but which reifies and naturalizes the human perspective of things as the only correct one.7 7 Alva Noë, introducing his highly convincing critique of this view, formulates as the doctrinal consensus of most neuroscientists the claim that ‘for every experience there is a neural structure or substrate whose activation is sufficient for the experience’ and therefore ‘experience supervenes on the brain’ (2006: 209). He goes on to show how this view is produced by an unwarranted shift from claiming that experience as a whole is partially dependent on the brain as a whole.
8 8 This is reflected in Aristotle’s theory of change, which is the actualization of a potentiality a thing has in itself that comes about as a result of a contact with an agent of change (Physics III, A201a9–202a13). Consequently, ‘only in a fixed thing-like substratum, which must first be given, can the logical and grammatical varieties of being in general find their ground and real application … The category of relation especially is forced into a dependent and subordinate position by this fundamental metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle’ (Cassirer 1953: 8). While Cassirer (as well as many others) has gone on to point out the incompatibility of this view with modern mathematics and natural science (1953: 36ff.), the Aristotelian view has proved to be remarkably resilient. Thus, Graham Harman, for example, formulates the ‘Rule No. 1’ of his ontology as ‘Things pre-exist their activity rather than being created by it’ (2016: 114).
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