Dublin unit. They organized themselves, linked up with other dissidents, and in November 1956 they began their own campaign by blowing up five unmanned customs huts along the Northern IrelandIRepublic of Ireland border. They burned a sixth hut to the ground.
This adventure had no attraction for Ó Brádaigh. Many of Christle’s followers were recent recruits who had been attracted by the arms raids. Ó Brádaigh, in contrast, had been in the IRA for five years; had been a delegate at conventions in 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956; and was in the leadership. Christle was impatient. Ó Brádaigh is careful and meticulous. Some of those who went with Christle were “young turks,” full of energy and, to a degree, themselves. Ó Brádaigh was the opposite. On the Army Council he was surrounded by men who had been in the leadership for decades. He was so full of trepidation that he did not even speak at his first two council meetings. Magan, Mac Curtiin, and Grogan, and McLogan in Sinn FCin were building for a military campaign. As veterans of previous campaigns, he knew, they wanted a successfil military campaign. It was a question of when, not if. The Christle crowd, less cautious, seemed most interested in simply having a go at the British.
But Christle’s activities put pressure on Magan and the Army Council. More defections were likely, and when the Dublin authorities went after Christle they would also go after Sinn FCin and the IRA. They decided to skip the passive resistance phase and begin a campaign in December 1956. It has been asserted that Belfast was excluded from the campaign because the leadership feared that including it would lead to sectarian conflict. In truth, Belfast was excluded because Paddy Doyle, an Army Council member and the Belfast commanding officer, had been arrested, which created disorganization there. Four flying columns, mobile groups of IRA volunteers modeled on the guerrilla columns of the 1920s IRA that operated in the countryside for extended periods, would be sent north. The columns, operating along Northern Ireland’s 240-mile border with the Irish Republic, were named for Irish patriots: Patrick Pearse, Liam Lynch, Bartholomew Teeling, and Tom Clarke. Under Cronin’s original Operation Harvest plan, each column would have twenty-five members. The columns were cut to fifteen members, armed with Bren light machine guns, rifles, Thompson machine guns, and pistols but no heavy gear such as bazookas or mortars. Gelignite was the primary source of explosives. The columns were supposed to link with local IRA units and attack high-priority targets, including police stations and British Army barracks. Local units were also to pursue their own-mainly sabotageoperations. It was hoped that a quick start would bring new recruits and the campaign would expand in quality and quantity. To fill the columns, the leadership drew on the best members of the various units available. Following the rules of the Geneva Convention, members of the flying columns dressed in uniform-a mix of British, U.S., and Irish fatigues- and wore black berets. On their shoulders they sewed tricolor patches (flashes) indicating they were soldiers in the Irish Republican Army.
On the night of December 11–12, 1956, the campaign began with a bang. Bridges were blown up and shots were exchanged with RUC patrols. In Magherafelt, a courthouse was bombed. In Derry, a BBC transmitter was blown up. In Armagh, Gough Military Barracks was attacked and there was a gun battle. On the 14th, police stations in Lisnaskea and Derrylin were attacked. A Sinn Féin manifesto was released: “Irishmen have again risen in revolt against British aggression in Ireland.” Early estimates were that 150 IRA volunteers were involved in the various assaults.
The Stormont government immediately authorized internment, the arrest and detention without trial of persons suspected of involvement in the campaign. British Army troops were rushed to Enniskillen from Ballykinlar Camp in County Down and ordered to stand ready for action against the IRA. British Army engineers destroyed bridges crossing the border and rendered side roads impassable with spikes, barriers, and obstructions. The next day, police rounded up thirty Republicans from across the north, including Sinn Féin activists. In the last week of December 1956, the northern government banned Sinn Ftin, making the party an illegal organization. Belfast Sinn Féin headquarters were raided, equipment was confiscated, and Sinn Ftiners were interned. In the south, Costello’s cabinet met and released a statement that the guerrilla activity might lead to civil war. Irish police and army personnel arrested and questioned suspected IRA activists along the border but released them for lack of evidence. Toward the end of the month, Costello urged Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, to allow Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic, which would end the guerrilla attacks.
Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, an Army Council member and a general headquarters staff officer charged with raising and training the Teeling Column in the West of Ireland, missed the opening of the campaign because he was teaching in Roscommon. Tony Magan instructed him to help organize supplies for the columns but to remain at his job until the Christmas holiday, which began on December 20th. After that, he was available full-time. As his students left for vacation, Ó Brádaigh “gathered up selected people from the West, and moved up" to South Fermanagh, just below the lakes. He joined the Teeling Column as second-in-command to Noel Kavanagh, the commanding officer.
5
Derrylin, Mountjoy and Teachta Dála
DECEMBER 1956—MARCH 1957
IN LATE DECEMBER 1956, Noel Kavanagh brought together the Teeling Column, including Ó Brádaigh’s section and Charlie Murphy, who was down from Dublin. Bases had been established, and the column spent the nights of December 28th and December 29th in the field, planning their next move. Kavanagh decided to attack the RUC barracks in Derrylin in South Fermanagh. It would be a return visit; the smaller column had attacked the barracks on December 14th. With the addition of Ó Brádaigh’s section, Kavanagh hoped that the barracks could be destroyed.
On Sunday night, December 30th, Kavanagh arranged for a local IRA unit to block the roads into Derrylin, which would slow down RUC reinforcements. The column traveled on foot into the village and split into two groups, a cover party and an assault team. Ó Brádaigh, who was in charge of the cover party, had a Bren light machine gun. The volunteers with him were armed with Lee-Enfield rifles captured from the British Army in the raid on Armagh military barracks in June 1954. Kavanagh was in charge of the assault team. Seven RUC men were inside the barracks.
The barracks sat on ground about five feet higher than the road that fronted it. Along its sides and in back were trees and thick vegetation. The cover party set up on a grass margin of the road and took cover behind the trees growing through a boundary fence between the road and the barracks. The assault team crept up to the barracks. At about 10:20 in the evening, the RUC men were sitting around the fire listening to the Radio Éireann news bulletin when Ó Brádaigh’s group opened fire, shooting through the windows and front door. Constable John Scally was hit in the back in the first burst of fire. He suddenly stood up and fell to the floor, groaning. Shots poured into the door and windows of the station as RUC men ran to help Scally or get up the stairs to see what was going on.
There was a brief lull, and the IRA called for those inside to surrender. The RUC men responded by returning fire through the second-floor windows. In front of the boundary fence was a shallow furrow filled with water. The return fire hit the water, which splashed Ó Brádaigh on the forehead. It was his first time under fire and his immediate thought was, “That bastard’s shooting at me!” He and the rest of the cover party kept firing; the shooting waxed and waned as volunteers moved about, reloaded, and fired.
Kavanagh and Pat McGirl (no relation to John Joe McGirl) placed a homemade mine-a sack filled with gelignite-against the door of the barracks. While McGirl prepared the fuse, Kavanagh ran on and shot out the front light with his Thompson machine gun. He then heard the radio room above him. One of the constables, Cecil Ferguson, was calling for help. Kavanagh tossed a grenade through the second-story window and went back for another mine. The grenade went off, destroying the radio and blowing debris back out the window. The cover party continued firing. Kavanagh arrived with a second mine as McGirl lit the
