The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26. Livy

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and six hundred horse: such of you as give in your names to-day and to-morrow, I will carry with me. I am more solicitous to bring home all my soldiers rich, than to employ a great multitude." Accordingly, with a competent number of men, who possessed greater hopes and confidence because a numerous army had not been required, he marched to the town of Aharna, from which the enemy were not far distant, and proceeded to the camp of the praetor Appius. When within a few miles of it, he was met by some soldiers, sent to cut wood, attended by a guard. Observing the lictors preceding him, and learning that he was Fabius the consul, they were filled with joy and alacrity; they expressed their thanks to the gods, and to the Roman people, for having sent them such a commander. Then as they gathered round to pay their respects, Fabius inquired whither they were going, and on their answering they were going to provide wood, "What do you tell me," said he, "have you not a rampart, raised about your camp?" When to this they replied, "they had a double rampart, and a trench, and, notwithstanding, were in great apprehension."

      "Well then," said he, "you have abundance of wood, go back and level the rampart." They accordingly returned to the camp and there levelling the rampart threw the soldiers who had remained in it, and Appius himself, into the greatest fright, until with eager joy each called out to the rest, that, "they acted by order of the consul, Quintus Fabius." Next day the camp was moved from thence, and the praetor, Appius, was dismissed to Rome. From that time the Romans had no fixed post, the consul affirming, that it was prejudicial to an army to lie in one spot, and that by frequent marches, and changing places, it was rendered more healthy, and more capable of brisk exertions, and marches were made as long as the winter, which was not yet ended, permitted. Then, in the beginning of spring, leaving the second legion near Clusium, which they formerly called the Camertian, and giving the command of the camp to Lucius Scipio, as propraetor, he returned to Rome, in order to adjust measures for carrying on the war, either led thereto by his own judgment, because the war seemed to him more serious than he had believed, from report, or, being summoned by a decree of the senate, for writers give both accounts. Some choose to have it believed, that he was forced back by the praetor, Appius Claudius, who, both in the senate, and before the people, exaggerated, as he was wont in all his letters, the danger of the Etrurian war, contending, that "one general, or one army, would not be sufficient to oppose four nations. That whether these directed the whole of their combined force against him alone, or acted separately in different parts, there was reason to fear, that he would be unable to provide against every emergency. That he had left there but two Roman legions; and that the foot and horse, who came with Fabius, did not amount to five thousand. It was, therefore, his opinion, that the consul, Publius Decius should, without delay, set out to his colleague in Etruria, and that the province of Samnium should be given to Lucius Volumnius. But if the consul preferred going to his own province, that then Volumnius should march a full consular army into Etruria, to join the other consul." When the advice of the praetor influenced a great part of the members, they say that Publius Decius recommended that every thing should be kept undetermined, and open for Quintus Fabius; until he should either come to Rome, if he could do so without prejudice to the public, or send some of his lieutenants, from whom the senate might learn the real state of the war in Etruria; and with what number of troops, and by how many generals, it should be carried on.

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      Fabius, as soon as he returned to Rome, qualified his discourses, both in the senate and when brought before the people, in such a manner as to appear neither to exaggerate or lessen, any particular relating to the war; and to show, that, in agreeing to another general being joined with him, he rather indulged the apprehensions of others, than guarded against any danger to himself, or the public. "But if they chose," he said, "to give him an assistant in the war, and associate in command, how could he overlook Publius Decius the consul, whom he had tried during so many associations in office? There was no man living whom he would rather wish to be joined in commission with him: with Publius Decius he should have forces sufficient, and never too many enemies. If, however, his colleague preferred any other employment, let them then give him Lucius Volumnius as an assistant." The disposal of every particular was left entirely to Fabius by the people and the senate, and even by his colleague. And when Decius declared that he was ready to go either to Etruria or Samnium, such general congratulation and satisfaction took place, that victory was anticipated, and it seemed as if a triumph, not a war, had been decreed to the consuls. I find in some writers, that Fabius and Decius, immediately on their entering into office, set out together for Etruria, without any mention of the casting of lots for the provinces, or of the disputes which I have related. Others, not satisfied with relating those disputes, have added charges of misconduct, laid by Appius before the people against Fabius, when absent; and a stubborn opposition, maintained by the praetor against the consul, when present; and also another contention between the colleagues, Decius insisting that each consul should attend to the care of his own separate province. Certainty, however, begins to appear from the time when both consuls set out for the campaign. Now, before the consuls arrived in Etruria, the Senonian Gauls came in a vast body to Clusium, to attack the Roman legion and the camp. Scipio, who commanded the camp, wishing to remedy the deficiency of his numbers by an advantage in the ground, led his men up a hill, which stood between the camp and the city but having, in his haste, neglected to examine the place, he reached near the summit, which he found already possessed by the enemy, who had ascended on the other side. The legion was consequently attacked on the rear, and surrounded in the middle, when the enemy pressed it on all sides. Some writers say, that the whole were cut off, so that not one survived to give an account of it, and that no information of the misfortune reached the consuls, who were, at the time, not far from Clusium, until the Gallic horsemen came within sight, carrying the heads of the slain, some hanging before their horses' breasts, others on the points of their spears, and expressing their triumph in songs according to their custom. Others affirm, that the defeat was by Umbrians, not Gauls, and that the loss sustained was not so great. That a party of foragers, under Lucius Manlius Torquatus, lieutenant-general, being surrounded, Scipio, the propraetor, brought up relief from the camp, and the battle being renewed, that the Umbrians, lately victorious, were defeated, and the prisoners and spoil retaken. But it is more probable that this blow was suffered from a Gallic than an Umbrian enemy, because during that year, as was often the case at other times, the danger principally apprehended by the public, was that of a Gallic tumult, for which reason, notwithstanding that both the consuls had marched against the enemy, with four legions, and a large body of Roman cavalry, joined by a thousand chosen horsemen of Campania, supplied on the occasion, and a body of the allies and Latin confederates, superior in number to the Romans, two other armies were posted near the city, on the side facing Etruria, one in the Faliscian, the other in the Vatican territory. Cneius Fulvius and Lucius Postumius Megellus, both propraetors, were ordered to keep the troops stationed in those places.

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      The consuls, having crossed the Apennines, came up with the enemy in the territory of Sentinum, their camp was pitched there at the distance of about four miles. Several councils were then held by the enemy, and their plan of operations was thus settled: that they should not encamp together, nor go out together to battle; the Gauls were united to the Samnites, the Umbrians to the Etrurians. The day of battle was fixed. The part of maintaining the fight was committed to the Samnites and Gauls; and the Etrurians and Umbrians were ordered to attack the Roman camp during the heat of the engagement. This plan was frustrated by three Clusian deserters, who came over by night to Fabius, and after disclosing the above designs, were sent back with presents, in order that they might discover, and bring intelligence of, any new scheme which should be determined on. The consuls then wrote to Flavius and Postumius to move their armies, the one from the Faliscian, the other from the Vatican country, towards Clusium; and to ruin the enemy's territory by every means in their power. The news of these depredations drew the Etrurians from Sentinum to protect their own region. The consuls, in their absence, practised every means to bring on an engagement. For two days they endeavoured, by several attacks, to provoke the enemy to fight; in which time, however, nothing worth mention was performed. A few fell on each side, but still the minds [of the Romans] were irritated to wish for a general engagement; yet nothing decisive was hazarded. On the third day,

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