effective in realizing the objectives above.
Both sides evaluated the result of the meet differently. The USSR won in the total score (172-170), while for the United States it was the men’s competition (in which it won) that mattered. As a result, each of the sides perceived themselves as winners.88 The same scheme was also present during future exchanges. Both the United States and the USSR were trying to use them diplomatically in two ways—as a tool of exposing the possibility to cooperate and as a means of presenting their superiority in sport. This paradox could be observed already when the track and field exchanges were negotiated.
In the years that followed Soviet-American track and field meets were held annually, alternately in the USSR and the United States. An event in Stanford in July 1962, when 153,000 tickets were sold for a two-day competition, is described as one of the most meaningful.89 Such a significant interest in the exchange was resulting from the popularity of the sport. It should be remembered that unlike today, international sports contacts were much more limited in the 1950s and 1960s, and any chance to see Americans competing with the Soviets was awaking interest.
The series of annual track and field meets lasted until 1966 despite political tensions, such as the Berlin Crisis or the Cuban Crisis. In response to the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw from the event in Los Angeles in 1966. The decision, described as a spontaneous demonstration of Soviet athletes against American policy, was announced two weeks before the event.90 The revival of track and field exchanges was not simple since AAU demanded compensation for the canceled meet. An agreement was reached during the Olympics in Mexico City when the Soviet side agreed to compensate AAU’s loss.91
The second stage of the dual meets lasted between 1969 and 1985. In this period exchanges were expanded with indoor, youth and all-around competitions. At the time, the popularity of professional track and field was raising, while the popularity of team meets was diminishing. What is more, the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) attempted to organize world championships (first such event was held in 1977). All this led to lowering the level of US-USSR dual meets and its political significance. It was also difficult to arrange dates of the meets because of the increasing number of other international track and field events—for that reason a meet in 1979 was canceled. The next meets were organized in 1981, 1982, and 1985, although the last one was, in fact, a tripartite competition held in Japan with separate US-USSR scoring.92 The diplomatic significance of the track and field exchanges was gradually diminishing and eventually abandoned.
American-Soviet bilateral track and field exchanges have all the hallmarks of positive sports diplomacy as a tool of realizing states’ foreign policy goals, which in this case was about mutual opening between the Cold War superpowers. Particularly in its first stage, it might be assessed as having positive effects, even though there were some controversies and protests and that one of the objectives of both sides was to defeat the rival.93 Such a dichotomy of goals was characteristic of the Soviet-American sports exchanges. They were supposed to show the societies that peace and dialogue were possible, but at the same time, both sides did not resign from ideological rivalry. Exchanges were not capable of overcoming political crises, but at times they were held despite such odds.
Basketball Exchanges
American-Soviet sports diplomacy directed at mutual rapprochement was also conducted through exchanges in basketball, a sport popular in both countries. The possibility of establishing such exchanges was discussed since the Olympic Games in Helsinki in 1952.94 They were eventually sanctioned by the Cultural Agreement in 1958. Just as in track and field, from the American side, they were negotiated by AAU despite being financed by the Department of State.95 The first exchange was held in the Soviet Union in 1958. Americans played six matches in Moscow, Tbilisi, and Leningrad. Soviet fans were reported to have created a great atmosphere, particularly during the first two matches in Moscow. The US team managed to win all of the games, although two of them against the Soviet national team and one against a team of Leningrad were very even.96 The further exchanges were supposed to be held in the United States and the USSR alternately.
Contrary to track and field meets in their first stage, the schedule of annual basketball exchanges was not kept very strictly. The second series of matches was held in 1960. The Soviet national team played six matches against the best teams of the NIBL league (a member of the AAU).97 The USSR won four out of six games. Americans claimed these results were insignificant, whereas the Soviet Union attempted to use them as proof of their superiority.98
Even though basketball was very popular in both countries, the series of matches did not receive particular attention in the United States, particularly in the early years. Despite that, there was a considerable political significance attached to them, particularly in the Soviet Union where victories in this typically American sport were appreciated. For this purpose, a program of development of basketball was initiated to create a strong and successful national team.99 From this perspective, the attitude of the American side might be surprising.
Subsequent basketball series were held in the following years. In 1962 Soviet team visited the United States and won two out of six games. Because of organizational issues, the United States was represented by weaker teams, leading to an even lesser interest in the matches by local fans. At the same time, Americans indicated numerous reasons for their losses,100 which was typical for the Cold War sports rivalry: victories were supposed to be proofs for national superiority, while losses were caused by external factors.
Cultural exchanges between the United States and the USSR were disrupted as a result of the Cuban crisis. A basketball series to be held in the United States was canceled. It was claimed that the series might upset American society, lead to protests and violence, and that continuation of exchanges would increase the tensions instead of defusing them. Still, both sides negotiated the continuation of exchanges since both John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev believed that culture provided a bridge to understanding even at the most turbulent moments in the Cold War.101 Basketball exchanges were resumed, but in general, they were more sensitive to political crises and tensions comparing to track and field exchanges.
In the initial period of basketball exchanges, Americans often failed to put their best players against the Soviet national team. This attitude has changed after the controversial loss to the USSR in the Olympic final in Munich in 1972. In the United States it was regarded as a national tragedy. As a result, there was a substantial increase in interest in the friendly series with the Soviet Union. The ticket sales for the matches increased, similarly as the media attention.102 In contrast to earlier exchanges, the American team was composed of decent players from the NCAA league. In total, 17,500 spectators watched the opening match in Los Angeles.103 The massive change of the US attitude after the dramatic loss in Munich could, therefore, be observed both in the general interest in the exchange and in the quality of the players selected to participate in the series.
The 1973 series in the United States was very even, while individual games were ruthless and full of fouls. The whole series was won by Americans 4-2 and is assessed as one of the most meaningful. It is claimed that American players were more interested in winning on the court than sustaining the spirit of détente. On the other hand, as Kevin Witherspoon observed, players from both countries had the opportunity to meet and despite the rough play, they had respect for the others. In most of their comments, they spoke about the goodwill within the games. Such a dichotomy of emotions was also conveyed by the media.104
The era of détente in the 1970s generally brought an intensification of American-Soviet exchanges. For example, a visit by Richard Nixon to Moscow in 1972 was preceded by a display tour of Soviet gymnasts including Olga Korbut and Ludmilla Tourischeva in the United States. In the same year, the USA-USSR Treaty on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation was signed in Moscow with a clause on sports exchanges (Article
