and were allowed to proceed unhindered. About an hour later, police arrested a man at the railway station next to the field, and part of the crowd responded by stoning the police. The police countered with pressure hoses but were met with a hail of stones, which drove them back from the field. Outfitting themselves with steel helmets, the police drew their batons and charged. The melee ended when Canon Maguire left the platform and called for peace. He was sprayed by water cannons. The RUC later issued a statement that they were simply enforcing an order prohibiting processions.
Around this time, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh moved into the IRA leadership. In June 1955, the IRA convention met at a hall in Parnell Square, Dublin. The delegates were enthusiastic. Arms raids had raised the IRA’S profile. The votes for Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland were amazing. The Clarke and Mitchell elections showed the hypocritical nature of democracy in Northern Ireland and demonstrated a large amount of support for the Republican cause. The local elections in the Twenty-Six Counties showed that Sinn Féin had a smaller but still significant constituency there. The movement was building itself into something formidable. At least it seemed that way to the delegates. The leadership had recognized Ó Brádaigh’s commitment and his competence, and as a complement to his responsibilities as a training officer in Roscommon he had been attached to IRA general headquarters as a staff officer. At the convention, he was elected to the IRA’S Executive. He was also placed in charge of an IRA raid in Britain.
In late 1954, Frank Skuse, who was from West Cork, was serving with the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers of the British Army. He sent word to the IRA that he was willing to help arrange a raid. Tony Magan turned the case over to Charlie Murphy, who visited Skuse in Wales. They determined that a raid in Wales was not feasible, but when Skuse was transferred to Arborfield, which is not far from London, Murphy paid him another visit and began planning a raid. Because of problems with previous raids in Britain, Magan bypassed IRA members in London and created a special seven-man team. Murphy, who was a logical choice to lead the raid, was deemed too valuable to risk. Magan, recognizing his talents, selected Ó Brádaigh as the commanding officer for the special operation.
Ó Brádaigh was briefed by Magan and Murphy, and in July he traveled to London and met with Skuse. Skuse, who was serving at a British base at Blandford, arranged for Ó Brádaigh and himself to tour the Arborfield base, posing as off-duty members of the British Army. When he first met Ó Brádaigh, Skuse was disappointed. Murphy was outgoing, flamboyant. Ó Brádaigh was quiet, reserved. He was also a potential security problem; Ó Brádaigh laughed too much, thought Skuse. During the initial tour of Arborfield they came across Irish Army officers in uniform who were attending a training school. Ó Brádaigh joked that they would get credit for the raid, prompting Skuse to caution him. Yet over the next several weeks, he found Ó Brádaigh’s sense of humor contagious and learned that he was a meticulous soldier and someone he could trust. Ó Brádaigh carefully checked every detail of the camp, every routinethe times of local pubs, the soldiers’ drinking habits, the local bus schedules, the names and times of films at local theaters, and so forth.
Back in Dublin, Ó Brádaigh organized a special training course for those involved in the raid. Maps, drawings, and photographs were pored over. Nothing was taken for granted. As far as he was concerned, there was no such thing as a dumb question, from him or anyone else. Each volunteer was given detailed instructions on how to travel to England, how they would meet up, and what they would do on the raid. A group of them traveled to England in early August to make final arrangements. They rented a dilapidated shop in London; the arms were to be stored there and later shipped to Ireland. Ó Brádaigh and a few others familiarized themselves with the roads by driving from the shop to Arborfield and back several times. On one trip, they gave hitchhiking British soldiers a lift to the barracks. Discreetly, they asked the soldiers questions about their surroundings. On Thursday, August 11, 1955, the rest of the raiding party arrived and registered in a London hotel.
The raiders had detailed information on Arborfield, to the point that they knew the numbers of the keys for the armory and the magazine. In discussing the plans with Magan, Ó Brádaigh asked what he should do if the keys were not where they were supposed to be. Magan told him to get a “jemmy" and go straight into the lock. On the morning of the 12th, Ó Brádaigh visited a tool shop in North London. He picked up various instruments for the raid, including a hacksaw and spare blades, and asked the man behind the counter for a jemmy. Picking up on Ó Brádaigh’s accent, the shopkeeper was amused. He laughed and turned to his apprentice, saying, “Paddy wants a jemmy.” Ó Brádaigh replied that he needed it for “bursting bales or opening wooden containers, that type of thing.” “Ah,” the shopkeeper replied, “what you want is a case opener.”“Yes,” Ó Brádaigh agreed, he wanted a case opener. The shopkeeper produced two, one big, one small, and asked, “Which of them, now?" Ó Brádaigh pointed to the big one. “Ah,” said the shopkeeper, “I thought so.” He wrapped it up in paper, looked at Ó Brádaigh and, performing for his apprentice, said, “Now, you catch it like this and you bonk him over the head like that.” Ó Brádaigh ignored the quip and gathered up his purchases. When he got to the case opener, he slid it up the sleeve of his sports coat. The shopkeeper commented, “Ah, see where Paddy hides his jernmy.” At this Ó Brádaigh laughed along with him, bade him farewell, and left the shop. Outside, he said to himself, “That was bad.” Undeterred, he went on and hired two vans and a car for the raid. Aware of what could happen, he also found time to go to confession.
Early in the morning of Saturday, August 13th, the IRA team, including Frank Skuse, traveled from London in two large vans and a car, arriving on the outskirts of Arborfield. The raid was scheduled to begin at 2: 10 AM, just after the sentries were changed. The driver in each van had instructions to enter the barracks at a prearranged time. The car was parked nearby. Six members of the team walked to the barracks entrance. 6 BrQdaigh and two others, one in uniform, led the way. The sentry, assuming they were soldiers returning from a night out, said “Right" as he left his box and lifted a barrier for them. “Right,” they replied as they passed under. Inside the camp, the guardroom was on the left, the armory on the right. They went straight to the guardroom. As they entered, guns drawn, a second group of IRA men reached the barrier, grabbed the sentry, and dragged him into the guardroom. A Dublin volunteer in British uniform took the sentry’s place. They had less than two hours to complete their work-a patrol check and a new sentry were due to arrive at the guardroom at 4 AM.
In the guardroom, the sergeant jumped up from his table to the words, “Get up your hands.” He and the sentry were spread-eagled against a wall. IRA men moved into the sleeping quarters of the guardroom, awakened the soldiers, and hustled them into the largest room in the complex. Just to be sure, they searched toilets and the area behind the building. The sergeant, who was responsible for camp security, was bound and gagged and held in a separate room. Two volunteers sought out the duty clerk in charge of the telephone exchange. He awoke with the question, “Who sent you?” They put him in handcuffs. In all, the IRA captured nineteen soldiers. Each was bound at the hands and the ankles and then they were all bound together and gagged. As this was happening, the vans were driven past the IRA sentry and backed up to the armory.
As feared, the keys to the magazine and armory could not be found. They forced the doors with the case opener. At 2:50 AM, they began loading the first van with literally tons of guns and ammunition; its springs sagged from the weight. Ó Brádaigh was concerned, but about 3: 15 AM he sent it off to London. A half an hour later, the second van was on its way. In the two vans were 55 Sten guns, 10 Bren guns, more than 75,000 rounds of ammunition, selected weapons and magazines, and one pistol. To provide more time for the vans, two IRA men in British Army uniform were left behind. When the patrol and new sentry arrived at 4 AM they were captured at gunpoint, bound, and gagged. This done, the two volunteers sped off for London in the rented car. Six hundred soldiers slept through the raid. The alarm was finally raised by the sergeant, who wiggled himself loose, hopped across the road, and banged his head on the door of the regimental sergeant-major.
Probably at about the time the sergeant-major sounded the alarm, the first van was being pulled over. They were traveling too fast, and they caught
