Western economies in the long run. There was knowledge, but societies were reluctant to let it shape their decisions. There was light, but societies often seemed to prefer to remain oblivious. So, in the end, there was not much enlightenment.
Is this excessive, to capture eight themes in one book? Some of my reviewers indeed suggested that I narrow the focus. It is a deliberate choice not to do so. Yes, it makes the reading less straightforward. But do the growing polarization in political debates, the difficulty of dealing with complex situations, and the struggle to grasp the causes of our challenges without one-sidely putting the blame on others all show the need for students, opinion leaders, and decision makers to accept that things are not always black and white? The world is an overwhelming place. Nothing is evident. The aim should be to provide clarity without losing sight of complexity.
Gray zone
This book is a history of recent world politics. I wrote it in the first place as a provocation for my students. Such a project always comes with the following question: What might it be important for them to ponder? What is relevant for the diplomats, journalists, entrepreneurs, activists, and politicians of tomorrow to understand about world politics? What is world politics in the first place? Events, some would argue, big, headline-hitting events that shape the outlook of our world, like major wars and large diplomatic conferences. This book certainly pays attention to decisive events, like the fall of the Soviet Union, the terrorist attack against the United States in 2001, and so forth. But at least as important, as was stated before, are incremental changes. Economic change, for instance, which alters the balance of power between countries, changes in consumer choices, which affect the organization of an economy, the productivity of countries, and the allocation of financial wealth. Hence, this work wants to familiarize the reader with the milestones of recent world politics, but also to tell something about the road in between.
A history of world politics cannot be about external politics alone. Some theorists insist on a clear separation between external and internal politics. Kenneth Waltz, an influential thinker about international relations, stated that it is not domestic politics that shapes the behavior of states, but the world system.11 Whatever the culture, the values, or the constitution of states, he argues, they are forced by the behavior of others to defend their interests. This argument is similar to what I refer to in this book as the school of strife. Russia in the 1990s, for instance, had an interest in replacing the antagonistic policy toward the West with a policy of accommodation and integration. Yet, distrust and a lack of interest on the side of the West, combined with latent nationalism, forced it back to battle modus. The same happened to China. Still, instead of seeing the world as an engine, controlled by mechanical laws, it is indispensable to examine the internal dynamics that help understand why some countries grow their power and why others lose it, what mediates their response to external challenges, in terms of institutions, values, public expectations, and so forth. It adds nuance and clarifies why the seemingly predictable mechanics of certain thinkers does not always work out so predictably.
A study of world politics must give a place to non-state actors: to cities, companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and opposition movements. States remain immensely powerful actors, but the understanding of their interaction with large companies and international organizations is critical. In the next chapters, for instance, we will discover how Western multinational companies detached from their home market, how they still influenced politicians to adjust their foreign policy regarding international economics, and how this contributed to the altering balance of power between countries. But we also explore how countries like China and Russia clung to state capitalism. They forced large domestic companies to serve the national interest and twisted the arm of Western investors to do the same. Hence, the same large companies that influenced the government in one country were influenced by the government in another country.
This instantly explains why experts have remained trapped in an unproductive debate about who influences whom.12 Influence went in both directions. The one country whose prosperity led it to ignore economic security allowed itself to be influenced by the multinational. The other state whose vulnerability made it put economic security upfront, insisted on preserving influence over the multinational. The same ambivalence applies to international organizations, like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the World Health Organization.13 While they have some autonomy with regard to states, and states sometimes find multilateral cooperation a relevant way to shore up their legitimacy in the world, these organizations atrophy when powerful states are no longer capable of brokering a mutually beneficial compromise through them. Multilateralism remains power politics by different means.
When Russia gained control over the Crimean Peninsula and staged a proxy war in Eastern Ukraine, newspapers and military staffs suddenly underlined the importance of gray zone conflict or hybrid war.14 Both concepts imply that states confront each other just below the threshold of a full-blown war. An American general summarized the challenge thus: “We can still win any war, but we have difficulties with anything short of war.”15 In this book, it becomes clear that world politics is always a gray zone. The difference between civilian and military actors is seldom clear. China built merchant ships sturdy enough to carry tanks and used small fishing boats to assert territorial claims. There were many examples of states going guerrilla. Iran supported proxies throughout the region and let them launch missiles against adversaries. Russia paid Afghani fighters to kill American soldiers. China’s inducing of foreign companies to give up technological secrets was a very effective way to alter the balance of power and also to make its military stronger. Hybrid and gray are intrinsic to world politics. But, because of technology, the possibilities of information warfare exploded.
Hybrid wars relate to information wars.16 A clear example of information war concerns the Russian interference with the American elections in 2016. Moscow used social media to spread fake news and to support its favored presidential candidate. But information wars were often more subtle. Authoritarian regimes from the Gulf conducted a permanent campaign against Western societies in order to be seen as trustworthy partners. In international meetings, like the World Economic Forum, they smoothly intermingled with leaders from the West. Through sponsorship of sports clubs, “Emirates” and “Qatar” became brand names. China first pursued a refined public diplomacy to showcase its peaceful intentions and went on to propagate a modern variant of the romantic ideal of the old Silk Road. During the corona pandemic, it tried to profile itself as a savior to other countries.
The battle for hearts
